Darryl Willer

The parties resolved all issues except parenting time and child support for their six-year-old child.

The respondent sought equal parenting time on a 2/2/3 schedule, while the applicant opposed, citing concerns about after-school care and the respondent's support network.

The court found that both parents were capable and loving, and that transitioning to equal parenting time was in the child's best interests.

The court ordered a 2/2/3 shared parenting schedule.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that the respondent was intentionally underemployed, finding his reduced hours accommodated his parenting time.

The applicant was ordered to pay $532 per month in child support based on the shared parenting arrangement.

The parties settled their family law matter with comprehensive minutes of settlement and brought a 14B motion for a consent order.

The court adjourned the motion, noting that while courts rarely interfere with such agreements, it cannot act as a rubber stamp and must independently consider whether the terms are in the children's best interests.

The parties were directed to file brief affidavits explaining the terms and updated Form 35.1 affidavits.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict family law trial primarily concerning the custody and access of their two children.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, alleging the children were alienated from the respondent father and his new wife.

The respondent father sought sole custody, alleging the mother was alienating the children from him.

The court found both parties contributed to the conflict but determined the mother's evidence lacked credibility on several substantive issues.

The court awarded custody to the father with an equal timesharing arrangement, finding he was more likely to facilitate contact with the other parent.

The court also ordered ongoing therapeutic intervention to ensure a balanced relationship between the children and both parents, and determined the parties' incomes for child support purposes.

The applicants brought a motion for leave to argue a motion for summary judgment mid-trial, and the respondent brought a motion for directions seeking a trial de novo following a mistrial declared by the previous trial judge.

The court dismissed the motion for leave for summary judgment, interpreting Rule 16(1) of the Family Law Rules to mean that such motions must be brought before a trial commences.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for a trial de novo, ordering that the trial continue from the point where the evidence concluded, in accordance with a prior Divisional Court order.