Gregory Azeff

The Court-appointed Receiver brought a motion to compel the principal of the Receivership Respondents to release approximately 11,271 emails.

The principal opposed the motion, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that the emails belonged to the corporate entities, not the principal personally, and that the Receiver was authorized under the Receivership Order to investigate the entities' affairs, which included reviewing the emails.

The motion was granted and the principal was ordered to release the emails.

The Receiver brought a motion for a contempt order against the respondent for failing to comply with a Receivership Order.

The court previously found the respondent in contempt.

At the sentencing hearing, the court considered the respondent's subsequent efforts to purge his contempt, including attending examinations and providing documents, as well as his apology.

Applying the Cavalon factors, the court declined to impose a custodial sentence but ordered the respondent to pay a $15,000 fine, declaring it a penalty under s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

In the context of CCAA proceedings, the moving party sought an order declaring that the limitation period for its action against the debtor was suspended by a prior tolling order, or alternatively, an order lifting the stay of proceedings nunc pro tunc to regularize its action.

The court held that the tolling order did not apply to third-party claims against the debtor.

Furthermore, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Green, the court held it had no authority to grant a nunc pro tunc order lifting the stay because the moving party failed to seek leave before the limitation period expired.

The motion was dismissed.

In a bankruptcy proposal proceeding, the fourth mortgagee brought a motion for a vesting order to purchase the debtor's property, while a competing purchaser brought a cross-motion to set aside a previous vesting order on the basis of lack of notice.

The court found that the competing purchaser had been unfairly deprived of notice and the opportunity to participate in the hearing.

The court terminated all previous agreements of purchase and sale and ordered a new confidential bidding process to ensure fairness.

The applicant tenant operated an adult entertainment club and sought a declaration that a notice of termination from the respondent landlord was invalid.

The tenant argued the lease had been validly extended by oral agreement with the previous landlord, while the new landlord argued the extension violated the Statute of Frauds and was unregistered under the Land Titles Act.

The court found the lease extension was valid due to part performance and binding on the new landlord because it had actual notice of the tenancy.

However, the court held the landlord was not required to maintain the municipal owner's licence for the club.

The court declared the termination notice invalid and granted the tenant relief from forfeiture, providing a reasonable time to obtain its own licence.

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitral award under the International Commercial Arbitration Act.

The court found that the arbitrator committed a reviewable error by deciding the issue on a theory not argued by the parties, which amounted to the applicant being unable to present its case.

However, the court declined to exercise its discretion to set aside the award.

The court found that the arbitrator's ultimate decision on the merits was reasonable, the contract interpretation involved mixed fact and law subject to deference, and remitting the matter for a rehearing would serve no practical purpose.

The defendant insurer moved to stay a civil action brought by insured parties seeking payment under a marine insurance policy following a ship collision with a railway bridge.

The insurer relied on an arbitration clause governed by the International Commercial Arbitrations Act requiring disputes to be referred to arbitration in London.

The plaintiffs argued their claim instead enforced a settlement agreement allegedly reached with the insurer.

The court held that the evidentiary record did not establish a stand‑alone settlement agreement independent of the insurance policy and therefore the arbitration clause applied.

However, due to concerns that procedural preconditions in the insurer’s internal rules could delay access to arbitration, the court issued a temporary stay and directed steps to ensure the arbitration process could proceed.