Diane Campbell

The appellant, the sole director of a roofing company, appealed an assessment for unremitted GST/HST, penalties, and interest.

The company faced severe cash-flow problems because contractors refused to pay for completed subcontracts unless the appellant submitted to sexual harassment, and the company also faced racial discrimination.

The appellant and her office manager prioritized remittances, hired bookkeepers, communicated constantly with the CRA, and sought loans, but were unable to collect on key contracts.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant established a due diligence defence under subsection 323(3) of the Excise Tax Act because she exercised the required degree of care, diligence, and skill to prevent the failure to remit in these exceptional circumstances.

The Appellant corporation appealed a tax assessment under subsection 160(1) of the Income Tax Act, which held it jointly and severally liable for the tax debt of a related corporation.

The related corporation had transferred property to the Appellant by paying a $600,000 dividend, and the Appellant argued it provided fair market value consideration by executing a $600,000 loan agreement in return.

The Tax Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the two corporations were controlled by the same directing mind and thus deemed not to deal at arm's length.

Furthermore, the Court concluded that the loan was a separate transaction and did not constitute fair market value consideration for the dividend.

The appellant appealed reassessments for the 2014 and 2015 taxation years that included overtime meal allowances and travel allowances in his income as taxable benefits.

The Tax Court of Canada held that the overtime meal allowances were reasonable travel expenses incurred in the performance of employment duties at remote work sites, and thus exempt under subparagraph 6(1)(b)(vii) of the Income Tax Act.

However, the travel allowances were properly included in income because they were calculated from a common departure point rather than the appellant's principal place of residence, failing to meet the requirements of the special work site exemption in paragraph 6(6)(b).

The appeals were allowed in part, without costs.