Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
Between:
Grant Hutchinson Applicant
-and-
York University Respondent
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Adjudicator: David Muir Date: August 14, 2013 Citation: 2013 HRTO 1395 Indexed as: Hutchinson v. York University
Written Submissions
Grant Hutchinson, Applicant Self-represented
Introduction
1This is an Application filed under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination with respect to contracts because of disability.
2In an Interim Decision 2013 HRTO 1263, I denied a Request for Interim Remedy and a Request for an Expedited Hearing. I also directed that a summary hearing be held to determine whether or not this Application should be dismissed in whole or in part because it had no reasonable prospect of success.
3The applicant has filed a Request for Reconsideration of the Interim Decision. It is not clear what aspect of the Interim Decision is at issue. However the applicant argues that I am biased because I am a graduate of Osgoode Hall Law School. He also argues that the Interim Decision is wrong.
4Rule 26.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provides that a party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal. A decision will only be considered a final decision where the decision has the effect of finally determining the substance of the dispute or a central element of the dispute between the parties. See for example Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Ontario Teachers’ Federation, 1994 CanLII 10578 (ON CTGD), 19 OR (3d) 371.
5In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34, the Tribunal considered at length the question of when a decision should be considered final for the purposes of the reconsideration power. After carefully considering the policy issues and the relevant authorities the Tribunal concluded:
As a general principle, having regard to the approach taken in other forums as well as the above discussion, it is reasonable to view a “final decision” as one that disposes of some or all of the central issues in the complaint as between the parties. This general principle will take on a more precise shape as the Tribunal applies it to cases before it.
6Having considered these cases and the Interim Decision I have concluded that the Decision is not a final one. I find that it does not deprive the applicant of “any prospect of a remedy” as against the respondent and does not dispose of any part of the Application. Not being a final decision, it cannot, at this time, be the subject of a reconsideration request. See Galuego v. Kensington Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 429.
7As regards to the claim of bias, it is entirely without merit. The legal principles to be applied are well-established. De Grandpré J. wrote in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369 at p. 394 that:
. . . the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.
8The applicant relies on the mere fact that I am a graduate of Osgoode Hall Law School. I did undertake a graduate degree at Osgoode Hall Law School and graduated in 2003 I believe. It is not at all clear how a reasonable and right minded person viewing the matter realistically and practically could conclude that I would be biased in favour of York University in this matter. In my view they would not. My association with the Law School was of short duration and many years ago. The applicant has not alleged that I have any close connections to the Law School or the respondent and I have none. In my view the applicant’s claim in this regard is pure speculation and entirely without basis.
9For these reasons the Request for Reconsideration is dismissed.
10I am not seized.
Dated at Toronto, this 14th day of August, 2013.
“Signed by”
David Muir Vice-chair

