CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW BOARD
BETWEEN:
DR Applicant
-and-
Family and Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin County Respondent
DECISION
Adjudicator: Donna A. Wowk Date: May 29, 2025 Citation: 2025 CFSRB 68 Indexed As: DR v Family and Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin County (CYFSA s.120)
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS
DR, Applicant Self-represented
Family and Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin County, Respondent Shannon Dinh, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
1The Applicant currently has two Applications before the Child and Family Services Review Board (“CFSRB”): CA24-0039 and CA25-0072 (“the current Applications”). The current Applications against the Respondent were filed under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c.14, Sched. 1 (the “Act”).
2On April 14, 2025, the CFSRB issued a Case Management Direction (“CMD”), in which it directed the parties to provided written submissions, within specified timelines, on the following issue:
- Should an order be made by the CFSRB regarding the applicability of Rule A8 to the current and future applications filed by the Applicant with the CFSRB.
3For the reasons set out below, I decline to find the Applicant to be a vexatious litigant.
BACKGROUND
4Between October 2024 and April 14, 2025, the Applicant filed six Applications with the CFSRB. One of these Applications was in relation to the Applicant’s stepdaughters, RG and EG, one was in relation to EG, two were in relation to his son BR, one was in relation to BR and EG, and one did not name any child.
5The CFSRB dismissed three of the Applications, one was resolved in mediation and the file closed following a non-compliance hearing, one is proceeding as a hearing in writing, and one is subject to the outcome of this Decision. The current Applications are the second and sixth filed by the Applicant. The history of all six Applications is set out in more detail below.
ANALYSIS
6Rule A8 of the CFSRB Rules of Procedure states:
A8.1 The tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes.
A8.2 Where the tribunal finds that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, the tribunal may find that person to be a vexatious litigant and dismiss the proceeding as an abuse of process for that reason. It may also require a person found to be a vexatious litigant to obtain permission from the tribunal to commence further proceedings or take further steps in a proceeding.
7The CFSRB has previously made vexatious litigant declarations including in the following cases: DD v. Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, 2018 CFSRB 56, DP v. Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton, 2017 CFSRB 30, DDS v. Children’s Aid Society for the Districts of Nipissing and Parry Sound, 2016 CFSRB 17 and BS v. Brant Family and Children’s Services, 2019 CFSRB 38.
Applicant’s Litigation History
8In determining whether the Applicant ought to be declared a vexatious litigant, it is necessary to consider the Applicant’s litigation history at the CFSRB, and then apply the factors relevant to determining whether an individual is a vexatious litigant.
The First Application
9In his first Application, the Applicant alleged that:
a. He was not heard or provided with reasons for the Respondent not opening a case into a report it received in December 2023 and did not acknowledge the report until January 2024; and,
b. He was not provided with reasons for the Respondent advising the police in January 2024 that there were no concerns or an open file regarding RG or her biological father and his partner.
10The parties reached a final settlement of the issues in the Application during a mediation conducted by the CFSRB on November 26, 2024. The Applicant subsequently alleged non-compliance by the Respondent with several terms of the Settlement Agreement. The file was closed following a determination made by the CFSRB on March 6, 2025 that the Respondent had complied with the Settlement Agreement.
The Second Application
11The Applicant’s second Application was filed with the CFSRB on February 28, 2025. The Applicant alleged that he was not heard or provided with reasons for the Respondent not investigating the teacher who was supervising the schoolyard and who he alleged did not act when the Applicant’s son was allegedly physically and sexually assaulted by two other youth in February 2025. The Applicant’s allegations raised specific issues pertaining to the decisions made by the Respondent for which he says he was not provided with reasons.
12The parties attended a Pre-Hearing/Mediation on April 1, 2025. They agreed to mediation but were not successful in resolving the issues in this Application.
13This Application is proceeding by way of a hearing in writing.
The Third Application
14The Applicant filed his third Application with the CFSRB on March 6, 2025. The principle issue raised in this Application was the Respondent declining the Applicant’s request for an Internal Complaint Review Panel Meeting (“ICRP”). In his Application, the Applicant clearly stated that his ICRP request pertained to the same complaint forming the basis of his first Application.
15The CFSRB dismissed the Application based on its review of the Application, Respondent’s Response, correspondence between the parties, and a Pre-Hearing Report in relation to the first Application. It held that the Respondent did not proceed with the complaint as it had already been determined by the CFSRB making it inappropriate to hear the same complaint by way of an ICRP.
The Fourth Application
16The Applicant filed his fourth Application with the CFSRB on March 7, 2025.
17The allegations by the Applicant in this Application were that the Respondent had not provided him with full disclosure of his record, including two specified complaints.
18On March 13, 2025, the CFSRB released a Decision finding the Application not eligible for review as, among other things, the CFSRB does not have jurisdiction related to the collection, use and disclosure of personal information.
19The Application was dismissed.
The Fifth Application
20The Applicant filed his fifth Application with the CFSRB on or about April 1, 2025.
21The issues raised by the Applicant in this Application were that the Respondent was refusing to provide him with its complete record, and they had refused his March 14, 2025 request for an ICRP related to the denial of the disclosure he had requested.
22On April 5, 2025, the CFSRB issued a Decision dismissing the Application on the basis that the CFSRB did not have jurisdiction over issues related to the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. In its Reasons, the Adjudicator noted that the CFSRB had dismissed the Applicant’s fourth Application on March 12, 2025 for the same reason as the dismissal of this fifth Application.
