Dr. Dino Zuccarini

The appellant father moved for a stay pending appeal of a final parenting order that granted primary residence and sole decision-making authority to the respondent mother.

The mother opposed the stay and moved for security for costs of the trial and appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the appeal grounds were weak and a stay would not be in the child's best interests given the trial judge's findings of severe coercive control and family violence by the father.

The court granted the mother's motion for security for costs of the appeal in the amount of $30,000 due to the father's unpaid costs orders and the weakness of the appeal, but dismissed the request for security for trial costs as they had not yet been determined.

In a high-conflict parenting trial, the court found a prolonged and severe pattern of coercive and controlling family violence by the applicant father against the respondent mother, with ongoing harmful impact on the child.

Applying the best-interests analysis under the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court held that the father’s conduct, including interference with parenting time, inappropriate communications, and pressure placed on the child, rendered him incapable of supporting the child’s relationship with the mother or making decisions in the child’s best interests.

The court ordered that the child reside primarily with the mother, granted the mother sole decision-making authority, imposed a staged and conditional parenting regime for the father, dismissed the father’s relocation request, and continued a restraining order.

The court also imputed the father’s income at $50,000 for child support purposes and directed ongoing support.

In a family law application that had been outstanding for five years, the self-represented party refused to participate in the trial without counsel, citing medical issues and stress.

The moving party brought a motion for the appointment of an amicus curiae to assist the court and ensure the trial could proceed.

Applying the principles from Morwald-Benevides, the court found that the self-represented party was hopelessly incompetent to self-represent and that the assistance of an amicus was essential to the adequate discharge of the judicial function.

The motion was granted, and Legal Aid Ontario was directed to provide a list of lawyers willing to act as amicus.