Stead v. Trehaven Golf & Country Club Inc., 2010 HRTO 1196

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Renee Stead

Applicant

-and-

Trehaven Golf & Country Club Inc., Joe Cvik and Barb Cvik

Respondents

Reconsideration decision

Adjudicator: David Muir

Date: May 27, 2010

Citation: 2010 HRTO 1196

Indexed as: Stead v. Trehaven Golf & Country Club

Decision

1On April 2010 the respondents filed a request for reconsideration of decisions 2009 HRTO 830 and 2010 HRTO 816.

2Section 45.7 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended, (the “Code”) provides as follow:

45.7 (1) Any party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may request that the Tribunal reconsider its decision in accordance with the Tribunal rules.

(2) Upon request under subsection (1) or on its own motion, the Tribunal may reconsider its decision in accordance with its rules.

3The Tribunal’s Rules Governing Transitional Applications provide that any party may request reconsideration of a decision in accordance with Rule 25.5.

A Request for Reconsideration will not be granted unless the Tribunal is satisfied that:

a. there are new facts or evidence that could potentially be determinative of the case and that could not reasonably have been obtained earlier; or

b. the party seeking reconsideration was entitled to but, through no fault of its own, did not receive notice of the proceeding or a hearing; or

c. the decision or order which is the subject of the reconsideration request is in conflict with established jurisprudence or Tribunal procedure and the proposed reconsideration involves a matter of general or public importance; or

d. other factors exist that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, outweigh the public interest in the finality of Tribunal decisions.

4The respondents rely on paragraph (d) citing what they state are palpable errors in findings of fact necessary to my conclusions on liability. In particular the respondents state that there was no evidence to support my finding that the decision to terminate the applicant’s employment was in part informed by the fact that she was or was perceived to be a person with a disability.

5The respondents also take issue with my findings on remedy. The respondents state that my findings were in error in that I should not have awarded lost wages during the period that the applicant was in receipt of a SEEB grant and further that I should not have awarded the applicant a portion of business losses incurred during the same period. The respondents also take issue with my findings in respect of what earnings the applicant might have expected to earn had her Code-protected rights not been breached.

6In Sigrist and Carson v. London District Catholic School Board, 2008 HRTO 34, the Tribunal held that reconsideration is not an opportunity to re-argue a case. Once the parties to an application have had the opportunity to present their evidence and arguments to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal has made a decision disposing of the issues, parties are entitled to treat the matter as closed, subject to the limited exceptions set out in the Rules.

7It is important that final decisions made by the Tribunal are perceived as such. Reconsideration does not provide the parties an opportunity to re-argue their case or provided them with a “second kick at the can”. It is not an appeal. Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy exercised by the Tribunal in the quite limited circumstances set out in the Rule. It is only where these circumstances exist that the Tribunal will reconsider its decision.

8The respondents evidently take issue with a number of my findings of fact but for the reasons set out above is not a proper basis for reconsideration of a final decision. Accordingly, the Request for reconsideration is dismissed.