23The April 5, 2025 Decision stated that this was the Applicant’s fifth Application within a short period and raised the potential for the application of Rule A(8) of the CFSRB Rules of Procedure should the Applicant continue to file Applications that are not within the jurisdiction of the CFSRB to review.
The Sixth Application
24On April 9, 2025, the Applicant filed his sixth Application with the CFSRB. The filing came four days after the April 5, 2025, Decision of the CFSRB with respect to the fifth Application.
25The allegations in this Application related to concerns impacting BR. The Applicant alleges that he was not heard by the Respondent or provided with reasons for decisions it made in relation to his reported concerns about conduct that the Applicant alleges has placed BR at risk of emotional harm.
26The CFSRB issued a Case Management Direction on April 10, 2025 (“CMD”). The CMD provided timelines for submissions as to whether an order should be made by the CFSRB regarding the applicability of Rule A8 to the current and future applications by the Applicant.
The Factors Relevant to the Determination as to Whether the Applicant is a Vexatious Litigant
27The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the factors the courts have considered in determining whether an individual is a vexatious litigant in Foy v. Foy (No.2), 1979 1631 (ON CA). These factors are summarized in Lang Michener Lash Johnston v. Fabian, 1987 172 (ON HCJ), [1987] O.J. No. 355 (H.C.), at paragraph 19:
(a) The bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;
(b) Where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;
(c) Vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;
(d) It is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;
(e) In determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;
(f) The failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of the unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious; and
(g) The Respondent’s conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.
28It is not necessary for all the factors listed in Lang Michener to be present for an individual to be declared a vexatious litigant. Rather, the CFSRB
must be satisfied on an objective standard that the Applicant has persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted himself [or herself] in a vexatious manner during the proceedings.1 (paragraph 31)
29Declaring an individual to be a vexatious litigant is an extraordinary step and one that should not be taken lightly.2 In Macyshyn v. Cheese Boutique Ltd., 2016 HRTO 341, the Human Rights Tribunal, applying Rule 8.2 held at paragraphs 9-11:
The declaration that a person is a vexatious litigant is a serious matter. The Tribunal does not declare an applicant to be a vexatious litigant in the absence of objective evidence that the person has persistently and without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious proceedings or conducted himself in a vexatious manner during the proceedings. See Hiamey v. Conseil scolaire de district Catholique Centre-Sud, 2012 HRTO 1331 (“Hiamey”), upheld 2015 ONSC 5113 (Div. Ct.).
30The inclusion in an application of allegations that have been previously litigated does not automatically constitute an abuse of process. A contextual analysis is required that takes into account all of the relevant factors and balances the interests of the parties in order to arrive at a just outcome overall.3
31I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s conduct has reached the very high threshold required to support a vexatious litigant declaration.
32There is no evidence before me that the Applicant has conducted himself inappropriately or in a manner intended to delay or frustrate the applications that have been filed from being moved forward expeditiously.
33I find that, at this juncture, no pattern by the Applicant of bringing unmeritorious applications has been established. Reviewing the applications that have been brought, one was resolved in mediation and a second is proceeding to a hearing in writing. The third Application was dismissed, however, it is not particularly surprising in the circumstances that the Applicant, as a self-represented litigant, understood he was entitled to bring an ICRP which was the principle issue raised by that application. The fourth Application was dismissed as it related to disclosure of personal information and the CFSRB does not have jurisdiction over these issues, as detailed above. Again, it is not surprising that the Applicant believed the denial of disclosure by the Respondent was reviewable by the CFSRB.
34I am troubled by the fifth Application brought by the Applicant. The issues raised in that Application related to the Respondent’s alleged denial of his request for an ICRP, the substance of which related to the alleged denial of disclosure requested by the Applicant. At the time this application was brought, the Applicant had the benefit of the CFSRB Decision dated March 13, 2025. The Applicant knew or ought to have known that the CFSRB did not have jurisdiction over the issues he had raised in the fifth Application.
35Had the current Application been about disclosure issues, my inclination would have been to declare it an abuse of process, dismiss it, and preclude the Applicant from bringing any further applications without leave of the CFSRB. The Applicant is reminded that should he bring applications with respect to issues not within the jurisdiction of the CFSRB or applications about issues that have already been decided by the CFSRB, this may result in the CFSRB declaring him to be a vexatious litigant.
36The current Application is not based on issues of disclosure nor do the allegations appear to relate to issues previously decided by the CFSRB. However, the issues raised in the current application require refining and clarification to ensure they are properly framed having regard to the provisions of subsections 120(4)4 and 120(4)5 of the Act.
ORDER
37The Applicant is not declared a vexatious litigant.
38The current Application will be scheduled for a Pre-Hearing at which time the issues for hearing will be more clearly delineated.
CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER
39Pursuant to Rules 9.3 and 9.4 of the CFSRB’s Rules of Procedure, parties and their representatives must not use, share, discuss or disclose any CFSRB documents or decisions, or any other documents or information provided or used in this Application, with anyone including through the media or online. The CFSRB prohibits the use of any of this information for any purpose outside of the CFSRB’s proceedings, except with an order of the Court or the CFSRB, as appropriate.
Dated at Toronto, May 29, 2025.
Donna A. Wowk
Donna A. Wowk Vice-Chair