D. MacDonald

The moving party (former husband) brought a motion to stay and suspend his spousal support obligations on an interim basis following the termination of his employment.

The responding party (former wife) opposed the motion, arguing she still required support and that the moving party had received a significant severance package.

The court applied the four-part test for an interim variation of a final support order and found the moving party established a strong prima facie case, hardship, urgency, and clean hands.

The court granted the motion, ordering the stay and suspension of spousal support obligations prospectively, effective March 31, 2023.

During a civil jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a child pedestrian, the court ruled on the permissible scope of testimony from an accident reconstruction expert.

The plaintiffs sought to elicit opinion evidence concerning alleged deficiencies in the defendant vehicle’s braking system and on driver perception and reaction times.

The court held that Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires expert reports to clearly state the opinions being advanced and their factual bases, and an expert cannot introduce a new field of opinion not articulated in the report.

Because the expert’s reports did not opine that the brake condition contributed to the collision, such testimony would improperly expand the report.

The court also barred additional human factors opinion evidence as duplicative of testimony already provided by a qualified human factors expert.

The defendant moved to exclude examination for discovery transcripts on the basis that he did not have an interpreter during the first discovery and that some answers during the second discovery were given in broken English.

The moving party argued the transcripts were unreliable and unfair to use at trial.

The court held that the obligation to arrange for an interpreter rests with the party being examined and noted the defendant had an opportunity during the second discovery to correct earlier answers.

The court found that although the defendant would testify at trial through an interpreter, the discovery transcripts should not be struck.

Instead, the court directed that proposed read‑ins be reviewed to ensure fairness in light of the language issues.

The plaintiffs in a motor vehicle personal injury action involving a child with an alleged brain injury sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial.

The court considered factors governing leave to call additional experts, including necessity, duplication of evidence, fairness between parties, and proportionality.

While acknowledging the complexity of the medical issues and future care claims, the court emphasized the trial judge’s gatekeeping role and the need to avoid unnecessary or repetitive expert testimony.

Leave was granted for several experts with distinct specialties but denied for others whose proposed evidence lacked a compliant Rule 53 report or would duplicate testimony from other experts.

The court limited the number of occupational therapists who could testify and refused permission for certain proposed witnesses whose opinions were unnecessary or procedurally deficient.

During a civil jury trial arising from a pedestrian motor vehicle accident involving a child, the defendants moved for a mistrial after the plaintiffs’ counsel delivered an opening address containing alleged misstatements of law and improper argument.

The court found that counsel repeatedly misstated the reverse onus under the Highway Traffic Act by suggesting that all defendants bore the burden of disproving negligence, improperly argued factual conclusions regarding vehicle brake defects without supporting expert evidence, and displayed discovery transcript excerpts suggesting an admission of negligence by one defendant.

The court held that the discovery excerpt was misleading, potentially inadmissible, and taken out of context, particularly given language barriers during the examination for discovery.

Considering the cumulative prejudicial impact of the opening remarks, the court concluded that corrective instructions would not sufficiently remedy the prejudice to the jury.

A mistrial was therefore declared.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a child pedestrian, the defendants moved for a mistrial following the plaintiffs’ opening address.

The court had previously ruled that a police mechanic could not provide expert opinion evidence regarding the condition or effect of the vehicle’s brakes.

In the opening address, plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that the defendant driver’s brakes were in an unsatisfactory condition and invited the jury to infer that this contributed to the accident, despite the absence of expert evidence supporting such a theory.

The court held that the opening address improperly contained argument, inaccurate statements about the police investigation, and suggestions that the jury act as enforcers of societal rules.

Because the comments invited the jury to draw conclusions unsupported by admissible evidence and could not be cured by a corrective instruction, a mistrial was declared.