HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Yu-Ting Liu Applicant
-and-
C-Squared, Andy To and Joe (Anh Chau) To Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Alan G. Smith Date: March 7, 2011 Citation: 2011 HRTO 485 Indexed as: Liu v. C-Squared
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Yu-Ting Liu, Applicant | Allison Greene, Counsel C-Squared, Andy To and Joe (Anh Chau) To, Respondents | Joseph J. Faust, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
1This is an Application filed November 26, 2010, pursuant to section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The purpose of this Interim Decision is to deal with the respondents’ Request for Order During Proceeding seeking deferral of the Application pending conclusion of a related criminal proceeding involving the personal respondent Joe To.
2The applicant opposes the Request. She notes that the issue in the criminal proceeding is different from that in the human rights proceeding. She also points out that she is not a party to that matter and neither are the other personal respondent or the corporate respondent. The applicant also states that she cannot obtain the same remedies in the criminal proceeding compared to those available pursuant to the Code. Finally, she argues that deferral would cause unnecessary delay in the Application being dealt with by the Tribunal.
3While deferral is not automatic, it is granted to avoid adjudicative duplication. Deferral of an application ensures that proceedings dealing with the same issues do not run concurrently, raising the possibility of inconsistent decisions on facts or law. The Tribunal has deferred applications where there are ongoing criminal proceedings involving the parties where the applicant or the respondent was the party who was criminally charged: Miller v. Bernard, 2010 HRTO 1488, Bernard v. London Transit Commission, 2010 HRTO 1829 and Hadley v. J.A.C.S. Cartage, 2010 HRTO 516.
DECISION
4The personal respondent Joe To is criminally charged with respect to an incident which forms a substantial part of the Application. The findings of fact in the criminal proceedings might overlap, perhaps significantly, with findings of fact required for the adjudication of the Application. This raises the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact. See Hadley v. J.A.C.S. Cartage, supra.
5The applicant and the personal respondent Joe To are, respectively, the alleged victim and accused in the criminal proceeding. Thus the Tribunal decision cited by the applicant, Martinez v. Peel Police Services Board, 2008 HRTO 434, is distinguishable on its facts.
6While the applicant may be frustrated with the length of time the criminal justice process may take, this is not a sufficient reason to proceed with the Application in all the circumstances. Law v. Organizational Solution, 2010 HRTO 1158.
7The possible effects on the personal respondent Joe To’s rights and interests in the criminal proceedings must also be considered. See Wright v. Dhawan, 2009 HRTO 1476.
ORDER
8In these circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the most fair, just and expeditious approach is to defer consideration of this Application pending the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the process by which a party may request, in accordance to Rule 19, the Tribunal to proceed with an application after the conclusion of another process.
9I am not seized.
Dated at Toronto, this 7th day of March, 2011.
“Signed by”
Alan G. Smith Member

