Sidney B. Linden

The appellant requested access to his personal health information from the Ministry of Health.

The Ministry agreed to provide access but required the appellant to pick up the records in person with photo identification to protect his privacy.

The appellant refused and insisted the records be sent by ordinary mail.

The Commissioner held that while the Ministry's caution was appropriate given the sensitive nature of health records, the appellant had put himself on public record as consenting to transmission by ordinary mail, thereby assuming the privacy risks.

The Ministry was ordered to mail the records to the appellant.

The appellant submitted 60 separate freedom of information requests to the Ministry of Correctional Services.

The Ministry extended the time to respond to all requests en bloc under section 27 of the Act, citing the large number of records and necessary consultations.

The Commissioner found that the Ministry erred by not considering each request individually to determine if a time extension was justified.

However, because the Ministry acted in good faith and the promised response date was imminent, the Commissioner declined to issue a formal order.

The appellant requested access to records filed with the Minister of Labour under section 86(2) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Ministry denied access, claiming section 86 was an implied confidentiality provision under section 67 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1987.

The Commissioner found that section 86 is not a confidentiality provision because it lacks express language prohibiting disclosure.

The matter was remitted to the head of the institution to make an access decision under the Act.

The appellant, a lawyer representing union trust funds, sought the identity of an individual who had requested access to the funds' financial statements filed with the Ministry of Labour.

The Ministry denied the request, claiming the requester's name was personal information and its disclosure would be an unjustified invasion of privacy.

The Commissioner found that while the name alone is not personal information, in the context of a request it is.

However, the Commissioner concluded that disclosing the name would not constitute an unjustified invasion of privacy under the circumstances and ordered the Ministry to disclose the requester's name.

The appellant appealed a decision by the Management Board of Cabinet denying access to records concerning the extension of government financing to separate schools.

The institution claimed the records were exempt under the Cabinet records exemption in subsection 12(1)(e) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner found that while the specific exemption in 12(1)(e) did not apply because the record had already been presented to Cabinet, the record still qualified as an exempt Cabinet record under the broader introductory wording of subsection 12(1).

The Commissioner also held that the head was not absolutely required to seek Cabinet consent for disclosure under subsection 12(2)(b) and had properly exercised his discretion not to do so.

Finally, the Commissioner determined that no responsive information could be reasonably severed from the record under subsection 10(2).

The decision to deny access was upheld.

The requester appealed the Ministry of the Attorney General's decision to deny access to records concerning whistleblower policies.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner upheld the institution's decision, finding that the records were properly exempted under the Cabinet records and advice or recommendations exemptions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner also held that the head is not absolutely required to seek Cabinet consent for disclosure under subsection 12(2)(b), and that no compelling public interest outweighed the purpose of the exemptions.

The requesters appealed the Ministry of Revenue's decision to deny access to the estimated 1984 market values of properties in Metropolitan Toronto on a property-by-property basis.

The Ministry claimed the records were exempt under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act as personal information and protected by a confidentiality provision in the Assessment Act.

The Commissioner found that while the Assessment Act contained a confidentiality provision, it did not apply to information otherwise publicly accessible on the assessment roll, such as municipal addresses and market values.

Furthermore, the Commissioner determined that the requested information was about properties, not identifiable individuals, and therefore did not constitute personal information.

The Ministry was ordered to disclose the records.

The appellant requested access to documents from the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The Board denied access to two labour relations officer reports, citing subsection 111(6) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner found that subsection 111(6) operates as a confidentiality provision under section 67 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1987, which bars the application of the Act.

The Commissioner concluded that the requested records fell within the scope of the confidentiality provision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision by the Ministry of the Attorney General denying access to the interview rating and data entry test results of the successful candidate in a job competition.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner found that the requested records constituted 'personal information' under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner held that disclosure of the personal evaluations would constitute an unjustified invasion of the successful candidate's personal privacy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant requested access to her probation case file.

The Ministry of Correctional Services withheld a psychological report, casenotes, and a Level of Supervision Inventory Form, stating under subsection 48(4) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act that the appellant must first meet with the Regional Psychologist to have the records explained to her.

The Commissioner ordered the unconditional release of the records, holding that subsection 48(4) requires records to be in a comprehensible form for an average person, but does not permit an institution to assess a specific requester's ability to comprehend or to make access conditional on receiving a professional explanation.

The appellant requested information from the Ministry of Health regarding the operations of the Health Care Accessibility Act, specifically periodic reports showing the number of declarations seeking reimbursement for additional charges by physicians.

