Self-represented

This decision concerns the dangerous offender sentencing of Mr. Francis, who was convicted of criminal harassment and breaches of probation and a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

The court determined that an indeterminate sentence was necessary due to the offender's extensive history of violent and harassing behaviour, particularly against women, his consistent refusal to engage in treatment, and the high risk of recidivism.

The court found no reasonable expectation that a lesser sentence, even with a new LTSO, would adequately protect the public, especially given his immediate re-offending after a previous LTSO.

The judgment emphasizes the severe and life-altering psychological harm inflicted on victims and the offender's profound lack of insight or remorse.

The Respondent brought a long motion seeking compliance with prior parenting orders, expanded parenting time, makeup time, enforcement, therapy provisions, access to information, termination of a restraining order, and possession of a child's passport.

The Applicant opposed the motion and was found to have actively undermined the children's relationship with the Respondent and failed to comply with court orders.

The court granted the Respondent's requests, terminating the restraining orders, ordering compliance, mandating therapeutic reintegration, granting access to information, and imposing fines for non-compliance with parenting time.

The court also declared the older child, Flora, to still be a "child of the marriage" due to her continued dependence and stunted development.

This endorsement concerns costs following an 18-day jury trial where the action was dismissed.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, citing the plaintiff's refusal of multiple settlement offers, 14 years of litigation delay, and egregious conduct, including threats made by his agent.

The self-represented plaintiff argued unfamiliarity with court processes.

The court awarded the defendant $120,927.02 in costs, applying a partial indemnity scale up to January 5, 2024, and a substantial indemnity scale thereafter.

The judge found the plaintiff's conduct, including rationalizing threats, causing excessive and unexplained delays, and failing to prepare for trial despite ample opportunity, warranted the higher scale of costs, emphasizing the need to correct behaviour and discourage ill-founded litigation.

The applicant, Karrilyn Wilcox, sought to appoint an arbitrator based on a 2017 letter of intent with the respondent, Loredana Abittan.

The court stayed Ms. Wilcox's application under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act until she pays an outstanding costs order from November 2020, which arose from a previous arbitration and subsequent court enforcement.

The court rejected her set-off argument, emphasizing the importance of complying with court orders and preventing abuse of process.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Animal Care Review Board decision upholding the warrantless seizure of 41 cats from her apartment.

The applicant failed to attend the Board hearing to present her Charter arguments, and the Board proceeded in her absence, finding the warrantless entry justified under s. 29 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board's refusal to grant a further adjournment was procedurally fair and its conclusion on the warrantless entry was reasonable.

The self-represented appellant filed a motion for leave to appeal three Superior Court orders relating to costs and the discharge of construction liens.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Finding that the appeals lacked merit, the appellant had over $125,000 in unpaid costs orders, and the litigation history demonstrated a clear abuse of process, the court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and barred further motions until all outstanding costs are paid.

The Court of Appeal considered multiple motions brought by the appellant, Eric Collins, including an extension of time to appeal a final parenting decision, a stay of interim child support orders, and a request to combine appeals.

The respondent, Amber Tiveron, opposed these motions and brought her own motion for security for costs.

The court denied Collins' request for an extension of time, citing jurisdictional issues and the best interests of the children.

His motion for a stay of orders was also denied, as the appeal lacked serious merit and any potential harm was reparable.

Tiveron's motion for security for costs was denied because Collins' appeals were either not properly filed or vulnerable to being quashed, and the underlying grounds were not deemed frivolous or vexatious despite past litigation conduct.

All motions were dismissed, and costs were awarded to Tiveron.

This motion concerned the appointment of a litigation guardian for Adam Montgomery Blair, the applicant, who was deemed mentally incapable due to a frontal lobe brain injury, seizures, schizophrenia, and memory deficit.

The court applied Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, to determine if the applicant was a person under disability requiring a litigation guardian.

Based on medical evidence and a capacity assessment, the court concluded that the applicant lacked the capacity to instruct counsel and litigate.

As no other suitable person was willing or able to act, the Public Guardian and Trustee was appointed as the applicant's litigation guardian.

The self-represented tenants brought a motion to extend the time for serving and filing a motion to vary a previous order that lifted a stay of eviction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting the tenants missed the deadline by almost a month without a reasonable explanation.

Furthermore, the court held that the tenants could not seek relief while remaining in breach of ongoing court orders to pay rent and outstanding arrears.

The plaintiff corporation sought leave under Rule 15.01(2) for its officers and directors to represent it in the action, and also sought to amend the statement of claim to properly name the Attorney General of Canada as the defendant.

