3 total
Two-and-a-half-year penitentiary sentence imposed for sexual interference with a minor.
The offender was convicted after a jury trial of sexual interference involving a person under the age of 16, arising from repeated acts of sexual intercourse during overnight visits at the offender’s home.
The court considered aggravating factors including repeated sexual acts, the vulnerability of the complainant, manipulation, and a breach of trust arising from the offender’s role as a family friend and host while the complainant babysat.
Mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record, strong employment history, family responsibilities, and compliance with bail conditions.
Applying the sentencing principles in ss. 718, 718.1, and 718.2 of the Criminal Code and emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court concluded that a penitentiary term was required within a range of two to five years.
A sentence of two and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed with credit for pre-sentence custody and multiple ancillary orders.
Police statements admitted except irrelevant child-abuse references.
On a blended voir dire in a sexual offence prosecution, the accused sought exclusion of two utterances made at arrest and during transport, and a videotaped police interview, on voluntariness and Charter grounds.
The court applied the confessions rule and held the utterances were spontaneous and voluntary, and the interview statement was also voluntary despite deceptive police comments about consent, which did not rise to community-shocking trickery.
The court found no breach of ss. 10(a), 10(b), or 7 of the Charter, including because the accused was informed of the charges and consulted duty counsel before the interview.
References in the interview to separate child abuse allegations and a Children’s Aid Society investigation were ordered excised as irrelevant.
Application to introduce complainant’s prior sexual allegations under s.276 denied.
The accused brought an application under ss. 276.1 and 276.2 of the Criminal Code seeking permission to cross-examine the complainant about prior sexual assault allegations involving other individuals.
The accused argued the evidence was relevant to demonstrate a pattern of false allegations or a motive to fabricate and was not intended to rely on the prohibited “twin myths.” The court held that the accused failed to provide detailed particulars of the proposed evidence or establish its relevance to an issue at trial.
There was no evidentiary foundation showing the prior allegations were false or recanted, and the proposed evidence would amount to impermissible collateral attacks on credibility.
The court further found that any minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice to the complainant and the administration of justice under s. 276(3).
The application was dismissed.
