Cameron Wetmore

Aragon brought an application for a declaration that Piller and its tenants were obstructing Aragon's right of way over an L-shaped parcel of land.

Piller brought a cross-application claiming it had acquired possessory title to the L-shaped land and a portion of Aragon's land through adverse possession by its tenants, and that Aragon had abandoned its right of way.

The court found that Piller's tenants, as trespassers, did not meet the high threshold for adverse possession, particularly the inconsistent use requirement, as their use was not inconsistent with the servient owner's intended use.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence that Aragon or its predecessors intended to abandon the expressly granted right of way.

Aragon's application was granted, and Piller's cross-application was dismissed.

Piller was ordered to remove the obstructions.

The applicant Fund sought the return of $1,461,220 that its Former Manager unilaterally paid itself upon resigning.

The Former Manager claimed the funds were owed as Incentive Participation Amounts (IPA) compensation under the Management Agreement.

The court found that the IPA compensation was contractually required to be paid as dividends.

Because the Fund no longer qualified as an open-end mutual fund, it was subject to the solvency test under s. 42 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, which it could not meet.

Therefore, the Fund was prohibited from declaring dividends, making the Former Manager's self-payment unauthorized.

The court ordered the Former Manager to repay the funds but declined to award punitive damages, noting the Former Manager did not conceal its actions.

The trustee of a deceased lawyer’s estate brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a third party negligence claim arising from mortgage transactions handled by the deceased solicitor.

The estate argued the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act, which governs tort claims by or against estates.

The responding party argued that the limitation period should be tolled due to fraudulent concealment or, alternatively, special circumstances.

The court held that while a solicitor‑client relationship constituted a special relationship, the evidence demonstrated negligence rather than unconscionable conduct required to establish fraudulent concealment.

The doctrine of special circumstances could not be used to commence a new claim after expiry of the limitation period, and the third party claim against the estate was dismissed.

The moving parties sought costs on a full indemnity basis following a motion involving a certificate of pending litigation, arguing that the opposing party engaged in material non‑disclosure on an ex parte motion and breached the deemed undertaking rule.

The responding party argued that any non‑disclosure was inadvertent and that the alleged breaches were not sufficiently serious to justify substantial or full indemnity costs.

The court reiterated that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for rare and exceptional cases involving reprehensible conduct.

Finding that the conduct did not meet that threshold, the court declined to award full indemnity costs.

Instead, the moving parties were awarded partial indemnity costs in the amount reflected in their bill of costs.