George Titulescu v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, 2011 HRTO 1602

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

George Titulescu Applicant

-and-

Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Alan G. Smith Date: August 26 2011 Citation: 2011 HRTO 1602 Indexed as: Titulescu v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board

WRITTEN SUBMISSION BY:

George Titulescu, Applicant ) Self-represented )

BACKGROUND

1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), on July 28, 2010, which alleges discrimination in services because of place of origin, citizenship and ethnic origin. In section 7(d) of the Application (“If you are applying more than one year from the last event, please explain why”), the applicant wrote “July 21, 2010”.

2The latest incident mentioned in the narrative of the Application is contained in the document entitled “Supplementary Statement” in which the applicant states:

…I had a few unbelievable telephone calls with a person from Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal called Daniel S. Revington, who spoke with me so rudely. I have the possibility to find the cassette of the recording of the calls, which happened on 2008.

3On July 12, 2011, the Tribunal Registrar sent a Notice of Intent to Dismiss to the applicant which noted that the Application appeared to be outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (power to decide) because, among other things, it was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination. The Tribunal invited the applicant to provide written submissions to explain the delay in filing.

4On July 21, 2011, the applicant sent the Tribunal submissions on the timeliness issue. The applicant stated in part:

In the third paragraph of your letter it states that the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of discrimination, which is false because I abandoned my file from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on July 21, 2010, just one week before I filed my case at the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal…

ANALYSIS

5The Tribunal does not have the general power to inquire into claims of unfairness or wrongdoing outside the parameters prescribed in the Code. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to dealing with disputes that properly fall under the Code. See Fulton-Bell v. Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society, 2009 HRTO 1769.

6Section 34 of the Code provides:

(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,

(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or

(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.

(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.

7The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. See, for example, Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241. The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the Code’s objective that human rights claims should be dealt with fairly and expeditiously.

8In order to satisfy the Tribunal that the delay was incurred in good faith, the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner: Corrigan v. Peterborough Victoria Northumberland and Clarington Catholic District School Board, 2008 HRTO 424, and Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670. Good faith is more than just the absence of bad faith. To succeed under s. 34(2) the applicant has to show he acted with all due diligence. See Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207 and McGhie v. Bell Canada, 2011 HRTO 1197.

9Clearly the abandonment of a Court proceeding dealing with the same subject matter as the Application does not constitute an “incident” of discrimination pursuant to s. 34 of the Code and hence the July 21, 2010 date mentioned by the applicant has no relevance to the delay issue.

10If the applicant’s argument is that he delayed filing an Application because he was awaiting the conclusion of a Court proceeding dealing with the same subject matter as the Application, it also cannot succeed. The Tribunal has found in the past that it is not reasonable for an applicant to delay filing an Application with the Tribunal while awaiting the outcome of other processes. See Hall v. Royal Victoria Hospital, 2010 HRTO 1165, and Sgro v. Spar Marathon and Roof Supplies, 2011 HRTO 688.

11Given the absence of evidence that the delay was incurred in good faith, I find that the Application does not satisfy the requirements of section 34 of the Code. Therefore, the Tribunal is without jurisdiction to proceed with the Application.

12The Tribunal has held that, if it has not been shown that the delay was incurred in good faith, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to make the further determination as to whether any party will be substantially prejudiced by the delay. See Esanu v. Georgetown Non-Contact Hockey League, 2009 HRTO 579 and McGhie above.

ORDER

13The Application is dismissed.