Self-represented

This decision concerns an application for state-funded counsel for a summary conviction appeal.

The applicant, convicted of assault, assault with a weapon, and choking, sought legal assistance after Legal Aid Ontario denied his application.

Applying the two-stage test from *R. v. Abbey*, the court found the applicant met the financial eligibility criterion.

However, the court determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate any arguable grounds of appeal, as his submissions primarily sought to re-litigate factual findings rather than identify legal errors.

Consequently, the application for state-funded counsel was dismissed.

The registrar's office referred two statements of claim to the court under Rule 2.1.01(7) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, following a request from the defendant, as the claims appeared frivolous and vexatious.

The court ordered that notice be given to the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01(3)(1) regarding the potential dismissal of the actions.

Pending the outcome of a written hearing, the plaintiff's actions were stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and no further filings were to be accepted except the plaintiff's written submissions.

The applicants, Inivos Limited and Warrick Fentiman, brought a motion seeking a civil contempt order against the respondent, Richard Marsh, for allegedly breaching a prior Ontario Superior Court order that recognized and enforced English High Court injunctions prohibiting him from publishing defamatory statements.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the November 7 order was not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to require the respondent to take positive steps to remove pre-existing defamatory content from the internet.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent had actual knowledge of the order's full terms until January 1, 2024, and he posted no new violating material after that date.

The court also stated it would have exercised its discretion to decline a contempt finding, as contempt is a remedy of last resort and there had been substantial compliance since the respondent gained full knowledge of the order.

The applicant father brought an ex parte application under section 7 of the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act to obtain information (mother's and child's addresses, mother's employer) from the Minister of Justice Canada to enforce an existing parenting order.

The court found that the father had taken reasonable steps to locate the mother and child and that the application met the criteria under section 9 of the Act, including providing police and vulnerable sector checks and affirming the sole purpose was enforcement.

The court was satisfied the order would not jeopardize the safety or security of the mother or child, despite historical concerns that had been resolved by a subsequent consent order.

The court authorized a court official to make the application to the Minister, ordering that notice be sent to the mother and child as per section 12.1 of the Act, and deferred a decision on further confidentiality restrictions until the information is received.

The applicant, Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), sought to register an Alberta judgment in Ontario without notice to the respondent.

The court found that CMHC failed to establish that the respondent was personally served with the "original action" (the Alberta application for a new judgment) and that the respondent did not appear or defend in that action.

Consequently, under s. 2(2) of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (REJA), CMHC was required to give reasonable notice.

The application was adjourned, and CMHC was ordered to proceed on notice to the respondent, with the court also noting concerns regarding the quality of CMHC's affidavit evidence and the calculation of the judgment amount.

The appellant, Massimo Conti, appealed an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation, which was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the costs for the successful self-represented respondents, John Duca, Joseph Duca, and Daytona Auto Centre Ltd., and the intervenor, Sergio Grillone.

The court considered the principles for awarding costs to self-represented litigants, including claims for lost income and opportunity costs, and the general principle of indemnification.

The court found no evidence to support the respondents' claim for lost commissions or special costs due to the appellant's counsel's conduct.

However, acknowledging the time and annoyance caused by the appeal, the court exercised its discretion to award modest costs to both the respondents and the intervenor.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, specifically Jaskaran Singh Bajwa, based on a guarantee agreement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the responding defendant filed no material to support pleaded defences.

However, the court limited the plaintiff's cost recovery to partial indemnity costs, despite contractual agreements for elevated costs, due to concerns about "forum shopping" and the lack of discernible connection between the underlying dispute and the London/Middlesex County venue.

Linck Child, Youth and Family Supports brought a motion for temporary care and custody of the child Z, seeking placement in society care and supervised access for the mother.

The respondent mother, S.A., opposed the motion, seeking Z's immediate return to her care.

The court granted the mother's request to provide oral evidence due to her self-represented status and past delays.

The court found that Linck failed to discharge its onus to prove a risk of harm to Z in the mother's care, criticizing the society's evidence as speculative, inconsistent, and tailored to justify apprehension.

The court also found Linck's interventions unjustified and overly intrusive, noting a pattern of baseless apprehensions.

The motion for temporary care was dismissed, and Z was ordered to be immediately returned to the mother's care without supervision.

The applicant brought a motion to remove an arbitrator due to undue delay by the arbitrator and the respondent's non-cooperation in the arbitration process.

The respondent failed to appear or file materials for the motion.

The court found that the arbitrator's unexplained delays, combined with the respondent's lack of engagement, caused significant prejudice to the applicant by preventing timely resolution of the matter, which was originally set for trial.

