HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Vannak Troeung
Applicant
-and-
St. Michael’s Hospital
Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Alan G. Smith
Indexed as: Troeung v. St. Michael’s Hospital
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
Vannak Troeung, Applicant ) Self-represented
BACKGROUND
1The applicant filed an Application under s. 34 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), on June 29, 2011, which alleged that the respondent employer discriminated against him because of his sexual orientation.
2In section 7(c) of the Application (“What was the date of the last event?”), the applicant’s representative wrote “May 11, 2010”. The Application indicates that the respondent terminated the applicant’s employment on that date. In section 7(d) of the Application (“If you are applying more than one year from the last event, please explain why:”), the applicant’s wrote:
…I am afraid that if I file an application with the Human Rights Tribunal, and the Tribunal notify my professional college….my regulatory body would interpret my errors as negligence, without talking into consideration the underlying cause of such errors, then take away my licence to practice ending my career as a Lab Technologist-Histotechnologist – a career for which I enjoy, and worked so hard to obtain…
3On July 12, 2011, the Tribunal Registrar sent a Notice of Intent to Dismiss to the applicant which noted that the Application appeared to be outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (power to decide) because it was filed more than one year after the last alleged incident of discrimination. The Tribunal invited the applicant to provide written submissions to explain the delay in filing.
4On July 26, 2011, the applicant sent the Tribunal further submissions on the timeliness issue. In essence, he repeated the explanation provided in the Application.
DECISION
5The Tribunal does not have the general power to inquire into claims of unfairness or wrongdoing outside the parameters prescribed in the Code. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to dealing with disputes that properly fall under the Code. See Fulton-Bell v. Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society, 2009 HRTO 1769.
6Section 34 of the Code provides:
(1) If a person believes that any of his or her rights under Part I have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order under section 45.2,
(a) within one year after the incident to which the application relates; or
(b) if there was a series of incidents, within one year after the last incident in the series.
(2) A person may apply under subsection (1) after the expiry of the time limit under that subsection if the Tribunal is satisfied that the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice will result to any person affected by the delay.
7The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay. See, for example, Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241. The mandatory one-year limitation period is consistent with the Code’s objective that human rights claims should be dealt with fairly and expeditiously.
8In order to satisfy the Tribunal that the delay was incurred in good faith, the applicant must provide a reasonable explanation as to why he or she did not pursue his or her rights under the Code in a timely manner. See Corrigan v. Peterborough Victoria Northumberland and Clarington Catholic District School Board, 2008 HRTO 424, and Cartier v. Northeast Mental Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 1670. Good faith is more than just the absence of bad faith. To succeed under s. 34(2) the applicant has to show he acted with all due diligence. See Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207 and McGhie v. Bell Canada, 2011 HRTO 1197.
9It appears that the applicant’s argument is that he delayed filing an Application because he was fearful of the repercussions that step might have on his professional designation. However, he fails to explain what difference the passage of time made in that regard. In other words, what difference would it have made if he had filed the Application on, for example, May 10, 2011, instead of waiting another seven weeks to June 29, 2011?
10Given the absence of evidence that the delay was incurred in good faith, I find that the Application does not satisfy the requirements of section 34 of the Code. Therefore the Tribunal is without jurisdiction to proceed with the Application.
11The Tribunal has held that, if it has not been shown that the delay was incurred in good faith, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to make the further determination as to whether any party will be substantially prejudiced by the delay. See Esanu v. Georgetown Non-Contact Hockey League, 2009 HRTO 579 and McGhie above.
ORDER
12The Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto this 12th day of August, 2011.
”signed by”____________
Alan G. Smith
Member