Turner v. 507638 Ontario Limited, 2009 HRTO 249

HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO

B E T W E E N:

Tammy Turner

Complainant

-and-

Ontario Human Rights Commission

Commission

-and-

507638 Ontario Limited o/a Park Place Sports Bar and Grill

and John Matusiak

Respondents

DECISION

Adjudicator: Alison Renton

Date: March 5, 2009

Citation: 2009 HRTO 249

Indexed as: Turner v. 507638 Ontario

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY

Ontario Human Rights Commission ) Jean Iu, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

1The complainant filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the “Commission”) on February 1, 2005 alleging harassment and discrimination in employment against the respondents on the basis of disability contrary to ss.5(1), (2) and 9 of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 as amended (the “Code”). The Commission referred the complaint to the Tribunal on April 16, 2008.

2The respondents have not participated in the proceeding before the Tribunal. As a result, the Commission, with the consent of the complainant, requested a written hearing. In an Interim Decision, 2008 HRTO 43, the Tribunal found that the personal respondent had been given adequate notice of the Tribunal proceeding. By Interim Decision, 2008 HRTO 51, (“the August 2008 Interim Decision”), the Tribunal found that the corporate and the personal respondent had been given adequate notice of the proceeding and ordered that the complaint proceed by way of written hearing. The Commission had served a “Michael Williamson” as representative of the corporate respondent.

3The Tribunal received the Commission’s evidence in support of the written hearing on October 14, 2008. That evidence consisted of an affidavit of the complainant and written submissions of the Commission. The affidavit and written submissions identified a “Mike Williams” as a manager of the corporate respondent, rather than a “Michael Williamson”. By Interim Decision, 2008 HRTO 322, (“the November 2008 Interim Decision”), the Tribunal ordered the Commission to provide written submissions explaining:

a) Why “Mike Williams” is now being identified as an employee when the Commission had previously identified “Michael Williamson” as the director/administrator of the corporate respondent;

b) Whether the Commission is now of the view that “Mike Williams” or “Michael Williamson” is the appropriate representative of the corporate respondent and the reasons why it takes that view;

c) What, if any, efforts the Commission has made to find Mr. Williams and serve him with the complaint, the referral brief, request for written hearing, complainant’s affidavit, Commission’s written submissions and the Tribunal’s Interim Decisions dated July 15 and August 11, 2008, if the Commission now takes the position that “Mike Williams” is the representative of the corporate respondent.

4The Commission filed written submissions dated December 5, 2008 addressing the points in the November 2008 Interim Decision. The Commission stated there was no evidence that “Mike Williams” and “Michael Williamson” were the same person. The Commission submitted that it was not successful in serving the “Michael Williamson” who was involved in the proceedings, but that sending the materials to “Michael Williamson” at the corporate respondent’s address should have caused “Mike Williams” to review the material that had been sent. The Commission confirmed that the personal respondent had been served and further that the personal respondent was the appropriate representative of the corporate respondent.

5I accept the Commission’s responses, as noted above, and particularly its position that material sent by the Commission to a “Michael Williamson” at the address of the corporate respondent should have caused “Mike Williams” to review it. The similarity between the names should have caused a Mike Williams to open mail addressed to a Michael Williamson at the address of the corporate respondent. Further to the August 2008 Interim Decision, the Tribunal will proceed to dispose of the complaint by way of written hearing.

6The complainant did not file any material in addition to the Commission’s materials noted in para. 4, and the respondents did not file any material. Given the respondents’ failure to provide any submissions or participate in any way in this proceeding as directed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal shall make its determination in this matter based only on the materials filed by the Commission.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7The following facts are set out in the complainant’s affidavit. The complainant was employed as a bartender and commenced employment with 507638 Ontario Limited, which operated as Park Place Sports Bar and Grill (“Park Place”) in July 1993. She also organized events, including pool, dart and poker tournaments, special events and promotions and she designed and updated Park Place’s website.

8In 2002, two customers attacked the complainant while she was at work. The customers were inebriated and she was directed by her manager not to serve them. She was struck with glasses and bottles, suffered numerous cuts and bruises and was unable to work for approximately two months following this incident.

