Christopher Uwagboe

Dia Eddin Hanan was sentenced for manslaughter, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and discharge of a firearm with intent to wound, following a jury trial where he was acquitted of second-degree murder and attempted murder.

The court made specific factual findings for sentencing, including that Hanan brought the gun, initiated the shooting, and shot one victim in the back as he fled, causing permanent paralysis.

The global sentence imposed was 15 years imprisonment, reduced to 12 years and 7 months after accounting for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence due to the gravity of the offences, which resulted in one death and one lifetime paralysis.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges including sexual assault and procuring.

He argued the justice of the peace erred in law and that a new release plan proposing electronic monitoring and an additional surety constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding no consequential error in the initial decision and concluding that electronic monitoring could not cure a deficient release plan involving unsuitable sureties.

The accused, charged with second degree murder and attempted murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to trial delay.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of trial was 47.5 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by discrete exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was 35 months and 7 days, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, because the case commenced before the release of the Jordan decision, the court applied the transitional exceptional circumstances framework.

The court found that the Crown's reliance on the previous law justified the delay, noting the Crown's efforts to push the case forward and the defence's lack of effort to expedite the proceedings prior to the trial adjournment.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant, Darryl Ryan Bloomfield, pleaded guilty to break, enter, and theft of a dwelling-house.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, the offender's troubled history including substance abuse and a lengthy criminal record, and victim impact.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence followed by two years probation, while the defence requested a suspended sentence with a three-year probation order including a curfew and electronic monitoring.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the serious nature of the offence and the offender's history of non-compliance with community supervision, while also acknowledging mitigating factors like the guilty plea and efforts towards rehabilitation.

A custodial sentence of nine months was imposed, followed by two years of probation with strict conditions, a DNA order, and a victim surcharge.

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually interfering with his 12-year-old niece while he was on parole for manslaughter.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the breach of trust and the offender's intoxication, against mitigating factors.

The court imposed a sentence of 30 months' custody for sexual interference, with the sexual assault charge conditionally stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The offender received 809 days of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and sexual assault against his 12-year-old niece.

The complainant alleged that the accused touched her buttocks and digitally penetrated her while she was sleeping in the living room.

The court found the complainant's core narrative to be credible and reliable despite some minor inconsistencies.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to two charges of breach of undertaking.

The central issue was the appropriate credit to be given for pre-trial custody.

The Crown argued for one-for-one credit under section 719(3) of the Criminal Code, while the defence argued for one-and-a-half-for-one credit under section 719(3.1).

The court found that because the Crown had not formally applied to cancel the accused's bail pursuant to section 524(8), the accused was not "detained in custody" within the meaning of section 719(3.1), and therefore was entitled to enhanced credit at the one-and-a-half-for-one rate.