Desiree Martin v. The Reverend Norman Johnston Youth Residence Inc., 2010 HRTO 970

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Desiree Martin

Applicant

-and-

The Reverend Norman Johnston Youth Residence Inc., Chris Grant, Ron Toop, Doris Marshall and Jeanne Hill

Respondents

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Adjudicator: David Muir Date: May 3, 2010 Citation: 2010 HRTO 970 Indexed as: Martin v. The Reverend Norman Johnston Youth Residence

1This is an Application filed under section 53(5) of the Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the "Code") on December 30, 2008.

2The applicant has made a Request for reconsideration of my Interim Decision 2010 HRTO 595 of March 23, 2010 dealing with a number of production requests made of the respondents.

3Rule 25.1 of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure for Transitional Applications provides that a party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal. A decision will only be considered a final decision where the decision has the effect of finally determining the substance of the dispute or a central element of the dispute between the parties. See for example Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Ontario Teachers' Federation, 1994 CanLII 10578 (ON CTGD), 19 O.R. (3d) 371). In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board et al., 2008 HRTO 34, the Tribunal considered at length the question of when a decision should be considered a final one for purposes of the reconsideration power. After carefully considering the policy issues at play and the relevant authorities the Tribunal concluded:

As a general principle, having regard to the approach taken in other forums as well as the above discussion, it is reasonable to view a "final decision" as one that disposes of some or all of the central issues in the complaint as between the parties. This general principle will take on a more precise shape as the Tribunal applies it to cases before it.

4It is important to note that the question arises here in a section 53(5) Application where the human rights complaint underlying the Application defines the scope of the dispute. As a result, the Tribunal has made Rules for the processing of these applications in a fair, just and expeditious way.

5Having considered these authorities and the context in which the issue arises, I have concluded that the Decision is not a final one. I find that it does not deprive the applicant of "any prospect of a remedy" as against the respondents and does not dispose of the entirety of the complaint. Not being a final decision, it cannot, at this time, be the subject of a reconsideration request (see Galuego v. Kensington Health Centre, 2009 HRTO 49). For these reasons the Request for reconsideration is dismissed.