9As a result of the attack, the complainant developed an anxiety disorder. Upon her return to work, she began to experience panic attacks, which escalated in frequency and severity. On occasions, it became difficult for her to go to or remain at work.

10When she was too ill to work, the complainant’s practice would be to call one of the managers before her shift and provide the name of a replacement. She would only stay home with the approval of the manager. Park Place was sympathetic to the complainant and supported her during these absences.

11In approximately June 2003, one of Park Place’s managers left and the personal respondent, John Matusiak (“Matusiak”) was hired as a manager. The complainant advised Matusiak of her anxiety disorder when he started.

12Initially the complainant had no difficulties working with Matusiak. However, after a few months, Matusiak became impatient with her and became less and less willing to take into account her disabilities. He began to make negative comments to her within the hearing of other staff and customers.

13The complainant continued her practice of calling Park Place when she was too ill to work. Matusiak was unhappy with her absences and made sure that she knew about his dissatisfaction. When she missed work due to illness, upon her return to work Matusiak would confront the complainant about her absence. He would ask questions publicly and in an angry tone. His behaviour was disparaging and showed that he doubted the veracity of her absence and her integrity.

14Matusiak lied to the complainant’s colleagues about the reasons for her absences. On one occasion, he told another worker, who was also the complainant’s mother, that the complainant was absent because she had to rush her son to the hospital. The complainant’s mother was extremely upset upon receiving that information. The complainant confronted Matusiak about the information he provided to her mother and he responded by saying, “Well, I was pissed off that you were calling and not coming in so I didn’t pay attention to the reason and I don’t remember what I said to your mom”.

15The complainant alleged that Matusiak told other “lies” but did not provide any details about those lies. She alleged that his lies created conflicts and difficulties between her and her colleagues. She alleged that many times she confronted Matusiak about his lies, but that each time he would respond that he did not remember what he had said.

16The complainant alleged that on one occasion, Matusiak yelled at her while she was on a break and eating her dinner. He berated her about eating and would not allow her to explain that she was on a break. She packed up her dinner and returned to work behind the bar. Matusiak followed, yelling and humiliating her in front of her colleagues and customers, and told her to go and eat her dinner. The complainant asked Matusiak to stop his yelling. Matusiak told her she was “messed up” in her head and “needed drugs”. The complainant was so upset that she became physically ill and left work.

17There were other incidents following the dinner break incident. On one occasion Matusiak told the complainant she looked “pretty unstable today”.

18By November 2004, the complainant could no longer tolerate Matusiak’s behaviour. Her doctor told her to quit since the work environment was having a serious negative impact on her health. The complainant approached another manager, Mike Williams (“Williams”), to tender her resignation and to explain the reasons for her resignation. Williams asked the complainant to reconsider her resignation and said that he would speak to Matusiak. Needing ongoing income, the complainant agreed to continue her employment with Park Place.

19By this time, Matusiak had also assumed responsibility for the scheduling of shifts. Matusiak reduced the complainant’s shifts. The complainant spoke with Williams who reinstated her shifts. During a staff meeting in December 2004, the staff were told that their shifts and hours would remain the same unless they were advised differently. On December 30, 2004, the complainant was told that she had lost her regular shifts and that she would only be scheduled on Thursdays and possibly Sundays. The complainant made a number of attempts to obtain an explanation for the reduction in her shifts. Matusiak called her at her residence at 11:00 pm and spoke with the complainant’s spouse. The complainant’s spouse advised that the complainant had gone to bed. Matusiak became extremely rude and would not accept that the complainant had gone to bed.

20According to the complainant’s affidavit, Matusiak’s conduct exacerbated her anxiety disorder and agoraphobia. Matusiak, she says, refused to acknowledge or accommodate the complainant’s disability and attacked her integrity. The complainant resigned from her position with Park Place in January 2005, since she felt that she had no other option.

21The complainant describes that her experience at Park Place and with Matusiak has had a serious impact on her mental and emotional state. She describes her condition as follows:

Since leaving my job with Park Place Sports Bar, I have not been able to work outside the home. My anxiety disorder and agoraphobia worsened as a result of Mr. Matusiak’s conduct. At one point in time, I was unable to leave my house. I was, therefore, unable to seek employment. During the calendar year, 2005, I received no income and was supported by my spouse at the time.

