HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Karen Adinolfi
Applicant
- and-
Sherman Crooks
Respondent
decision
Adjudicator: Ena Chadha
Indexed as: Adinolfi v. Crooks
1The applicant filed this Application on March 7, 2011, under section 34 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), alleging discrimination and reprisal with respect to housing on the basis of disability. The Application indicates that the last incident was on October 14, 2008.
2The Application narrative appears to indicate that the applicant was criminally charged with abuse of an animal and it appears this offence related to events arising out of the applicant’s housing circumstances. The applicant alleges that respondent illegally charged her rent for her dog. The applicant alleges that animal protection services failed to appreciate that her dog had a food allergy. The narrative appears to suggest the events leading to the criminal charges took place in August 2008.
3By correspondence dated May 13, 2011, the Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss on the grounds that the Application was filed more than one year after the last incident of alleged discrimination. The applicant was further advised that, based on a review of the Application and narrative, the Application does not appear to explain how the respondent’s alleged behaviour was related to “reprisal” under section 8 of the Code. The applicant was invited to file submissions with respect to all of these issues.
4On June 14, 2011, the applicant filed submissions in response to the Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The applicant asserts that the Tribunal should not put a time limit on people’s rights and emotions and that the delay was because of the emotional stress of the events.
DECISION
5An application will be dismissed at a preliminary stage, before it is served on a respondent, if it is “plain and obvious” on the face of the application that it does not fall within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
6I find that the Application does not raise matters of reprisal which the Tribunal has the power to decide and I also find that the applicant’s allegations with respect to her former landlord relate to events beyond the one-year limitation period of the Code.
7The Tribunal has set a fairly high onus on applicants to provide a reasonable explanation for any delay. See, for example, Klein v. Toronto Zionist Council, 2009 HRTO 241. As stated in Miller v. Prudential Lifestyles Real Estate, 2009 HRTO 1241, in order for an applicant to establish that a delay in filing an application was incurred in good faith, the applicant must show something more than simply an absence of bad faith; otherwise, there would be little meaning to the statutory limitation period.
8The Application was filed well beyond the one year timeline after the alleged discriminatory events. Although given the opportunity, the applicant provided little explanation for the delay, except for the assertion of emotional stress, and no supporting evidence that leads to the conclusion that the delay was incurred in good faith.
9As stated in the Tribunal‘s Decision in Dionne v. Toronto (City), 2011 HRTO 317, while the Tribunal accepts that a delay may be in good faith because of an applicant’s disability, it has consistently ruled that it requires medical evidence that the disability was so debilitating that it prevented an applicant from pursuing his or her legal rights under the Code. See for example Reid v. Ontario March of Dimes, 2009 HRTO 2207; Downer v. Little & Jarrett, 2010 HRTO 992; and Savage v. Toronto Transit Commission, 2010 HRTO 1360.
10Based on the Application and the applicant’s submissions, I am also satisfied that the applicant’s allegations with respect to her landlord do not raise concerns with respect to reprisal as contemplated by section 8 of the Code. While the applicant clearly feels that she has been treated unfairly by the respondent, she does not explain how the alleged mistreatment occurred because of an attempt on her part to claim or enforce her Code-rights.
11In conclusion, I am not persuaded that the delay in bringing this Application was incurred in good faith, and further find the Application does not allege that the actions of the respondent constituted a reprisal or threat of reprisal within the meaning of the Code.
12Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto, this 7th day of July, 2011
”signed by”____________
Ena Chadha
Vice-chair

