C.K. Boggs

The vehicle owner brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing multiple civil actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident caused by her 17‑year‑old son while impaired.

The central issue was whether the son had the owner's implied consent to possess and operate the vehicle, engaging owner liability principles.

The court held that the issue of implied consent could properly be determined on summary judgment where the evidentiary record was complete and no responding party adduced evidence.

Accepting the son's consistent discovery evidence that he did not believe he had permission and had taken the vehicle without consent, the court found no implied consent on a balance of probabilities.

The actions against the vehicle owner were dismissed.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment in a defamation action.

The underlying dispute arose from an email sent by the defendant, a neurologist, to the Minister of Health and the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario requesting investigation into the plaintiff’s involvement in diagnosing and treating a controversial medical condition.

The motion judge had refused summary judgment largely on the basis that the plaintiff had delivered a jury notice and should have the opportunity to have issues such as malice determined by a jury.

The court held that the existence of a jury notice does not alter the test for summary judgment and that the motion judge erred by declining to determine the asserted defences of absolute privilege, qualified privilege, justification, and fair comment where the material facts were not in dispute.

Finding conflicting authority and good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and that the issue was of broader importance regarding the availability of summary judgment in defamation actions, the court granted leave to appeal.