ANALYSIS

Violation of the Code

22The relevant provisions of the Code provide as follows:

5.(1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability.

5.(2) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to employment without harassment because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or disability.

9. No person shall infringe or do, directly or indirectly, anything that infringes a right under this Part.

10.(1) In Part 1 and in this Part,

“disability” means,

(d) a mental disorder…

17.(1) A right of a person under this Act is not infringed for the reason only that the person is incapable of performing or fulfilling the essential duties or requirements attending the exercise of the right because of disability.

17.(2) No tribunal or court shall find a person incapable unless it is satisfied that the needs of the person cannot be accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of funding, if any, and health and safety requirements.

23The Tribunal finds no reason to doubt the uncontradicted evidence before it concerning the harassment and discrimination suffered by the complainant in the period leading up to her resigning her employment. The evidence establishes that Matusiak was aware of the complainant’s medical condition.

24While there are general allegations about Matusiak’s conduct, there are only three occasions in relation to which specific details were provided. Matusiak made comments to the complainant, in the presence of other staff and customers, about her medical condition. Matusiak told the complainant she was “messed up” in her head, “needed drugs” and she looked “pretty unstable”. Those comments are discriminatory on the basis of disability and contravene ss. 5(1) and (2) and 9 of the Code.

25The evidence establishes that Matusiak fabricated reasons for the complainant’s absences to other staff members, including the complainant’s mother, and unnecessarily and publicly challenged the complainant about the reasons for her absences. Matusiak knew of the complainant’s anxiety attacks and by fabricating the reasons for the complainant’s absences, he knew or ought to have known that these fabrications would have an emotional impact on the complainant. These fabrications are discriminatory on the basis of disability and contravene the Code. Similarily, Matusiak knew or ought to have known that calling the complainant’s home at 11:00 pm, being rude to her spouse and not accepting the complainant had gone to bed, would have an emotional impact on the complainant. Those actions are discriminating and a breach of the Code. Further, by challenging the complainant about the reasons for her absences when he knew about her medical condition, doing so publicly and expressing his dissatisfaction with her absences, Matusiak discriminated against the complainant on the basis of disability.

26The evidence establishes that Matusiak reduced the complainant’s shifts which were temporarily reinstated after Williams spoke with Matusiak, but were then reduced again by Matusiak. Her shifts were reduced by Matusiak the first time following her discussion with Williams in November 2004 and advising Williams that she wanted to quit her employment because of the difficulties she was experiencing with Matusiak as a result of her disability. It is reasonable to infer that Matusiak discriminated against the complainant the first time that her shifts were reduced as they were reduced shortly following her discussion with Williams.

27However, the evidence is not sufficient to support finding Matusiak discriminated against the complainant when he reduced her shifts the second time. The evidence is that all staff members were told in December 2004 that their shifts and hours would remain the same unless they were advised differently. While the complainant’s shifts were reduced in December 2004, there is no evidence that she was treated differently from other employees.

28The Tribunal finds that the complainant resigned from her employment of 12 years because of the discriminatory conduct by Matusiak. Park Place allowed the complainant to resign, despite knowing the concerns she had with Matusiak’s conduct towards her, her previous attempt to resign her employment because of his discrimination on the basis of disability, and his previous reduction in her shifts. Matusiak was a manager and Park Place knew or ought to have known about his actions and instead allowed the actions to continue. As an employer, Park Place is responsible for its employee’s actions. The Tribunal also finds that Park Place’s conduct constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability within the meaning of ss. 5(1) and (2) and 9 of the Code.

29The Tribunal finds that the actions of the respondents made the workplace intolerable for the complainant. The Tribunal finds that the complainant’s resignation was not truly voluntary and that the comments and conduct of the respondents were the direct cause of the complainant’s loss of employment.

Defence or Justification

30Since the Commission and the complainant have established there was prima facie discrimination, the legal onus shifts to the respondents to demonstrate if there was a defence or justification under the Code; see, for example, British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU, 1999 CanLII 652 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3. Since the respondents have not appeared nor presented any evidence or argument in the Tribunal’s process, the respondents cannot meet this burden and I need not consider this issue.

