HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Courtney Peavoy
Applicant
-and-
TMMC – Toyota Manufacturing Canada
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Sherry Liang
Indexed as: Peavoy v. TMMC -Toyota Manufacturing Canada
1This is an Application filed on January 12, 2012 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”).
2The applicant alleges discrimination in employment, which ended with her resignation on or about December 12, 2010. The Application was filed a year and a month following her resignation.
3By Case Assessment Direction dated January 24, 2012, I directed the applicant to provide submissions on two issues:
The reasons for why the Application was filed more than a year after the events described in it, including any medical evidence in support of those reasons;
The applicant’s request that her name be kept confidential and not part of any public record. I indicated in the CAD that the reasons the applicant provided in her Application do not appear to be a sufficient basis for granting such a request. I also indicated that if the request is not granted, the decision of the Tribunal will be issued in the applicant’s name and will be, as usual with the Tribunal’s decisions, available on legal databases. However, I invited the applicant to provide further submissions on her request.
4With respect to the first issue, the applicant explained in her submissions that after the events giving rise to the Application, she experienced personal changes in her life. She states that said she was trying to cope with stress and depression arising out of the events, which affected other aspects of her life. She states that much of the reason she waited to file the Application was that she had a fear of opening up the thoughts of what happened. She wished to file the Application when she first left the employment of the respondent, but she found it difficult to do without anxiety. The applicant explained that since she left the respondent’s employ, she has had to struggle emotionally, financially and in relocating.
5In support of her submissions, the applicant filed letters from two personal friends. One individual confirmed that the effort of filling out the Application caused the applicant anxiety. The other individual, a former co-worker, states that the applicant has spoken to her about the stress and depression she experienced after she left the respondent.
6With respect to the second issue above, the applicant states that she is currently working for a police service and she fears that if her personal information is placed on the internet, this would allow a person to have access to it and in turn affect her safety.
DECISION
7Section 34 of the Code states:
(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
8As indicated above, an application must be filed within a year of the incident or incidents to which it relates. The Tribunal may, however, accept a late application if it is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith. In order to satisfy the Tribunal that the delay was incurred in good faith, the applicant must provide the Tribunal with a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner. The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, while recognizing that there will be legitimate circumstances that justify exercising the discretion under section 34(2). See Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241.
9The applicant has not provided any medical evidence to support her submission that her stress and depression prevented her from filing the Application in a timely way. Even accepting that the applicant experienced some personal stress and depression following her departure from the respondent, it did not prevent her from finding new employment with a police service, which she describes as being a very good career. While the Tribunal accepts that a delay may be in good faith because of a Code-related reason, such as a disability, it requires medical evidence that the disability was so debilitating that it prevented an applicant from pursuing his or her legal rights under the Code. See for example Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207; Downer v. Little & Jarrett, 2010 HRTO 992 and Savage v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2010 HRTO 1360.
10The applicant believed that she had been wronged by her former employer, over a period of time and until her resignation in December 2010. I do not find that the applicant’s submissions meet the onus the Tribunal requires to show that the delay in the filing of the Application was incurred in good faith pursuant to section 34(2) of the Code. I stress that I am not finding that she acted in “bad faith” in not filing this Application earlier, but rather, that she has not provided a reasonable explanation that justifies extending the time limit.
11In sum, I find that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to process the Application because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination described in the Application and the delay was not incurred in good faith.
12Turning to the applicant’s request to remain anonymous, the Tribunal’s Rules state that:
3.10 The Tribunal’s hearings are open to the public, except when the Tribunal determines otherwise.
3.11 The Tribunal may make an order to protect the confidentiality of personal or sensitive information where it considers it appropriate to do so
3.12 All written decisions of the Tribunal are available to the public.
13Participation in legal proceedings often leads to the publication of information individuals would prefer to keep private. This interest is weighed against the principles of open justice and freedom of expression: see Bartlett v. Hydro One Networks, 2012 HRTO 212 and C.M. v. York Region District School Board, 2009 HRTO 735. The Tribunal’s practice has been to consider any request to close a hearing to the public, or to keep the name of a party or other information confidential as an exception to the general principle that the Tribunal’s process should be open and transparent in accordance with the province’s legal system. See TA v. 60 Montclair, 2009 HRTO 369 and S. and C. v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2008 HRTO 437.
14The Tribunal has allowed for the name of an applicant to be replaced by initials in its written decisions in exceptional circumstances. The fact that the applicant is a police officer is not in itself a reason to anonymize her identify in the Tribunal’s decisions. There are numerous decisions in which police officers have been named either as applicants or respondents. The applicant’s concern for safety is not based on any reason specific to her, as opposed to any other police officer, and is speculative. Therefore, I find that the applicant’s reasons do not justify the anonymization of her name in this case.
15For the reasons given, the Application is dismissed for delay.
Dated at Toronto this 19th day of March, 2012.
“Signed by”
Sherry Liang
Vice-chair