Khan v. Toronto (City), 2009 HRTO 869

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario

B E T W E E N:

Farhan Khan Applicant

-and-

City of Toronto and Lorraine Davis Respondents

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Jay Sengupta Date: June 17, 2009 Citation: 2009 HRTO 869 Indexed as: Khan v. Toronto (City)

Submissions by:

Farhan Khan, Applicant Kate Stephenson, Counsel

City of Toronto and Lorraine Davis, Respondents Ansuya Pachai, Counsel

1The applicant, Farhan Khan, filed an Application with the Tribunal on December 3, 2008 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”). He claims that he suffered discrimination in receipt of goods, services and facilities on the basis of race, colour and creed. The respondents dispute the allegations and deny they have discriminated against the applicant.

2The hearing in this matter is scheduled for July 2 and 3, 2009. In a previous Interim Decision 2009 HRTO 820, the Tribunal denied a request made by the respondents, opposed by the applicant, to reschedule the hearing dates, following a conference call to hear submissions from the parties. Although not required to do so, the Tribunal issued reasons for the Interim Decision at the request of the respondents.

3The Tribunal has now received a letter from counsel for the respondents asking that the Tribunal reconsider its Interim Decision and reschedule the hearing dates, having regard to the circumstances of the case. The respondents argue that the authority under which the Tribunal can consider this request is its reconsideration power and its authority to control its own processes, which must be exercised having regard to the parties’ rights to procedural fairness.

4Counsel for the applicant has responded, arguing that the Tribunal’s power to “reconsider” its decisions is governed by section 45.7 of the Code and Rule 26 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. She asserts that reconsideration is available for final decisions and the decision at issue in the present case is an interim one. Finally, she argues that the analysis adopted by the Tribunal in denying the respondents’ original request to reschedule was in keeping with the Tribunal’s Information Bulletin on Scheduling of Hearings and Mediations, Rescheduling Requests and Requests for Adjournments.

5Counsel for the applicant has rightly pointed out that the Tribunal power to reconsider its decisions is limited to “final” decisions. The Rules do not define what is meant by “final” but the Tribunal, in Sigrist and Carson v. London District School Board et al., 2008 HRTO 34, in considering this question ruled as follows:

As a general principle, having regard to the approach taken in other forums as well as the above discussion, it is reasonable to view a “final decision” as one that disposes of some or all of the central issues in the complaint as between the parties.

6I do not find that an interim procedural ruling on a request to reschedule hearing dates is a “final” decision that disposes of any of the central issues in the Application as between the parties. There is no final decision to reconsider and, consequently, there is no basis on which I can grant the respondent’s Request.