REMEDIES

31The Commission has requested a number of remedies including general damages, special damages, interest and public interest remedies. The Tribunal grants some of those remedies although the Tribunal finds it appropriate to make different awards of certain remedies from those requested. The Tribunal’s ability to award remedies is found in s. 45.2 of the Code, which states:

(1)On an application under section 34, the Tribunal may make one or more of the following orders if the Tribunal determines that a party to the application has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the application:

1. An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

2. An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.

3. An order directing any party to the application to do anything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the party ought to do to promote compliance with this Act.

For greater certainty, an order under paragraph 3 of subsection (1),

(a)may direct a person to do anything with respect to future practices; and

(b)may be made even if no order under that paragraph was requested.

GENERAL DAMAGES

32The Commission seeks an award of $20,000.00 in general damages for breach of the complainant’s rights under the Code as compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. In support of its position, the Commission submits that there is an intrinsic value to the rights enumerated under the Code and the infringement of those rights warrants the assessment of general damages which generally flow whenever a complaint of discrimination is upheld. The Commission submits that there is no ceiling on general damage awards and the Tribunal has cautioned against making such awards too low, since doing so could trivialize the social importance of the Code by effectively creating a sort of license fee to discriminate. In this respect, the Commission relies on Sanford v. Koop (No. 2), 2005 HRTO 53 at para. 34 and Boodhram v. 2009158 Ontario Ltd. (No. 2), 2005 HRTO 54 at para. 23.

33The factors that are generally considered in determining the quantum of general damages are:

• Humiliation experienced by the complainant;

• Hurt feelings experienced by the complainant;

• A complainant’s loss of self-respect;

• A complainant’s loss of dignity;

• A complainant’s loss of self-esteem;

• A complainant’s loss of confidence;

• The experience of victimization;

• Vulnerability of the complainant; and

• The seriousness, frequency and duration of the offensive treatment.

(Sanford v. Koop, supra, at para. 35)

34In the circumstances of this complaint, the Commission argues that an award of $20,000 is justified because of the seriousness of the actions by the respondents and the significant impact on the complainant. The complainant lost her job and was rendered unemployable.

35The Commission has correctly summarized the general principles applicable to making an award for general damages including its reference to applicable factors. However, after applying the factors set out in para. 33 above to the evidence in this case, the Tribunal finds it appropriate to award a different amount of general damages.

36The complainant’s rights under the Code were violated by the respondents. The conduct occurred over an approximate one and a half year period, from approximately August 2003 (several months after Matusiak was hired) until January 2005 (when the complainant resigned). The conduct was primarily verbal. Although there were two periods during which the number of her shifts was reduced, only one of those was found to amount to discrimination.

37In assessing the seriousness of the conduct, what is most significant in this case is the impact of the discriminatory conduct on the complainant’s mental and emotional state. As a woman already suffering from an anxiety disorder, the discriminatory conduct compounded the complainant’s feelings of vulnerability, dignity and self-respect and humiliation. This ultimately led to her resigning her employment and rendered her unable to work and, at one point in time, unable to leave her house.

38Considering the Tribunal’s findings in this complaint and bearing in mind its jurisprudence, the Tribunal finds it appropriate to award the complainant $15,000.00 in general damages.

SPECIAL DAMAGES FOR LOST WAGES

39The Commission seeks $300,000.000 as special damages for loss of future income ($10,000.00 annual income x 30 years of employment from age 35 to age 65), with $40,000.00 as loss of damages from the date of resignation until the date of the written submissions filed by the Commission. The complainant’s affidavit states that she has not been able to work outside of the home following her resignation from Park Place. She claims that her anxiety disorder and agoraphobia worsened as a result of Matusiak’s conduct and that at one point she was unable to leave the house. It was not until 2007 that she started to receive an income from Ontario Disability Support Program.

