D. Hurren

Following dismissal of an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act as out of time, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The applicant argued the matter was public interest litigation and that no costs should be awarded.

The court held that applications under the Act do not attract a blanket public interest exception and that unsuccessful applicants may be ordered to pay costs.

Although the respondents sought substantial indemnity or significant partial indemnity costs, the court found the claimed hours excessive and declined to award enhanced costs.

Costs were fixed at a reduced all-inclusive amount reflecting reasonableness and access to justice considerations.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a fentanyl patch contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

She attended a detention centre to deliver forms to an inmate.

A fentanyl patch was discovered attached to one of her personal documents by a correctional officer during inspection.

The accused denied knowledge of the patch.

The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework and found that while the Crown's evidence raised suspicions, it did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of or was complicit in the smuggling.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a Fentanyl Patch contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused elected trial in the Ontario Court of Justice and pled not guilty.

The Crown sought to introduce an analyst's certificate regarding the substance found.

The defence argued that proper notice of the certificate had not been given to counsel because the documents were served on counsel's agent but never reached counsel personally.

The court ruled that service on counsel's authorized agent constitutes valid service on counsel, and the failure of the agent to deliver the documents to counsel does not invalidate the service.

The certificate was admitted into evidence.

The defendant was charged with driving while disqualified.

At the conclusion of the Crown's case-in-chief, the defence brought a motion for non-suit, arguing there was insufficient evidence that the defendant knew she was disqualified from driving.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant's acknowledgment of the prohibition order, combined with the certificate of suspension and deemed knowledge provisions under the Highway Traffic Act, provided sufficient evidence of mens rea for a jury to consider.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and possessing cocaine.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

At trial, defence counsel conceded sufficient evidence of guilt but argued the evidence should be excluded under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that sections 8, 9, and 10(b) had been infringed.

The defence argued the approved screening device demand was not made "forthwith" and the test was not conducted "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found no Charter infringement occurred and, in any event, would not have excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.