D. Chappel

The applicant brought an urgent motion prior to a case conference seeking exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, interim child support, and interim spousal support.

The respondent was in default but appeared and consented to exclusive possession on the condition he not pay support.

The court granted the applicant leave to proceed due to urgency, as she and the child were facing eviction.

The court ordered exclusive possession of the home to the applicant, with the respondent to pay all carrying costs in lieu of interim spousal support.

The respondent was also ordered to clean the home, pay Table child support of $1,006 per month, and contribute to section 7 expenses.

In the context of a family law trial, the court held a voir dire to determine the admissibility of expert opinion evidence from a pediatrician regarding alleged child maltreatment.

The applicant father sought to exclude the evidence entirely, arguing the expert was a litigation expert who failed to comply with procedural rules and lacked impartiality.

The court found the pediatrician was a participant and non-party expert, and admitted his viva voce evidence and most of his report, but excluded specific paragraphs opining on whether the child suffered maltreatment specifically in the father's care, finding those conclusions lacked necessity and threshold reliability.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion for the return of the children to her primary care, temporary sole decision-making responsibility, and school enrollment after the respondent father failed to return the children following a summer vacation.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking primary residence and school enrollment in his municipality, alleging the children refused to return due to the mother's toxic home environment and excessive discipline.

The court ordered the children returned to the mother's primary care on a temporary without prejudice basis pending a long motion, granting her sole decision-making responsibility and the right to enroll the children in her chosen schools, while ordering alternate weekend parenting time for the father.

The applicant father brought a motion for temporary sole custody of the parties' 11-year-old child, seeking to supersede an existing New York custody order that granted physical custody to the respondent mother.

The child had resided in New York with the mother for over a year prior to the application.

The court determined that sections 42 and 43 of the Children's Law Reform Act applied to the jurisdictional analysis.

Finding that the child's habitual residence had reverted to New York and that the balance of convenience favoured New York as the forum with the most substantial evidence, the court declined jurisdiction and dismissed the application.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a temporary without prejudice spousal support order, seeking an increase to $850 per month.

The respondent argued that the applicant had not established a material change in circumstances and that income should be imputed to her due to insufficient efforts to find employment.

The court held that the test for varying a temporary without prejudice order is a hearing de novo, not a substantial change in circumstances.

The court declined to impute income to the applicant, finding she had made reasonable efforts to retrain and seek employment given her circumstances.

The motion was granted, and temporary spousal support was increased to $850 per month.

The applicant, an adult entertainment parlour operator, challenged the City of Brantford's by-law requiring operators and entertainers to obtain licences and pay fees.

The applicant argued the by-law was ultra vires, discriminatory on the basis of sex, and imposed excessive fees.

The court found the licensing provisions were within the municipality's authority under the Municipal Act, 2001, and the fees were not excessive.

However, the court held that the by-law's definition of 'partial nudity', which singled out the female breast, discriminated against female entertainers on the basis of sex contrary to the Human Rights Code.

The court declared that specific provision invalid but suspended the declaration for six months to allow the municipality to amend the by-law.

The applicant Children's Aid Society brought an application to extend a secure treatment order for a 15-year-old Crown ward for a period of 180 days.

The youth suffered from schizophrenia and substance abuse issues, and had a history of high-risk behaviours including going AWOL and acting aggressively.

The court found that all five criteria under section 120(5) of the Child and Family Services Act were met, including that the youth suffered from a mental disorder, the treatment would prevent serious bodily harm, no less restrictive method was appropriate, and there was an appropriate plan for care upon release.

The application was granted and the secure treatment order was extended for 180 days.