Stephanie Figliomeni

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that approximately 1.4 miles of coastline (the Disputed Beach) forms part of the Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29 under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The trial judge found that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty and acted dishonourably when a surveyor improperly excluded the beach from the reserve boundaries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of treaty interpretation principles or her assessment of the historical record.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to deny the bona fide purchaser for value defence to private landowners, prioritizing the First Nation's constitutionally protected treaty rights.

A cross-appeal by Canada regarding the allocation of pre-Confederation liability was allowed and referred to the next phase of the trial.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation brought an action seeking a declaration that a 1.4-mile strip of Sauble Beach (the Disputed Beach) is part of their unsurrendered reserve land under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The court found that the Imperial Crown's surveyor, Charles Rankin, improperly marked the northern terminus of the reserve's eastern boundary further south than the Treaty stipulated, depriving the First Nation of the promised coastline.

The court held that the Imperial Crown and the federal Crown breached their sui generis fiduciary duties and acted inconsistently with the honour of the Crown by failing to properly survey, protect, and preserve the reserve.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the First Nation's claim was defeated by Crown patents, the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Limitations Act, laches, dedication, or proprietary estoppel.

The court declared that the Disputed Beach remains unsurrendered reserve land for the sole use and benefit of the First Nation.

The applicants brought a motion to strike portions of the respondents' affidavits filed in a pending application regarding a right of way dispute and defamation claims.

The applicants argued the impugned paragraphs contained irrelevant, prejudicial, and hearsay evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was either withdrawn from objection by the applicants or was admissible as it went to the respondents' state of mind, responded directly to issues raised by the applicants, or provided relevant narrative history rather than being offered for the truth of its contents.