Self-represented

The applicant father sought a "chasing order" for declaratory relief that the child, F.K., is habitually resident in Brampton, Ontario, and for the child's return from Poland under the Children’s Law Reform Act and the Hague Convention.

The court found that F.K. was wrongfully retained in Poland by the mother and ordered the child's immediate return to Ontario.

The decision reviews the legal principles of habitual residence, wrongful retention, and the best interests of the child, and addresses the credibility of the parties' evidence.

The respondent, Niman Mamo LLP, brought a motion on consent for a sealing order over all materials filed in the court file, citing solicitor-client privilege and ongoing litigation.

The court found that the materials filed did not meet the requirements for a sealing order as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada, most recently in Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25.

The court emphasized the presumption of openness in court proceedings and the need for strong, evidence-based grounds to override this principle.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant and his ex-spouse jointly owned two abutting parcels of land.

They executed a charge on one parcel in favour of the respondent bank, and later transferred the other parcel without a severance.

The respondent successfully applied to have the transfers declared void under the Planning Act.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 44(1) of the Land Titles Act and notations on the register insulated the transactions from the Planning Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'Land Titles Conversion Qualified' notation only guaranteed against Planning Act contraventions up to the date of conversion, and did not oust the operation of the Planning Act for subsequent transactions.

The Ottawa Police Services Board brought an application to have Deirdre Moore declared a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court reviewed Ms. Moore’s extensive litigation history, including multiple meritless and repetitive claims, improper purposes, and abusive conduct both inside and outside the courtroom.

The court found that Ms. Moore’s conduct met the hallmarks of vexatious litigation and granted the application, prohibiting her from instituting or continuing proceedings without leave of the court, except for ongoing divorce proceedings.

The court also fixed costs against Ms. Moore.

The court considered a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous or vexatious.

The registrar was directed to give notice to the plaintiff that the court is considering dismissal, to stay the plaintiff’s actions pending the outcome of the written hearing, and to limit further filings to the plaintiff’s written submissions.

The endorsement sets out procedural steps for both the registrar and the parties.

The court considered a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous and vexatious.

The statement of claim was found to be very poorly pleaded and would require amendment to allow a response.

The court ordered that the plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions as to why the claim should not be dismissed, and stayed the action pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The reasons for judgment in this case are not available at this time.

The reasons for judgment in this case are not available at this time.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal for want of jurisdiction, while the appellant brought a motion to disqualify counsel and compel document production.

The appellant sought to appeal a motion judge's order declining to schedule a motion to stay execution of a judgment from an underlying fee dispute.

The Court of Appeal held that the order declining to schedule the stay motion was interlocutory, meaning jurisdiction for the appeal lies with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed, and the appellant's motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to review a motion judge's decision dismissing his request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal for convictions in 2020 and 2022.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test for an extension of time, noting the lack of evidence of an intention to appeal within the timeline and the lack of an adequate explanation for the delay.

The motion was dismissed.

This decision addresses an appeal by Antonio Dimilta against his conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign under s.136(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appeal challenges the validity of the Certificate of Offence on the basis that the indicated place of offence was incorrect, arguing that the Certificate was not “complete and regular on its face” as required by s.9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act (POA).

The court reviewed the statutory framework and jurisprudence concerning default proceedings and the interpretation of “complete and regular on its face.” It concluded that the alleged error regarding the municipality was not sufficient to mislead or prejudice the defendant, especially given the totality of information before the Justice of the Peace.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision that altered a consent order regarding decision-making responsibility for his daughter.

The trial judge found a material change in circumstances due to ongoing parental conflict and assigned sole decision-making responsibility for schooling, health care, and extracurricular activities to the respondent mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the trial judge relied on improperly admitted documents and concluding that her factual findings were supported by the record and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Motion dismissed.

The applicant, Paul Lafortune, sought declarations and orders to enforce a 2017 agreement with the respondent, Tami Diebel, regarding the division and sale of jointly owned properties following their separation.

The court reviewed the parties' relationship history, the terms of the agreement, and the respondent's arguments against enforcement, including claims of duress and unfairness.

The court found no basis in contract or family law to set aside the agreement and granted the relief sought by the applicant, ordering the respondent to provide vacant possession of the property within 90 days.

The applicant, Ronald Shiomi, sought a declaration that he was a dependant of the deceased, Anna Maria Tocheri, and that she failed to make adequate provision for his support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court found that after a 53-year common law relationship, the deceased’s will, which left the applicant only personal and household effects and the residue to five charities, did not make adequate provision for his support.

The court ordered that 50% of the net estate be paid to the applicant and the remaining 50% be divided among the five named charities.

The court also awarded the applicant $15,000 in costs, plus disbursements and HST, to be paid by the estate.

This decision addresses the awarding of costs following temporary parenting and child support motions involving a 13-year-old child.

The court granted the mother temporary decision-making responsibility for major educational and health issues and ordered the father to pay temporary child support.

The mother made a severable offer to settle that was more favourable to the father than the court's order, triggering costs consequences under subrule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

The court analyzed the reasonableness and proportionality of costs, the parties' conduct, and the father's ability to pay, ultimately ordering the father to pay $5,500 in costs with a payment plan.

This decision addresses the constitutionality and application of ss. 42(5)(a) and 42(2)(p) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) which restrict Deferred Custody and Supervision Orders (DCSO) for young persons convicted of indecent acts causing bodily harm.

The court found these provisions violate sections 15 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and declared them invalid.

The sentencing reflects the offender’s diminished moral blameworthiness as a young person at the time of the offence, despite his current age and serious health issues.

The court imposed a 2-year less a day DCSO, exceeding the statutory 6-month limit, to ensure proportionality and community denunciation.

The decision addresses a motion by Pamela Adderley for standing in an application brought by Bridgepoint Financial Services Limited Partnership I against Rudolf Steinberg.

The application concerns entitlement to settlement funds arising from accident benefits and the priority of claims to those funds.

The court considers whether Adderley should be joined as a party under Rule 5.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure or permitted to participate under section 67 of the Personal Property Security Act.

The court concludes that while Adderley is not a necessary party for joinder, her interests are engaged under the PPSA and she is permitted to participate in the application, subject to limits on her evidence and submissions.

This decision addresses the constitutionality of ss. 42(2)(p) and 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), which restrict the availability and duration of Deferred Custody Supervision Orders (DCSO) for young persons convicted of offences causing or attempting serious bodily harm.

The court found these provisions violate sections 15 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by denying young persons access to a fit and appropriate sentence comparable to adults' Conditional Sentence Orders (CSO).

The court followed the precedent set in R. v. T.M., striking down the impugned provisions and removing the six-month limitation on DCSOs.