Employment and Labour Law

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer the human rights application because the applicant had filed a concurrent Employment Standards complaint with the Ministry of Labour.

The applicant opposed deferral, arguing the ESA complaint dealt with wage issues and working conditions, while the human rights application alleged discrimination and harassment.

The Tribunal found that the issues were separate with little potential for conflicting findings of fact or law, and directed that the application continue in the Tribunal's process.

The applicant, a cook, alleged he experienced discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, and place of origin, claiming he was denied promotions, subjected to racist comments, and discriminatorily terminated following a verbal altercation with a manager.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

The Tribunal preferred the respondent's evidence, concluding the applicant never applied for a promotion and was terminated for insubordination rather than discriminatory reasons.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability.

The respondents filed a Request for Order During Proceedings seeking access to the applicant's Occupational Health and Safety File before filing their Response.

The Tribunal found that the respondents required access to the applicant's health information to meaningfully respond to the allegations.

The Tribunal ordered that the respondents be permitted to access and use the health information and extended the deadline for filing their Response.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and sexual harassment in employment by the respondent municipality and several individual respondents.

The respondents requested a summary hearing to dismiss the application on the basis of delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the serious allegations of sexual harassment from 2010 did not form a series of incidents with later allegations of workplace differences, and were therefore out of time.

The Tribunal also found no good faith explanation for the delay.

Most of the remaining allegations were dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success, as the applicant failed to establish a link between the workplace conflicts and her gender.

However, a few specific allegations against two individual respondents were allowed to proceed, and those individuals remained as parties.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination because of disability, following a workplace injury and subsequent termination.

The respondent requested that the application be deferred pending the outcome of a related grievance process.

The Tribunal found that the grievances related to the same circumstances and alleged a failure to accommodate.

As the arbitrator was empowered to deal with the human rights allegations and the arbitration was scheduled to commence shortly, the Tribunal deferred consideration of the application pending the conclusion of the grievance process.

The respondent requested to defer the human rights application alleging sex discrimination pending the completion of an internal investigation.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that an internal employer investigation is not an independent decision-making process that could lead to inconsistent findings of fact or law, and therefore does not constitute a proceeding for the purposes of deferral.

The Tribunal also noted the respondent's lack of communication with the applicant regarding the investigation.

The applicant, an early childhood educator, alleged discrimination on the basis of sex (pregnancy) and family status, as well as reprisal, after her employment was terminated by the respondent preschool.

The Tribunal found that the respondents had adequately accommodated the applicant's family status and child care needs.

While the respondents ultimately granted the applicant's request for time off to attend pregnancy-related medical appointments, the Tribunal found that the request was a factor in the respondents' decision to terminate her employment 72 hours later.

The Tribunal concluded that the termination was discriminatory and constituted a reprisal for seeking accommodation under the Human Rights Code.

The applicant was awarded $5,587 for lost wages and $10,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The applicant sought to re-activate a human rights application alleging failure to accommodate a disability, which had been deferred pending a union grievance.

The grievance arbitration had previously dismissed the accommodation claim, finding the employer incapable of accommodating the applicant.

The Tribunal dismissed the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding that the substance of the application was identical to the grievance and had been appropriately dealt with by the arbitrator.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, ethnicity, place of origin, and ethnic origin after he was denied a building operator position.

The respondent brought a request for a summary hearing to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had no reasonable prospect of proving his claims, as he relied solely on his own subjective beliefs and speculation without any objective evidence linking the respondent's actions to a protected ground.

The application was dismissed.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer consideration of the human rights application pending the outcome of the applicant's WSIB appeal.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the WSIB proceeding concerned the cause of the applicant's injury, whereas the human rights application concerned the respondent's duty to accommodate the applicant's disability.

As the duty to accommodate applies regardless of the cause of the disability, the facts and issues did not overlap sufficiently to warrant deferral.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, sex, and reprisal.

She claimed she was sexually harassed by a co-worker years prior, subjected to a toxic work environment, and reprised against when the respondent required her to pay rent for her employer-provided apartment while on medical leave.

The Tribunal dismissed the sexual harassment allegations for delay, finding no series of incidents and no good faith explanation for the delay.

