Caroline Ursulak

The appellants, who are self-represented lawyers, appealed a Master's order dismissing their motion to set aside a Registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the appellants failed to meet any branch of the test to set aside the dismissal.

The court noted the appellants' near total abdication of their responsibility to move the case forward for many years, their failure to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, and their failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

A case management endorsement setting out the procedural and technological directions for an upcoming virtual appeal hearing before the Divisional Court.

The court provided instructions on the use of Zoom, electronic document filing via a drop box, hyperlinking in factums, and time allocations for oral argument.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing their action for delay.

The action, commenced in 2013, alleged improper solicitation of clients by former associates.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiffs failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, failed to show the deadline was missed through inadvertence, and did not move promptly to set aside the dismissal.

Furthermore, the court found actual prejudice to the defendants due to the loss of key evidence, specifically a mobile phone containing allegedly incriminating messages.

The motion to set aside the dismissal was dismissed.

An employee sought a judicial interpretation of an employment contract following termination without cause, claiming additional severance based on commissions.

The dispute concerned whether the calculation of average annual commissions for termination pay should account for company losses incurred in the final fiscal quarters before termination.

The court held that the contract referred to "earned commissions" tied to net profits and losses rather than commissions actually paid.

Interpreting the contract in accordance with commercial reasonableness, the court concluded that outstanding company losses must be included when calculating average commissions for termination pay.

The employer had already paid the correct amount and owed no further compensation.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim, which alleged unpaid overtime and defamation.

The court found that the employment-related claims were barred by sections 97(1) and (3) of the Employment Standards Act, as the plaintiff had already pursued and resolved these claims through the Ministry of Labour.

Furthermore, the defamation claim was barred by absolute privilege, as the alleged defamatory statements were made during the course of the quasi-judicial Employment Standards Act proceeding.

The court ruled that both legal claims must fail and awarded costs to the defendants.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21.01 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking determination of questions of law and dismissal of a statement of claim arising from an employment dispute.

The plaintiff had previously pursued overtime and public holiday pay through an Employment Standards Act complaint and received compensation through a Ministry of Labour order.

The court held that s. 97(1) and (3) of the Employment Standards Act barred a civil proceeding relating to the same employment matters.

The court further held that alleged defamatory statements made to an Employment Standards officer during the ESA investigation were protected by absolute privilege because they occurred in a quasi‑judicial proceeding.

The employment and defamation claims were therefore legally unsustainable.

The appellants were employed in the respondent's Information Technology Services Group.

The respondent outsourced this group to CGI, transferring assets and employees.

CGI recognized the employees' seniority for statutory and common law purposes.

The appellants sued the respondent for severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA), arguing the transaction was not a 'sale of a business' under s. 9 because it did not transfer a 'going concern'.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'going concern' test from labour relations law does not apply to the ESA, which requires a broad interpretation to protect individual employment rights.