The applicant sought judicial screening leave under s. 745.61 of the Criminal Code to empanel a jury to reduce his parole ineligibility period for first degree murder arising from a fatal bank robbery.
He argued that the post-2011 amendment changing the threshold from a 'reasonable prospect' to a 'substantial likelihood' of success violated ss. 11(h) and 11(i) of the Charter when applied retrospectively.
The court rejected the constitutional challenge, holding the amendment was procedural and did not alter the applicant’s settled expectation of liberty or amount to additional punishment.
On the merits, the court found the applicant’s institutional record, only recent rehabilitative efforts, qualified remorse, failure to fully accept responsibility, and the brutal nature of the offence meant there was not a substantial likelihood that a jury would unanimously reduce parole ineligibility.
The application was dismissed, with leave to reapply in five years.