40The Commission filed medical documentation as exhibits to the affidavit. Specifically, it filed a medical certificate for Employment Insurance Sickness Benefits completed by Dr. Hunchak dated April 25, 2006; a Health Status Report completed by Dr. Coulby dated October 17, 2006 (with pages missing); a Durham Access to Care Request for Assessment form completed by Dr. Hunchak dated April 4, 2006; a Durham Access to Care form completed by A. Banfield, RN, dated 11/4/6; and a Community Advantage Rehabilitation O.T. Mental Health Assessment Report completed by T. Clayton, occupational therapist, dated October 2, 2006 (with pages missing).

41The Commission also filed the complainant’s Notice of Assessments for the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2004 as exhibits. The Notice of Assessments show that the complainant’s income fluctuated over those years with, at its highest, over $10,000.00 in income in 1999 and its lowest, over $6,000.00 in income in 2004. The Commission submitted that the Tribunal should calculate the complainant’s loss of wages based upon an annual income of $10,000.00. In her affidavit, the complainant stated that her income dropped following the birth of her second child in 2002 and that she had fully expected to return to the 1999 income once her second child was out of his infant stage. Notice of Assessments were not submitted subsequent to 2004 to establish what, if any, sources of income the complainant received after her resignation. No evidence was submitted regarding the complainant’s hourly rate and the number of shifts to which she had been regularly scheduled before December 2004.

42The Commission agrees complainants are under a duty to mitigate their special damages, but notes the onus is on a respondent to prove that a complainant failed to mitigate such losses. The Commission submits that the respondents have not adduced any such evidence and there is no basis to question the inability of the complainant to obtain other employment.

43In awarding special damages, the applicable principle is to place the complainant into the position that she would have been in had the discriminatory acts not occurred. In this case, I have found the complainant involuntarily resigned her employment of over twelve years because of the harassment and discrimination perpetrated by the respondents.

44The complainant explained that she resigned from her employment because of the conduct of the respondents, her medical condition worsened because of Matusiak’s conduct, and that at one point following her resignation she was unable to leave her house. The Tribunal accepts this as evidence the harassment and discrimination suffered by the complainant by the respondents had an immediate and ongoing impact on her mental and emotional state. However, for the following reasons the Tribunal is not satisfied the medical evidence is sufficient to establish the discriminatory incidents caused the complainant to have been, and continue to be, unable to work outside her home in any capacity since her resignation.

45The medical documentation was completed by four different health care professionals between April and October 2006. The medical documentation (in the form of the Medical Certificate completed by Dr. Hunchak in April 2006) suggests that the complainant was unable to work for medical reasons beginning December 23, 2005, rather than from January 2005, the time of her resignation from Park Place. In the same report, the complainant self reports that her illness began on December 12, 2005, not earlier. The Durham Access to Care Social Assessment form completed in April 2006 by A. Banfield, RN and signed by the complainant states that as of April 2006, the complainant wanted to return to work and that a job was being held for her. In the same report it was noted the complainant had increased difficulties managing work and activities of daily living and would develop strategies to manage those issues. Her prognosis is marked “improve” over the other options of “remain stable”, “deteriorate” or “unknown”. In the Durham Access to Care Request for Assessment form completed by Dr. Hunchak in April 2006, he also marks the complainant’s prognosis as “improve” over “remains [stable]…” or “deteriorate”. By October 2006 the Community Advantage Rehabilitation O.T. Mental Health Assessment Report completed by T. Clayton states that the complainant was not able to obtain and maintain employment and that the complainant reported being unable to leave the house. Dr. Coulby, in October 2006, also noted the complainant’s difficulties in leaving the house. There is no medical documentation provided beyond October 2006.

46While I accept that it is the respondents’ onus to prove failure to mitigate (see Heintz v. Christian Horizons, 2008 HRTO 22 at para. 265), the Commission and/or the complainant have an obligation to establish the complainant’s losses (see Pchelkina v. Tomsons, 2007 HRTO 42 at para. 26). In this case, the complainant is alleging that she was not able to work because of her medical condition rather than not being able to find other employment. The medical documentation provided does not establish the complainant’s inability to work following her resignation in January 2005 or any connection of her medical problems to the discrimination.