After hearing the applicant's evidence, the Tribunal dismissed the remaining allegations, finding that the work environment complaints were not linked to any Code grounds and that the reprisal claim had no reasonable prospect of success because the applicant's underlying complaints did not relate to Code rights.

The applicant, who self-identified as Hispanic/Latina, alleged discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin after the respondent employer implemented a rule requiring employees to speak only French in the workplace, including during unpaid breaks.

The respondent operated a care home for elderly francophone nuns.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that language is not a protected ground under the Code, and the applicant failed to establish that the rule was used as a proxy for discrimination based on ethnic origin.

Most of the allegations were dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success, except for the allegation that the applicant was required to leave the premises to make telephone calls to her family, which was allowed to proceed to a full hearing.

The respondents requested an order removing two personal respondents as parties and an order for particulars regarding various allegations in the human rights application.

The applicant consented to the removal of the two personal respondents.

The Tribunal ordered the applicant to provide particulars for several general allegations of discrimination and harassment, finding that the respondents were entitled to further details to fully understand the allegations and prepare their case.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging she was terminated from her employment as a nanny because of her pregnancy.

She had previously filed an Employment Standards claim regarding the same termination, which resulted in an award for lost wages and general damages.

The Tribunal held a preliminary hearing to determine whether the application should be dismissed under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the Employment Standards proceeding appropriately dealt with the substance of the application and that it would not be unfair to dismiss the application.

The application was dismissed to avoid relitigation of essentially the same dispute.

The Member, a teacher, pleaded no contest to allegations of professional misconduct arising from his use of inappropriate language, profanity, and sexually suggestive materials in the classroom, as well as leaving an opened bottle of alcohol in a classroom closet.

The Discipline Committee accepted a joint submission on penalty, ordering a reprimand and the completion of a course on professional boundaries.

The Committee also ordered that the Member's name be published in the College's official publication, rejecting the Member's argument for publication without name, given the nature of the conduct and the Member's intention to return to teaching as an occasional teacher.

The respondent employer brought an application seeking reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that confirmed a Review Officer's order requiring the employer to establish pay equity.

The employer argued the Tribunal erred in law by concluding that a release signed by the applicant upon termination did not preclude her from continuing a pay equity complaint.

The Tribunal dismissed the application for reconsideration, finding that the employer was merely re-arguing positions already considered and rejected, and that the order in question required the employer to meet broader pay equity obligations in the establishment, which could not be compromised by an individual settlement.

The Pay Equity Office referred a matter to the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, alleging that the employer and the union failed to comply with a Review Officer's order to post a pay equity plan and make retroactive adjustments.

The employer and the union did not respond to the referral, and the Tribunal concluded that the order had not been complied with.

However, the Office sought additional remedies, including interest and a declaration of a breach of the Pay Equity Act.

The Tribunal directed the Office to provide written submissions on the Tribunal's jurisdiction to grant these additional remedies under subsection 24(5) of the Act before making a final determination.

The applicant requested an extension of time to serve and file an amended application, citing newly retained counsel and the complexity of the matter.

The respondent agreed to a short extension.

The Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal granted the extension to March 21, 2003, balancing the need for new counsel to familiarize themselves with the file against the need to avoid significant delay.

The union filed an application seeking a declaration that the Crown was the employer of its members working at Family and Children's Services for the purposes of the Pay Equity Act.

The Crown raised a preliminary objection, arguing that subsection 1.1 of the Act prevented the Tribunal from finding the Crown to be the employer.

The Tribunal held that the exception in subsection 1.1(4)(b) applied because the issue of the Crown's status as employer had been raised in a previous application filed before December 18, 1991.

The preliminary objection was dismissed and the union's application was permitted to proceed.

One member dissented.

The Tribunal determined whether the Corporation of the Township of Michipicoten or the Crown in Right of Ontario was the employer of employees at Chadwic Home, a Family Resource Centre, for the purposes of the Pay Equity Act.

While the Crown provided significant funding, the Township exercised comprehensive day-to-day control over operations, hiring, wages, and terms of employment.

The Tribunal concluded that the Township was the employer and upheld the Review Officer's order.