HRTO 2011

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Registrar issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss because the application failed to identify specific acts of discrimination.

The applicant was directed to file submissions by a specified date but failed to respond.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging workplace discrimination on the basis of disability and sex, naming only her manager as a respondent.

The respondent filed a request to remove the manager as a personal respondent and substitute the employer, the Municipality of Chatham-Kent.

Applying the Persaud factors, the Tribunal granted the request, finding that the manager was acting in the course of his employment, the employer accepted vicarious liability, and there was no compelling reason to proceed against the manager personally.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and reprisal, over a year after her employment was terminated.

The respondents requested the application be dismissed for delay.

The Tribunal found that the application was filed outside the one-year limitation period and that the applicant's medical condition and stress did not establish that the delay was incurred in good faith.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability because a Deputy Judge and a mediator at the Small Claims Court did not permit him to make an audio recording of proceedings as an accommodation.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss to determine if the application was barred by judicial immunity.

The Tribunal dismissed the portion of the application relating to the judge's actions, finding it was plainly and obviously barred by judicial immunity.

However, the Tribunal allowed the portion relating to the mediator's actions to continue, as it was not plain and obvious that judicial immunity applied to the mediator.

The applicant filed a Request for an Order During Proceedings to amend her human rights application to add and increase financial and public interest remedies.

The respondent opposed the request, arguing the remedies could have been requested initially.

The Tribunal granted the request to amend, finding no prejudice to the respondent that could not be addressed by allowing an amended response.

The Tribunal also directed the respondent to provide contact information for the union, as the requested remedy of placement in a unionized position made the union an affected party.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The respondents requested that the Tribunal dismiss the application, arguing that their business, located on a First Nation, was under exclusive federal jurisdiction pursuant to a recently passed Band Council Resolution.

The Tribunal treated the request as a reconsideration of an earlier interim decision that had affirmed provincial jurisdiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the Band Council Resolution was passed after the alleged discrimination occurred and could not apply retrospectively.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) because the application appeared to be outside its jurisdiction.

The applicant failed to respond to the NOID by the specified deadline.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the application as it appeared to be outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The applicant failed to respond to the Notice within the required timeframe.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the application on the basis that it appeared to be outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The applicant failed to respond to the Notice by the specified deadline.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed an application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) on the basis that the application appeared to be outside its jurisdiction.

The applicant was directed to respond but failed to do so by the deadline.

As a result, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The institutional respondent requested a deferral because another proceeding involving the same parties and issues had been initiated.

The applicant was granted an extension to file a reply but failed to do so.

After the applicant failed to respond to a subsequent Case Assessment Direction warning of dismissal, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The respondents requested that the Tribunal defer consideration of the human rights application until a related criminal matter involving the respondent is resolved.

The Tribunal granted the request, noting that deferral prevents concurrent proceedings and inconsistent decisions, and avoids prejudicing the respondent in the criminal proceedings.

The corporate respondent requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that found it liable for discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual solicitation and ordered it to pay $18,000 in damages.

The respondent argued that the damages were excessive and conflicted with established jurisprudence.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the respondent was attempting to re-argue issues already canvassed and failed to demonstrate any conflict with established legal rules or other criteria justifying reconsideration.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO), one of its Vice-chairs, and the Ministry of the Attorney General, alleging discrimination and reprisal in the handling of her ongoing human rights complaint against a school board.

The applicant alleged the Vice-chair showed bias during mediation and the HRTO improperly denied interim relief.

The HRTO determined it had jurisdiction to assess whether the application was properly before it without creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The adjudicator dismissed the application, finding it was an abuse of process and a collateral attack on an ongoing proceeding.

The adjudicator also noted that the allegations related to adjudicative functions, which are protected by adjudicative immunity and do not constitute 'services' under the Code.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging workplace reprisal.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) because the application appeared to be filed outside the one-year limitation period and did not allege a specific ground of discrimination.

The applicant responded, clarifying the date of the last incident and the nature of the reprisal allegations.

The Tribunal applied the 'plain and obvious' test and found it was not plain and obvious that the application fell outside its jurisdiction.

The Tribunal directed the applicant to file a detailed statement specifying the Code grounds related to her allegations, failing which the application may be dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant, who suffered from a mental health disability, was terminated from her employment shortly after requesting a medical leave of absence supported by a doctor's note.

The respondent claimed the termination was due to poor performance and an attempt by the applicant to undermine the business by leaving a major proposal unfinished.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's disability-related absence was a factor in the decision to terminate her employment, constituting discrimination under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal awarded $15,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and ordered the respondent's management to complete human rights training.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of race, specifically that the respondent taxi company refused to issue him a letter of employment.

The last incident occurred in May 2009, but the application was not filed until November 2010, beyond the one-year limitation period.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss.

The applicant attributed the delay to his attempts to address concerns with the City of Brampton, which was not named as a respondent.

The Tribunal found the applicant provided no reasonable explanation for the delay in filing against the respondents and dismissed the application as being outside its jurisdiction.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) on the basis that the application appeared to be outside its jurisdiction.

The applicant failed to respond to the NOID by the specified deadline.

Consequently, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant filed an application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss (NOID) on the basis that the application appeared to be outside its jurisdiction, directing the applicant to respond by a specified date.

The applicant failed to respond to the NOID.

As a result, the Tribunal deemed the application abandoned and dismissed it.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation after a priest expressed views on homosexuality during a religious rite at the applicant's parents' home.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the interaction fell within the social area of 'services' under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the actions of a clergyperson performing purely religious functions, including teaching and dissemination of religious beliefs, are protected by freedom of religion and do not constitute a 'service' under the Code.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.