Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
B E T W E E N:
Veloris Brooks
Applicant
-and-
North York General Hospital, Esther Koven, Kevin Rittenberg and Ashton White
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Sherry Liang
Indexed as: Brooks v. North York General Hospital
1This is an Application filed on April 29, 2009, under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”).
2On January 26, 2010, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, in which it directed the applicant to provide submissions explaining the delay in filing the Application. The applicant filed a letter on February 17, 2010. In the letter she states, among other things, that she sought legal help and was refused. She states that she slipped into depression and suffered confusion, memory loss, speech problems and headaches. She submits that due to these complications in her health, she was not able to complete the Application accurately, which caused the delay in filing it.
3An application will only be dismissed at a preliminary stage, before it is served on the respondents, if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This includes a decision to dismiss for delay: Battaglia v. Maplehurst Correctional Complex, 2009 HRTO 1167.
4Section 34 of the Code provides:
(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
5Based on the information provided by the applicant, it is not plain and obvious to me that her delay in filing the Application was not incurred in good faith. On the basis of the applicant’s assertions, which are at this stage unchallenged, the delay may have been caused by medical conditions affecting her ability to pursue her rights. Consequently the Tribunal will continue, at this point, to process the Application.
6The Tribunal shall serve the Application and a copy of this Interim Decision on the respondents. This is not a final decision with respect to the issue of whether the Application is barred by section 34 of the Code. If the respondents take the position that the Tribunal should not accept the Application because of delay, the applicant may be required to provide medical evidence to support her inability to pursue her rights in a timely manner.
7I am not seized of this matter.
Dated at Toronto this 1st day of March, 2010.
“Signed by”
Sherry Liang
Vice-chair