Celina DeVuono

The applicant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and reported property damage to his insurer on the same day, explicitly denying any injuries.

Over seven months later, he notified the insurer of his intention to claim accident benefits.

The insurer denied the claim for non-compliance with the 7-day notice requirement under s. 32(1) of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the applicant failed to provide a credible or reasonable explanation for the delay, noting he had a prior accident benefits claim and his evidence regarding his lack of knowledge was unpersuasive.

The application was dismissed as the applicant was barred from proceeding under s. 55(1) of the Schedule.

The plaintiffs were successful in defeating the defendants' motion for summary judgment and sought costs of $97,824.74 on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendants argued the amount claimed was disproportionate and excessive, suggesting an award between $10,000 and $15,000.

The court reviewed the time claimed by the plaintiffs' counsel, finding that the hours spent on preparing affidavits, facta, and other materials were unreasonably excessive and not proportional to the complexity of the motion.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court fixed the plaintiffs' costs at $40,949.89 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident, arguing the claim was statute-barred by the two-year limitation period.

The accident occurred in June 2011, and the plaintiff suffered a stroke one month later.

The action was commenced in July 2015.

The plaintiffs argued the limitation period was suspended due to the plaintiff's incapacity to commence a proceeding and that the claim was not discoverable until 2015 when a medical report causally linking the stroke to the accident was explained to her.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding both the plaintiff's capacity to commence a proceeding and the date of discoverability, given conflicting medical evidence about her cognitive impairments.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside orders dismissing several construction lien and related breach of trust actions for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the Reid factors governing relief from dismissal orders under Rule 37.14 and considered whether the delay was adequately explained, whether the missed deadlines were inadvertent, whether the motion was brought promptly, and whether reinstatement would prejudice the defendants.

The court found the litigation delay was extreme and largely attributable to repeated failures by the plaintiff’s former counsel to comply with court‑ordered timelines, coupled with insufficient oversight by the plaintiff.

Although the motion to set aside was brought promptly once the dismissal became known, the delay was not inadvertent and reinstatement would cause real prejudice given the nature of lien and trust claims.

Applying a contextual approach, the court concluded the balance favoured finality and refused to set aside the dismissal orders.

This costs decision addressed whether counsel for the plaintiff should be personally liable under rule 57.07(1) for costs thrown away arising from unnecessary attendance on a prior return of a transfer motion.

Applying the two-step framework governing personal costs against lawyers, the court held that counsel's conduct had caused unnecessary costs, but declined to impose personal liability because solicitor-client privilege and the possibility that counsel acted on client instructions made such an order unwarranted.

The previously ordered $550 was directed to be paid by the plaintiff within 30 days.

The plaintiff's collateral requests attacking the earlier endorsement and seeking assessment of prior costs were rejected, and the defendants' request for an additional $250 was also denied.

A contractor sought to enforce lien and related claims against a land vendor after a hotel purchaser defaulted on payment for servicing work on the parcel to be sold.

The court held the vendor was not an owner within sections 1.1 or 18 of the Construction Lien Act for the impugned work, finding no request, privity, consent, or joint/common ownership status that would ground liability.

Claims in unjust enrichment and quantum meruit were rejected because the deprivation flowed from the purchaser’s contractual breach and no corresponding enrichment by the vendor was established.

The court found the contractor’s proven damages remained those already reflected in judgments against the purchaser.

The action was dismissed with costs, but the contractor was found entitled to a lien against the purchaser’s $25,000 deposit held by the vendor.