HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Michael Christianson

Applicant

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as Represented

by the Attorney General

Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

Michael Christianson

Applicant

-and-

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as Represented by the Attorney General and Superior Court of Justice Southwest Region (Ontario)

Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Alan Whyte

Date: June 15, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 840

Indexed as: Christianson v. Attorney General (Ontario)

Appearances

Michael Christianson ) on his own behalf

Her Majesty the Queen in Right )

of Ontario as Represented by the ) Kisha Chatterjee

Attorney General and Superior Court of ) Counsel

Justice Southwest Region (Ontario) )

1In these Applications filed under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), the applicant alleges discrimination in the area of goods, services and facilities on the basis of disability as a result of certain statements and Orders made by a number of judges and judicial officers in the course of various court proceedings involving the applicant.

2A hearing was held in Windsor on April 15, 2009 at which time I heard oral submissions from both the applicant and counsel for the respondents. At the outset of the hearing, the categories of judicial officers at issue in this case were identified as:

· Justices of the Superior Court of Justice

· Justices of the Peace

· Deputy Judges of the Small Claims Court

· Masters of the Superior Court of Justice

3In an earlier Interim Decision, 2009 HRTO 16, the Tribunal directed a hearing to be held to address the following preliminary issues:

(a) whether the Superior Court of Justice Southwest Region (Ontario) is improperly named in the Application as it is not a suable entity;

(b) whether complaints about the conduct of the judiciary are properly the subject matter of proceedings under the Code;

(c) whether the adjudication of legal disputes by the courts is “services” within the meaning of section 1 of the Code.

I find that this matter can be decided by addressing the third issue only, on the basis of established Tribunal jurisprudence.

Whether the adjudication of legal disputes by the courts is “services” within the meaning of section 1 of the Code

4I have considered the extensive and well-argued positions of both parties. The issue before me is the extent to which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with a claim that an adjudicative body failed to provide its “services” in a non-discriminatory way. The issue has been addressed in a number of recent cases. See for example: Baird v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, 2009 HRTO 99; Christianson v. (Ontario) Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2009 HRTO 203; Dann v. Wallace, 2009 HRTO 392; Lindberg v. Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, 2009 HRTO 463.

5The Tribunal has ruled that the services offered by statutory tribunals do not extend to their final adjudicative decisions: see Baird. In Dann the Tribunal held that an adjudicator’s comments at a hearing about her findings are an element of the decision making process that is not a “service” under the Code. However, in Lindberg, the Tribunal suggested the possibility that some actions of an adjudicative body might be subject to the Code:

This does not mean, however, that statutory tribunals enjoy blanket immunity from complaints grounded in the Code. In providing their services to the public, it is possible that statutory tribunals could run afoul of the Code.

In the present case, the applicant has failed to allege incidents or actions that involve the services of the WSIB, within the meaning of the Code. Rather, the allegations all fall squarely within the adjudicative function of the WSIB and specifically to its interpretation and application of its enabling legislation.

6In this case, the allegations contained in the Application relate either to comments made during the course of judicial proceedings by judicial officers, or to the outcome of those judicial proceedings which were adverse to the applicant. It should be noted that none of the alleged statements made by the judicial officers are prima facie discriminatory.

7To the extent that the allegations relate to comments made during the course of judicial proceedings, I find that they can reasonably be interpreted to fall within the adjudicative function of the courts in question. Consequently, in accordance with the principles in the Lindberg decision, they are not “services” within the meaning of the Code.

8To the extent that the allegations relate to the outcome of the judicial proceedings, they do not constitute “services” within the meaning of the Code for the reasons stated in Baird at paragraph 12:

The content, reasons and result contained in a decision of a statutory decision-maker cannot be understood to be part of the “service” a statutory Tribunal is providing to the public. The decision is, therefore, not subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.

9There is no reason to think that the principles set out above do not apply to the courts and are limited to statutory tribunals.

Order

10For the reasons set out above, the Application is therefore dismissed.