The court denied leave for the corporation to be represented by non-lawyers, finding the supporting materials inadequate and the proposed representatives not capable of comprehending the legal issues.

The court ordered the statement of claim to be amended to correctly name the Attorney General of Canada as the defendant.

The defendant, Himelfarb Proszanski, brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, Aynoush Biniaz-Sarabi, was self-represented and opposed the motion.

The court found that the statement of claim lacked a basis for liability against the defendant, constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a prior License Appeal Tribunal decision regarding accident benefits, and was virtually identical to another action commenced by the plaintiff the day prior.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action without costs.

The respondent brought a motion to terminate an interim without prejudice spousal support order.

The respondent's income had significantly decreased due to job loss, while the applicant's income had increased and surpassed the respondent's.

The court applied the test for varying a temporary support order and found a strong prima facie case for a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that continuing the order would cause financial hardship and be incongruous and absurd, and therefore terminated the temporary spousal support obligation.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action against the Attorney General of Canada as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sought $100 billion for alleged violations related to various judicial orders, claiming they were fraudulent and negligent.

The court affirmed the doctrine of judicial immunity, stating that judges are exempt from civil liability for acts in their judicial capacity, even if alleged to be in bad faith.

It also held that the Attorney General of Canada is not responsible or vicariously liable for judicial decisions, underscoring the independence of the judiciary.

The claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The respondent brought a motion to terminate an interim without prejudice spousal support order.

The respondent's income had significantly decreased due to job loss, while the applicant's income had increased and surpassed the respondent's.

The court applied the test for varying a temporary support order and found a strong prima facie case for a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that continuing the order would cause financial hardship and be incongruous and absurd, and therefore terminated the temporary spousal support obligation.

The applicant husband commenced a divorce application in Ontario while residing in India.

The respondent wife, who had never lived in Canada, subsequently commenced divorce and support proceedings in India.

The respondent brought a motion to stay or dismiss the Ontario application for lack of jurisdiction.

The court granted the motion, finding that neither party had been habitually resident in Ontario for at least one year prior to the application, as required by the Divorce Act.

The court also held that the respondent could not attorn to a jurisdiction the court did not possess, and that under the Family Law Act, the parties' property rights were governed by the law of India, their last common habitual residence.

The applicant and respondent were unmarried spouses who separated in 2015.

The applicant owned the home they lived in.

Following criminal charges, the applicant was forced to leave the home, and the respondent remained.

The applicant brought an application for a writ of possession and an order that the respondent vacate the property.

The respondent did not participate in the proceedings.

The court found that the respondent had no legal interest in the property and was remaining on the property without lawful justification, constituting trespass.

The court granted the applicant a writ of possession and ordered the respondent to vacate the property.

The defendant insurance company brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim regarding a fire insurance policy cancellation.

The court struck the claims alleging Charter breaches and conspiracy, as the Charter does not apply to private entities and conspiracy requires multiple actors.

The court also dismissed the personal plaintiff's action because he lacked standing to sue on a contract issued solely to the corporate plaintiff.

However, the court allowed the corporate plaintiff's breach of contract claim to proceed.

Motions regarding corporate representation and security for costs were adjourned.

The applicant sought judicial review of fifteen reconsideration decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dismissing his applications alleging discrimination by various individuals and organizations.

The applicant requested an extension of time to file the judicial review, which the Divisional Court granted due to the HRTO's delay and lack of prejudice.

However, the Court dismissed the application on the merits, finding that the HRTO's decisions to deny reconsideration were reasonable and that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the same adjudicator hearing the reconsideration requests.

The plaintiff, New Haven Mortgage Corporation, brought a motion for default judgment or, alternatively, summary judgment, and leave to issue a writ of possession against the defendants due to a mortgage being in default for sixteen months.

Despite a previous court order setting aside an initial default judgment and requiring the defendants to file a statement of defence, the defendants failed to comply or respond to the summary judgment motion.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding the plaintiff entitled to default judgment due to non-compliance, and alternatively, summary judgment as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

A writ of possession for the property was also granted.

The Plaintiff sought an order for Land Genesis Development Corp. to pay $394,212 in partial satisfaction of a prior fraud judgment against the Defendants, including Genesis (LA) Corp. The Defendants, Eduardo and Patricia Garcia, opposed, asserting the funds were beneficially owned by non-resident investors.

Land Genesis did not oppose but required a court order.

The court found the record insufficient and conflicting regarding beneficial ownership claims and the proper filing of evidence.

Consequently, the motion was adjourned to allow all parties to properly file materials and for Land Genesis to respond to new evidence, emphasizing the need for a complete and properly presented record for a determination.