47The medical documentation addresses a period of time much after the complainant resigned her employment with Park Place. There is no medical evidence submitted pertaining to the period from January to December 2005. Further, while the medical documentation that has been provided identifies the complainant’s medical conditions as of 2006, there is no medical information provided about the cause of those medical conditions, and no medical evidence that they were related to or exacerbated by the discrimination. Despite the claim for loss of wages for 30 years until the complainant is age 65, the last medical documentation submitted is from October 2006 and there is no medical documentation addressing the complainant’s ability or inability to work until age 65. Therefore, the evidence that was submitted does not substantiate a claim for loss of wages following the complainant’s resignation from Park Place in January 2005.

INTEREST

48The Commission requests pre-judgment interest on all amounts in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990. c. C.43, as amended (the “CJA”). The Tribunal finds it appropriate to award pre-judgment interest on the general damages award. Pre-judgment interest shall run from the date of the complaint. The rate shall be in accordance with s. 127 of the CJA.

49Post-judgement interest on the damages awarded shall be payable commencing 30 days from the date of this Decision and calculated in accordance with s. 127 of the CJA.

ORDERS REGARDING FUTURE PRACTICES

50The Commission also seeks orders to achieve future compliance with the Code. The Tribunal’s authority to award such remedies is set out in s. 45.2(2) of the Code (see para. 29). The Commission has requested that the Tribunal award the following additional remedies:

a) An order that within two months of the Tribunal’s Decision, Park Place shall deliver to all employees a written notice stating the following:

As an employee, you have the right to reasonable accommodation for any and all disabilities. Please speak to your manager about any accommodations that you require. You also have the right to be free from harassment on account of your disability.

b) Within a week of delivering the above notice, the Corporate Respondent shall confirm in writing to the Commission that the notice has been delivered.

c) The corporate respondent shall provide a written notice to all future employees and sub-contractors of Casa Industries [sic].

51The Tribunal has broad powers under s. 45.2(2) of the Code to direct a party to do anything that is necessary to achieve compliance with the Code. As stated in Pchelinka, supra, at paras. 33 and 34, referencing an earlier version of the Code:

33. The Tribunal’s power in s. 41(1)(a) to direct a party to do anything that in its opinion is necessary to achieve compliance with the Code is, as the Board of Inquiry recognized in Curling v. Torimiro (No. 4) (2000), 38 C.H.R.R. D/215 at para. 66, broad, and should be interpreted liberally and in a manner consistent with the Code as remedial legislation. Moreover, the Tribunal’s power to award what have become known as ‘public interest remedies’ is an important part of its mandate in ensuring that its decisions not only redress the discrimination experienced by the individual Complainant, but also assist in ensuring that future violations do not occur. They are of particular concern in a case where the Respondent has not participated, because this may suggest that the Respondent ‘does not take the law, or his violations of it, seriously’: Morrison v. Motsewetsho (No. 2), 2003 HRTO 21 at para. 224.

34. While the Tribunal’s power is broad, remedies under s. 41(1)(a) must relate to the section’s purpose of promoting compliance with the Code. Moreover, they must reflect the general principle that human rights codes are remedial, not punitive, and should reflect the violation of the Code that the Tribunal has found.

52I accept that the remedies sought by the Commission are consistent with the principles of s. 45.2(2) and require the corporate respondent to comply with them.

ORDER

53Having found the respondents violated ss. 5(1) and (2) and 9 of the Code, the Tribunal makes the following orders:

1. the respondents Park Place and Matusiak, jointly or severally, shall pay the complainant $15,000.00 in general damages, together with pre-judgment on this amount from January 2, 2005 to the date of this Decision in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act;

2. post-judgement interest on the general damages award shall be payable on any amounts not paid within 30 days of the date of this Decision in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act;

3. within two months of the Tribunal’s Decision, Park Place shall deliver to all its employees by posting in the workplace a written notice stating it has been directed to communicate with them by the HRTO and to advise them of the following:

As an employee, you have the right to reasonable accommodation for any and all disabilities. Please speak to your manager about any accommodations that you require. You also have the right to be free from harassment on account of your disability.

4. within one week of posting the above notice, Park Place shall confirm in writing to the Commission that the notice has been posted; and

5. Park Place shall provide such written notice to all future employees.