E. Gionet

A real estate brokerage sought summary judgment for unpaid commission under a Buyer Representation Agreement after the defendant purchased a property during the agreement’s term.

The defendant argued the agreement had been terminated by an oral agreement and that the brokerage failed to perform its obligations to assist with the purchase.

The court held that the alleged oral termination lacked evidentiary support and failed to establish the essential elements of a binding agreement.

The court also found the brokerage had fulfilled its contractual obligation to assist the buyer and that the eventual purchase largely relied on earlier efforts undertaken by the brokerage.

Summary judgment was granted and the buyer was ordered to pay the contractual commission.

The moving party sought partial summary judgment rescinding a franchise agreement under s. 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, alleging the franchisor failed to provide proper disclosure.

The respondent argued the transaction fell within the resale exemption under s. 5(7)(a)(iv), asserting the franchise was granted by an existing franchisee and not effected by or through the franchisor.

The court held that the franchisor was actively involved in effecting the grant by approving the franchisee, requiring training, structuring the lease and security arrangements, and setting the terms of the new franchise agreement.

Because the franchisor played a substantive role beyond merely consenting to the transfer, the disclosure exemption did not apply.

The franchise agreement was therefore rescinded pursuant to s. 6(2) of the Act.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction enforcing restrictive covenants in a license agreement with a former licensee operating a mobile sign business.

After the agreement expired, the former licensee allegedly solicited customers and attempted to continue operating under a competing company within the restricted geographic area.

Applying the test from RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada, the court found a strong prima facie case that the restrictive covenant was enforceable and had been breached.

The court also found that the diversion of customers and misuse of the plaintiff’s trade name would cause irreparable harm to goodwill and business relations, and that the balance of convenience favoured protection of the plaintiff’s business.

An interim injunction was granted restraining the defendant from operating a competing mobile sign business within the restricted area and from soliciting the plaintiff’s customers pending further review.

During a jury trial concerning entitlement to life insurance proceeds, the court issued a mid‑trial ruling on when a life insurance contract takes effect under s. 180(1) of the Insurance Act.

The dispute concerned whether the policy came into force on its stated effective date or only upon delivery, payment of the first premium, and the absence of any change in insurability.

The court held that ambiguous language in the application’s signature form did not displace the statutory requirements.

The contractual references to an “effective date” related only to the calculation of policy benefits and time periods, not the date the policy came into force.

Accordingly, s. 180(1) governed and the policy would only take effect if there had been no change in insurability between application and delivery.