The court granted the motion, removed the arbitrator, terminated the mediation/arbitration agreement, and ordered the parties to return to the trial management process, awarding full indemnity costs to the applicant.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, incest, and sexual assault against his biological daughter and sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and that trial counsel was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the uneven scrutiny argument, affirming the trial judge's credibility findings, and no support for the inadequate counsel claim.

The court also found no error in the sentence, noting its consistency with sentencing principles for sexual violence against children.

However, the court granted a Charter remedy, varying the lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) registration order to 20 years, with the Crown's consent.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant, Trayvon Boreland-Goode, appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and possessing a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The appeal raised two grounds: the trial judge's handling of a juror's note regarding another juror's influence during deliberations, and the reliability of a Crown witness's testimony concerning vehicle ownership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to take the verdict without explicitly responding to the juror's note, as it did not involve a legal misapprehension and the verdict indicated the jury had resolved its internal difficulties.

The court also found the second ground of appeal, regarding the witness's memory of dates, to be without merit, as the crucial evidence of vehicle resale to the appellant was uncontradicted and supported the finding of constructive possession.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action and awarding costs, which was premised on their failure to pay previously ordered costs and to either appoint counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person after their lawyer withdrew.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the undisputed failure of the appellants to pay the prior costs award of $4,095.

No costs were awarded for the appeal itself.

The respondent T.A. brought a motion seeking re-introduction and virtual parenting time with the child K.A., whom he had not had contact with for nearly 10 years and who was unaware he was her biological father.

The child's mother, E.L., opposed the motion, citing K.A.'s lack of awareness of T.A.'s paternity and the serious criminal charges T.A. faced involving K.A.'s older siblings.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test under the Children's Law Reform Act, dismissed T.A.'s motion for immediate re-introductory parenting time.

Instead, the court ordered that K.A. be informed of T.A.'s biological fatherhood by her mental health worker with the mother's support, emphasizing a cautious approach due to the child's age, lack of prior relationship, and the criminal charges.

T.A. was granted leave to bring a new motion for parenting time after a period of counselling for K.A. and an update on her progress.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order compelling the respondents, unit owners, to remove alterations made to common elements without consent, in violation of sections 97 and 98 of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The respondents argued they had obtained consent or were being treated unfairly compared to other owners.

The court found that no valid consent was given for the expansion of their fenced backyard into common elements and rejected the argument of unfair treatment due to lack of evidence.

The application was granted, ordering the respondents to restore the common elements at their own expense.

The applicant, an estate trustee, sought to set aside the respondent's Notice of Objection to the deceased's will and expedite the issuance of a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee.

The respondent, the deceased's brother, had filed an objection asserting the will was "fake" and that he, as "first kin," was entitled to the estate assets, but provided no evidence and did not attend the hearing.

The court, applying Rules 75.03 and 75.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered a hearing to determine the respondent's standing, requiring him to provide an affidavit supporting his assertion by a specific date, with the applicant having an opportunity to respond.

The moving party, a self-represented lawyer, sought to set aside a registrar's order administratively dismissing his family law appeal for delay and requested an extension of time to perfect it.

The moving party had previously been granted an extension but failed to file the required documents, claiming inadvertence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the explanation for delay unsatisfactory given the moving party's history of non-compliance with court orders and the Rules, and concluding that a further extension would prejudice the responding parties.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed her spousal support claim, ordered a trial for child support, and dismissed both parties' property claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding the statutory definitions of "spouse" and "parent" distinct.

However, it allowed the appeal regarding the property claims, concluding that the motion judge erred in dismissing them without sufficient factual findings or legal application.

The issues of child support and property damages were ordered to proceed to trial.

The Applicant sought to relocate with the children from North Bay to Bear Island, Lake Temagami, and to vary an existing interim parenting order.

The Respondent opposed the relocation.

The court dismissed the Applicant's motion, finding that she had not met the test for varying a temporary order for relocation.

The decision emphasized the importance of maintaining the status quo in North Bay, citing the children's need for stability and the substantial reduction in contact with the father that the proposed move would entail.

The court also noted the Applicant's inconsistent positions and unilateral actions throughout the proceedings.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim without leave to amend.

The respondent sought dismissal of the appeal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as frivolous and vexatious, finding that the appeal materials reflected re-litigation, rehashing of complaints, and spurious allegations, lacking any prospect of success, and continuing a pattern of vexatious litigation.

The moving party brought a motion seeking the release of net proceeds from the sale of a property, which were being held in trust.

The responding party opposed, arguing that a joint credit line/mortgage debt and property tax arrears on other properties needed to be paid from the proceeds first.

The court ordered that $70,000 be retained in trust to cover the outstanding credit line/mortgage debt, with the balance released to the moving party.

The court declined to order the payment of the unspecified property tax arrears from these funds.