HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Keith Thrower Applicant
-and-
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as represented by the Attorney General Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Sherry Liang Date: July 7, 2010 Citation: 2010 HRTO 1469 Indexed as: Thrower v. Ontario (Attorney General)
1This is an Application filed on February 16, 2010 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”).
2The name of the respondent is amended to reflect its proper name. The respondent filed a Response as well as a Request for Order During Proceedings. The respondent takes the position that the Application should be dismissed as it does not raise matters in the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The applicant did not file a Response to the Request for Order, although he did file a Reply.
3On review of the material before me, I find that this Application cannot proceed and it is dismissed.
DECISION
4The applicant alleges that the respondent, which he names as the Ontario Court of Justice – Criminal, discriminated against him when he was found guilty of impaired driving caused by medication that he was required to take to control his disabilities. He provided a copy of the reasons for judgment given by a judge of the Court. The applicant states that the judge did not take into account his disability as the cause of his impairment, and ignored his medical evidence. In his Application, the applicant states that he initiated an appeal of the conviction to the Court of Appeal but was unable to proceed with it because he could not afford a lawyer. He states that he will pursue his wrongful conviction with the Court of Appeal when it is affordable to do so. In this Application, the remedy the applicant seeks, among other things, is to have the “criminal charges dropped & record reinstated”.
5It appears that the judgment was given on June 11, 2007. The applicant also appears to raise an issue with respect to a previous conviction in May 2006, which he also states was discriminatory because the judge should have found him unfit to stand trial. The Code requires that Applications be made within a year of the alleged incident of discrimination. This Application was filed more than two and half years after the last judgment, and there is therefore a question about whether the Tribunal can proceed with the Application given the delay. However, it is unnecessary to decide whether the Application should be dismissed for delay, given my conclusion that it is outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in any event.
6The Tribunal has found that it has no jurisdiction to consider allegations of discrimination arising out of the exercise of adjudicative functions by a tribunal or court: Baird v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, 2009 HRTO 99; Christianson v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2009 HRTO 203; Dann v. Wallace, 2009 HRTO 392, (“Dann”); Zaki v. Ontario (Community and Social Services), 2009 HRTO 1595. This principle has been applied in dismissing an application challenging support payment orders made by the Family Court (Gibson v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2009 HRTO 870), and in dismissing an application challenging actions of various judges and judicial officers (Christianson v. Attorney General (Ontario), 2009 HRTO 840).
7In these cases, the Tribunal has found that the “content, reasons and result contained in a decision or order” of a tribunal or judge are not a “service” within the meaning of the Code. Comments made by an adjudicator in the course of exercising adjudicative functions are likewise not covered by the Code: Dann, above, and Kentebe v. Haggerty, 2009 HRTO 1163.
8The Tribunal has also applied the principle of judicial immunity, which protects the independence and impartiality of the judiciary or tribunals by preventing claims against judges or adjudicators for acts or omissions done while acting in the course of their duties: Hazel v. Ainsworth Engineered, 2009 HRTO 2180. The Tribunal’s approach to these cases is also informed by the principle that the Tribunal does not act as an appellate court from a decision of another tribunal or court. To the extent that this applicant seeks to have his conviction overturned, the rule against “collateral attack” prevents him from using the processes before the Tribunal to challenge decisions of a judge.
9In conclusion, I find that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to inquire into the applicant’s claim that the judgment of June 11, 2007 was discriminatory in that it failed to take into account his disability, or that his previous conviction in 2006 was discriminatory.
10This Application is dismissed.
Dated at Toronto this 7th day of July, 2010.
”signed by”____________
Sherry Liang Vice-chair