HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Steve Vetricek
Applicant
-and-
642518 Canada Inc., DBA Algonquin Careers Academy.
Respondent
RECONSIDERATION DECISION
Adjudicator: Judith Keene
Indexed as: Vetricek v. 642518 Canada
INTRODUCTION
1The Tribunal issued a Decision with respect to this Application on April 6, 2010, in 2010 HRTO 757. On May 5, 2010, the respondent filed a Request for Reconsideration of the Tribunal’s Decision. The Request was apparently delivered to the applicant on May 4, 2010.
2Section 45.7(1) of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended, (the "Code"), provides that “[a]ny party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules”. The Rules elaborate on the conditions and requirements of such a request. Rule 26.1 states that “[a]ny party may request reconsideration of a final decision of the Tribunal within (thirty) 30 days from the date of the decision”.
3Pursuant to Rule 26.5, reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:
a) there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or
b) the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or
c) the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or
d) other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.
4In this case, the respondent relies on the factors set out in subparagraphs c) and d) of Rule 26.5.
5In regard to Rule 26.5(c), the respondent submits that there is a “maximum standard award” in respect of “general damages” which was exceeded in the Decision, citing Shroff v. Tipco, 2009 HRTO 1405 as authority for this proposition. I am unable to find any mention of such a concept in the cited case. I conclude that the Decision is not “in conflict with established jurisprudence”. For considerations relevant to establishing “conflict” and their relationship to reconsideration, see Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34.
6In regard to Rule 26.5(d), the respondent claims that “there was some apprehension of bias toward the applicant and prejudice toward the respondents”. The respondent does not elaborate on this assertion. Most of the submissions filed with the Request are reiterations of assertions made and references to evidence adduced at the hearing. It is clear that the respondent disagrees with the findings made in respect of the evidence, but finding in favour of one party or the other does not meet any of the criteria for a reasonable apprehension of bias, as set out by the Supreme Court in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (S.C.C.), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369.
7The respondent also points out three errors of fact in the Decision’s introductory summary of undisputed facts. One is a typographical error; the Decision states that there were “17” employees in the respondent’s Mississauga office; this should have been “11”. Another relates to a statement that “each of the contracts signed by the appellant had an appendix dealing with matters such as targeted annual compensation, base salary and incentive payments, that was signed on a later date than the contract to which it pertained.” In fact, only two out of the three contracts signed by the applicant contained appendices that were signed later than the relevant contract. Finally, the Decision states that “[t]he applicant obtained a doctor’s note dated August 11, 2008 concerning his condition”. The respondent is correct that in fact the note itself was not dated, but referred to an appointment on August 11, 2008.
8Having noted these errors, the respondent does not explain why they are relevant to the factors set out in subparagraphs (c) or (d) of Rule 26.5. The respondent does not assert, much less establish, that, had the above-noted errors not been included, the Decision would have been different. The respondent’s submissions address neither “general or public importance” nor “the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions”.
9The Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Reconsideration states in part:
Decisions of the Tribunal are generally considered final and are not subject to appeal. However, parties may request that the Tribunal reconsider a final decision it has made. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy; there is no right to have a decision reconsidered by the Tribunal. Generally, the Tribunal will only reconsider a decision where it finds that there are compelling and extraordinary circumstances for doing so and where these circumstances outweigh the public interest in finality of orders and decisions.
Reconsideration is not an appeal or an opportunity for a party to repair deficiencies in the presentation of its case.
10The Tribunal’s reconsideration process is not intended to be an appeal of a Tribunal decision. The Request does not establish that any of the factors noted in Rule 26.5 apply in this case. Reconsideration is denied.
Dated at Toronto, this 30th day of June, 2010.
”signed by”______________
Judith Keene
Vice-chair