The Ministry granted access but severed physicians' names, OHIP registration numbers, and dates they opted in or out, relying on section 67 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1987.

The Commissioner found that section 44 of the Health Insurance Act and section 7 of the Health Care Accessibility Act are confidentiality provisions that bar the application of the Act, and upheld the Ministry's decision.

The appellant requested access to all verbal or written information relating to a job competition and the early termination of her employment contract.

The institution provided existing records but the appellant appealed, arguing that unrecorded oral comments and recommendations from her superiors should also be provided and that the Act requires such conversations to be recorded.

The Commissioner upheld the institution's decision, finding that the institution had made reasonable efforts to locate the requested information and that the right of access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act applies only to existing recorded information, imposing no duty to create new records from oral discussions.

The appellant requested access to 1986-87 investigation reports related to funeral firms from the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations.

The Ministry initially refused to confirm or deny the existence of the records under subsection 14(3) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1987.

During the appeal, the Ministry raised subsection 14(1) of the Business Practices Act as a confidentiality provision.

The Commissioner allowed the new issue to be raised, found that subsection 14(1) of the Business Practices Act is a valid confidentiality provision under section 67 of the Act, and concluded that the requested records, if they exist, would fall within its scope, thereby barring disclosure.

The appellant requested access to her personal file from the Ministry of Community and Social Services, specifically seeking information relating to her late brother's estate and the identity of the third party who provided this information.

The institution denied access to the requested records, citing exemptions under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner upheld the institution's decision, finding that the records contained personal information provided in confidence by a third party, and that disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of the third party's personal privacy under subsection 49(b).

The Commissioner also found that the records could not be reasonably severed under subsection 10(2).

The appellants, correctional officers, requested a complete portfolio showing how their contributions to the Public Service Superannuation Fund were invested.

The Ministry of Correctional Services advised that no such record existed but provided explanatory information obtained from the Ministry of Treasury and Economics.

The appellants appealed.

The Commissioner found that the request did not need to be reformulated and that the institution took all reasonable steps to locate the record, concluding that the requested record does not exist because the funds are deposited into the Consolidated Revenue Fund rather than a portfolio of marketable investments.

The appellant requested access to a job competition file, including the applications and resumes of interviewed candidates.

The Ministry of Skills Development denied access to the applications and resumes, citing the protection of personal privacy.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner upheld the Ministry's decision, finding that the records contained personal information and that their disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The appellant appealed a fee estimate of $147.20 for a freedom of information request to the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

The appellant also requested a fee waiver on the basis of financial hardship.

The Commissioner found that the fee estimate was properly calculated in accordance with subsection 57(1) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner also upheld the decision not to waive the fees, as the appellant provided no evidence to support the claim of financial hardship.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the Ministry of Health's decision to sever the names, OHIP registration numbers, and opt-in/out dates of doctors who extra-billed from records released under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Commissioner found that section 44 of the Health Insurance Act and section 7 of the Health Care Accessibility Act operate as confidentiality provisions under section 67 of the FOIPPA, barring disclosure.

The Commissioner upheld the Ministry's decision to withhold the information but affirmed the Commissioner's authority to review records to ensure confidentiality provisions apply.

The appellant, a media organization, appealed a fee estimate of $1,682 for a freedom of information request to the Ministry of Education.

The appellant argued that the head had discretion to waive the fee, that the fee caused financial hardship, and that charging fees to the media infringed section 2(b) of the Charter.

The Commissioner held that the head has general discretion under section 57(1) of the Act to not charge a fee, and ordered the head to reconsider the fee using this discretion.

The Commissioner also found that the specific fee waiver grounds in section 57(3) are exhaustive and did not apply to the appellant.

The Charter argument was dismissed, as a reasonable fee does not infringe freedom of the press.

Finally, the Commissioner found the fee estimate improperly included decision-making time in its preparation costs.

The appellant appealed a decision by the Ministry of Revenue regarding a freedom of information request.

The appellant sought to view the requested records in Ottawa and requested a fee waiver.

The Ministry refused to send the original records to Ottawa citing security concerns and refused to waive the estimated $18.97 fee for photocopying and shipping.

The Commissioner found that the Ministry failed to demonstrate it was not reasonably practicable to ship the records to Ottawa for viewing, ordering them to do so.

However, the Commissioner upheld the Ministry's decision to charge fees for shipping and any subsequent photocopying, finding insufficient grounds for a fee waiver under the Act.