Anne‑Marie Lévesque

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The application was previously deferred pending a disciplinary hearing under the Police Services Act.

After the Ontario Civilian Police Commission allowed the applicant's appeal, the applicant sought to reactivate the application.

The respondent requested continued deferral as it had appealed the OCPC decision to the Divisional Court.

The Tribunal found substantial overlap between the proceedings and ordered the application to remain deferred pending the completion of the Divisional Court appeal.

The applicant requested to re-activate his human rights application, which had been deferred pending a WSIB appeal regarding his workplace injury and accommodation.

The WSIB Appeals Resolution Officer allowed the appeal in part but returned issues of fitness for work and availability of alternate duties to the WSIB operating area for further enquiry.

The Tribunal denied the request to re-activate, finding that proceeding concurrently with the WSIB's ongoing enquiries could lead to conflicting findings and decisions.

The application remains deferred.

The applicant, a medical resident, filed a human rights application against the University of Ottawa and four doctors, alleging discrimination on the basis of race, colour, place of origin, citizenship, and ethnic origin.

The respondents requested the removal of the personal respondents, arguing the University accepted full liability for their actions as its agents.

The Tribunal removed three of the doctors whose involvement was limited to their official capacities and who were not alleged to have engaged in personal discriminatory conduct.

The Tribunal declined to remove the fourth doctor at this stage, as the applicant alleged she made personal discriminatory comments, which could warrant a specific remedy against her if proven.

The applicants sought disclosure of documents relating to the respondent's consideration of an expert report on infertility.

The respondent claimed public interest immunity over the documents, arguing they were generated during an ongoing policy development process.

The Tribunal found that the documents were arguably relevant but concluded it was premature to determine the public interest immunity claim.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to clarify its position on undue hardship and certain factual conclusions before the balancing of public interests could be properly assessed.

The applicant, a physician in a cardiac surgery residency program, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin, and disability.

The respondents requested that the application be deferred pending the outcome of an ongoing academic appeal regarding the applicant's requirement to participate in further remediation.

The Tribunal found that there was significant overlap between the circumstances giving rise to the application and the academic appeal, and that deferral would avoid concurrent proceedings and potential inconsistent findings.

The Tribunal ordered the application deferred until the conclusion of the academic appeal.

The applicant, sentenced under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, sought to remain in a youth facility after turning 20.

The Provincial Director refused the request, and the applicant was transferred to an adult facility.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in the provision of a service.

The respondents requested dismissal on the basis that the Provincial Director's decision was an adjudicative decision, not a service under section 1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that the decision-making process, which included the opportunity to make submissions and an appeal to the Custody Review Board, was adjudicative in nature.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the respondent's refusal to fund in vitro fertilization treatments.

The applicant requested an order to consolidate her application with four already consolidated applications proceeding as a Lead Case.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that adding a fifth case would complicate and lengthen the proceedings, and that the existing Lead Case already covered a range of biomedical conditions causing infertility.

The Tribunal set a schedule for submissions on whether to defer the application pending the outcome of the Lead Case.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of race during an arrest and detention by a police officer.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the application, arguing that applying the provincial Human Rights Code to an arrest under the federal Criminal Code would violate the constitutional division of powers.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that the Code's prohibition on discrimination in services applies to policing and does not impair the core of the federal criminal law power or conflict with the Criminal Code under the doctrines of interjurisdictional immunity or paramountcy.

The respondents brought a Request for Order During Proceeding to dismiss the human rights application for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the applicant's detention and search fell under federal criminal law.

The applicant argued the police actions constituted services under provincial legislation.

The Tribunal deferred the jurisdictional decision and directed that notice be provided to the Ontario Human Rights Commission to allow it the opportunity to intervene on the broader public policy issue.

The appellant paving company constructed an asphalt plant and claimed an accelerated capital cost allowance and investment tax credit, arguing the plant was used primarily for 'manufacturing or processing goods for sale'.

The Minister denied the claims because 75% of the asphalt was used in the appellant's own paving contracts (contracts for work and materials), not sold to third parties.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the term 'sale' in the Income Tax Act imports settled commercial law distinctions, meaning goods supplied through contracts for work and materials do not qualify as goods for sale.