Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Jessica Hinz
Applicant
-and-
Hairloft
Respondent
Interim DECISION
Adjudicator: Geneviève Debané
Indexed as: Hinz v. Hairloft
1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), on July 11, 2011 alleging discrimination in employment on the basis on sex, family status and age in employment.
2The applicant alleges that her termination from employment occurred shortly after she advised the respondent that she was pregnant. The last date of alleged discrimination is therefore July 23, 2009, the date that her employment was terminated.
3A Notice of Incomplete Application and Notice of Intent to Dismiss (“NOID”) was issued by the Tribunal on August 18, 2011 indicating that some information was missing and that the Application appears to be outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction because it was filed more than one year after the last incident of alleged discrimination.
4The NOID advised the applicant that she had until September 7, 2011 to provide the Tribunal with the missing information and to make submissions on the jurisdictional issue. Though on September 8, 2011, the applicant provided the Tribunal with the missing information in her application she did not make any submissions on the jurisdictional issue.
5However, in her application she alleges that she suffered from severe anxiety and depression that affected her mental and physical health which resulted in her being under the care of a psychiatrist. She also refers to being hospitalized for some period of undefined time.
6An application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage, before it is served on the respondents, if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This includes a decision to dismiss for delay: Battaglia v. Maplehurst Correctional Complex, 2009 HRTO 1167 and Brooks v. North York General Hospital, 2010 HRTO 453.
7Section 34 of the Code provides:
(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
8Based on the information provided by the applicant, it is not plain and obvious to me that her delay in filing the Application was not incurred in good faith. On the basis of the applicant’s assertions, which are at this stage unchallenged, the delay may have been caused by medical conditions affecting her ability to pursue her rights. Consequently the Tribunal will continue, at this point, to process the Application.
9The Tribunal shall serve the Application and a copy of this Interim Decision on the respondent. This is not a final decision with respect to the issue of whether the Application is barred by section 34 of the Code. If the respondents take the position that the Tribunal should not accept the Application because of delay, the applicant may be required to provide medical evidence to support her inability to pursue her rights in a timely manner.
10I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto, this 28th day of September, 2011.
”signed by”_____________________________________
Geneviève Debané
Vice-chair