C. Israel

The Crown sought to admit statements made by three defendants charged in relation to a first degree murder.

The defendants argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of their Charter rights.

The court found all three statements were voluntary.

Mr. Kerr's statement was admitted despite a minor s. 10(b) breach.

Mr. Samuel's statement was admitted as no Charter breaches were established.

Ms. Owen's statement was excluded under s. 24(2) because she was arbitrarily detained and denied her right to counsel during the execution of a search warrant, and the court rejected the Crown's argument that the 'actus reus exception' precluded exclusion.

The accused applied for a bail review following a detention order based on the tertiary ground.

The accused proposed a release plan involving house arrest with his parents as sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found that the combination of the electronic monitoring proposal and the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that a reasonably informed member of the public would not lose confidence in the justice system if the accused were released under strict conditions during a global health crisis, and granted the application for release.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The charges arose from an execution-style shooting in downtown Toronto where the applicant allegedly acted as the getaway driver.

The Crown was seeking certiorari to reinstate a first-degree murder charge.

The court denied bail, finding that while the primary and secondary grounds might be manageable with a strict supervision plan, detention was necessary under the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the offence.

The applicant, charged with drug offences following the execution of a telewarrant at his residence, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The applicant argued that cross-examination was necessary to challenge the reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant, specifically regarding the urgency of the telewarrant, the need for a night-time search, and the reliability of confidential informants.

The court applied the Garofoli test and granted leave to cross-examine the affiant, but restricted the scope to specific areas including when the affiant learned the applicant's name, the basis for describing the applicant as having a violent record and multiple firearms, and the failure to disclose a linked vehicle.