Carol Prier v. Chrysler Canada, 2012 HRTO 2116

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Carol Prier

Applicant

-and-

Chrysler Canada

Respondent

-and-

CAW Local 444

Affected Party

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Mary Truemner

Date: November 7, 2012

Citation: 2012 HRTO 2116

Indexed as: Prier v. Chrysler Canada

INTRODUCTION

1This is an Application under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The Application describes the termination of the applicant’s employment, and indicates that the facts of the Application are part of a union grievance proceeding that is still in progress. The applicant provided a copy of the Grievance which states, “The Union strongly protests the actions of the company for discharging Carol Prier,” and which, like the Application, seeks her reinstatement. This Interim Decision deals with the issue of whether the Application should be deferred pending the completion of the Grievance proceeding.

2On September 21, 2012, the Tribunal sent a Notice of Intent to Defer to the parties indicating that the Tribunal had determined that it might be appropriate to defer consideration of the Application pending the resolution of another proceeding. The Tribunal invited the parties, and the applicant’s union, CAW Local 444 (“the union”), as an affected party, to provide written submissions in response.

POSITION OF PARTIES

3None of the parties has filed submissions with respect to the Notice.

DECISION

4The Tribunal may defer consideration of an Application on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure). Deferral of an Application seeks to ensure that proceedings dealing with the same facts or issues do not run concurrently, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that grievance arbitrators have not only the power but also the responsibility to implement and enforce the substantive rights and obligations of human rights and other employment-related statutes as if they were a part of the collective agreement. See, Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, 2003 SCC 42, and O’Brien v. Burlington (City), 2009 HRTO 1818. Thus, the Tribunal will generally defer an Application where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and issues. However, the Tribunal must also consider, in light of the particular circumstances of each case, whether deferral is the most fair, just and expeditious way of proceeding with the application.

5In this case, given that both the Application and the Grievance focus on the termination of the applicant’s employment, most of the facts and issues raised in this Application are part of another process that is still in progress. Since the issues in the Application and the Grievance overlap significantly, proceeding with the Application at the Tribunal could very possibly lead to inconsistent decisions on the facts and/or legal issues raised in the Application and the Grievance. The primary purpose of deferring an Application is to avoid such potential inconsistency. In all of the circumstances, I find that deferring the Application is appropriate.

6The parties’ attention is drawn to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure, which address how the Application may be brought back on before the Tribunal, following conclusion of the Grievance proceedings. The Rules of Procedure are available on the Tribunal’s website, www.hrto.ca under “New Applications”.

7I am not seized.