Brenda Woodman-Dodds v. The Corporation of the Township of Bonfield, 2009 HRTO 782

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Brenda Woodman-Dodds

Applicant

-and-

The Corporation of the Township of Bonfield

Respondent

INTERIM DECISION

Adjudicator: Sherry Liang

Date: June 5, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 782

Indexed as: Woodman-Dodds v. Bonfield (Township)

1This is an Application filed on February 24, 2009 under section 34 of Part IV of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”). The application alleges discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. By Interim Decision 2009 HRTO 540, the Tribunal granted leave to the applicant to file a revised Application. The Tribunal further directed the applicant to include information about the status of a grievance and the applicant’s position on deferral of the Application.

2The revised Application was received by the Tribunal on May 13, 2009. The applicant alleges that she has been denied opportunities to train for the position of winter maintenance operator because she is a woman. She has filed a grievance about the events through her union, the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE), which is also representing her in this Application. This grievance was forwarded to arbitration by CUPE, which has proposed arbitrators to hear the grievance.

3On the applicant’s behalf, CUPE submits that the respondent took eight months to respond to its proposed arbitrators. Given that, it is not confident that the employer will act expeditiously in regards to the scheduling of hearing dates with an arbitrator, and wishes this case to proceed to hearing before the Tribunal.

4The Tribunal may defer consideration of an application, on such terms as it may determine, on its own initiative or at the request of any party (Rule 14.1 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure). The Tribunal will generally defer an application where there is an ongoing grievance under a collective agreement based on the same facts and issues. The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that grievance arbitrators have not only the power but also the responsibility to implement and enforce the substantive rights and obligations of human rights and other employment-related statutes as if they were part of the collective agreement (Parry Sound Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 342, 2003 SCC 42. However, the Tribunal must also consider, in light of the particular circumstances of each case, whether deferral is the most fair, just and expeditious way of proceeding with the application.

5Having considered the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal orders the deferral of the Application pending the conclusion of the grievance and arbitration process. There is no dispute that the grievance and Application are based on the same facts and issues. The concerns raised by the applicant do not provide a sufficient basis for the Tribunal to depart from its usual approach. In the circumstances, the Tribunal orders the deferral of the Application pending the conclusion of the grievance and arbitration process.

6The Tribunal directs the parties’ attention to Rules 14.3 and 14.4 which outline the process by which the Application may be brought back on after the grievance has been concluded.