Lorraine Sukhu v. Hiarrow and Wayne Kreklewich, 2013 HRTO 1538

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Lorraine Sukhu

Applicant

-and-

Hiarrow and Wayne Kreklewich

Respondents

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: September 13, 2013

Citation: 2013 HRTO 1538

Indexed as: Sukhu v. Hiarrow

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Lorraine Sukhu, Applicant

Self-represented

Introduction

1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to employment because of disability and sex.

2In her Application the applicant alleges that she was subject to sexual solicitation at unspecified times in the mid-1990’s. She also makes allegations of inappropriate conduct towards her in 1999 and a wrongful dismissal in May 2000. The applicant filed a statement of claim in Small Claims Court on October 29, 2012, and advises that her claim was dismissed in March 2013. This Application was filed on April 11, 2013. The issues raised in the statement of claim are largely the same as in the Application.

3This Application was dismissed in 2013 HRTO 1380 on the basis that it was plain and obvious that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over Application because it had been filed more than one year after the last incident complained of and there was no good faith explanation for the entire period of 13 years since the last incident complained of.

4The applicant has filed a Request for Reconsideration under section 45.7 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the “Code”).

45.7 (1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.

(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.

5The Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provide that any party may request reconsideration of a decision in accordance with Rule 26.5.

A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:

a. there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

b. the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

c. the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

d. other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

6It is also useful to consider the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration, which states in part:

Decisions of the Tribunal are generally considered final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the Tribunal reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Generally, the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.

Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to repair deficiencies in the presentation of its case.

7Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That is, while the Tribunal has the authority in certain circumstances to reconsider its own decisions, it is not obliged to do so. As is clear from the Code the Tribunal may decide when reconsideration of a Decision is appropriate, both through the making of rules governing the exercise of the discretion and in the determination on a case-by-case basis of how the rules will be applied.

8The applicant relies on all of the threshold factors set out in paragraph 5 above. However, although the applicant has provided further details of her life and medical condition since the events giving rise to this Application in 1999 and 2000, all of what is plead was articulated in her written submissions to the Tribunal.

9I find that the applicant has not met the burden of establishing any of the threshold criteria justifying reconsideration.

10In support of her Request, the applicant essentially repeats arguments previously made before the Tribunal. In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34, the Tribunal held that reconsideration is not an opportunity to re-argue a case. Once the parties have had the opportunity to present their arguments to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has made a decision disposing of the issues raised, parties are entitled to treat the matter as closed, subject to limited exceptions. I find that the submissions in this Request amount to the reiteration of argument on issues already fully canvassed before the Tribunal.

11For these reasons this Request must be dismissed.