Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The court considered a motion by the Defendants for security for costs against the Plaintiff Beijing Hehe Fengye Investment Co. Limited (BHF) in a high-value commercial litigation.

The court reviewed the legal framework under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the justness of ordering security, the merits of the claim, and the financial circumstances of the parties.

The court found that BHF did not have sufficient assets in Ontario, and the claims of BHF and co-plaintiff Rong Kai Hong were not joint such that one could satisfy the other's costs.

The court ordered BHF to post $140,000 as security for costs, balancing the interests of both parties and ensuring access to justice.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion for security for costs against Telecore, a corporate plaintiff, in a procurement action.

The court considered whether the AGC required leave to bring the motion, the sufficiency of Telecore’s assets, and whether Telecore was impecunious.

The court found Telecore to be impecunious but determined that the AGC’s delay in bringing the motion was not justified.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed, and no costs were awarded on the motion.

The court dismissed a defamation action brought by UM Financial Inc., Omar Kalair, and Yusuf Panchbhaya against Ronald Butler and Butler Mortgage Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that a social media post by Mr. Butler defamed them by referencing a halal mortgage organization that "ripped off its clients years ago & embezzled people’s money." The court found that UM Financial lacked standing as an undischarged bankrupt, and that the impugned words did not refer to the plaintiffs specifically.

The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to show substantial merit to their claim, failed to show the defendants had no valid defences, and failed to demonstrate that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries sustained in a 2013 motor vehicle accident.

Following a jury trial where the jury awarded zero damages, the defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that he sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function caused by the 2013 accident.

The plaintiff's medical evidence was flawed because his experts were either unaware of or could not parse out the effects of three subsequent motor vehicle accidents.

The defendant's motion was granted and the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was dismissed.

The appellant, a plaintiff and defendant by counterclaim in a motor vehicle accident action, appealed a Master's order dismissing his motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The appellant argued that because he was counterclaimed against for contribution and indemnity regarding his co-plaintiff daughter's damages, their joint counsel was in a disqualifying conflict.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Master's conclusions that the risk of conflict was remote, that the clients had provided fully informed consent to waive any potential conflict, and that the risk of improper disclosure of confidential information was speculative.

The proposed intervenors sought leave to intervene in an undefended trial concerning the authenticity of a painting purportedly by First Nations artist Norval Morrisseau.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The court granted leave to intervene to two corporate art collectors and an Indigenous artist, finding that the case straddled private and public issues and that the intervenors would provide necessary opposing evidence and represent Indigenous cultural interests in the absence of the defendants.

The motion by a fourth proposed intervenor was deemed moot.

A plumber used an open flame torch to repair a leaking pipe in the basement of a heritage mansion.

Shortly after the repair was completed, a massive fire broke out, destroying the house.

The property owner and the condominium corporation's insurers brought a subrogated negligence claim against the plumbing company.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, as there was no evidence the downward-directed flame ignited combustibles in the adjacent joist space.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of the standard of care because they did not call expert evidence on the standard expected of a reasonably prudent plumber performing soldering work.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment, which was resolved on consent.

The only remaining issue was costs.

The defendants' in-house counsel sought costs against the plaintiff's lawyer personally, alleging he fabricated evidence of a misfiled Notice of Intent to Defend to trap the defendants.

The court found these allegations of professional misconduct to be completely groundless and reprehensible.

As a result, the court dismissed the defendants' costs claim and ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff and its lawyer $30,592 in substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants, a lawyer and his law firm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for solicitor negligence and improper retention of funds.

The plaintiffs sought an adjournment on the day of the hearing, which was denied due to issue estoppel and lack of a change in circumstances.

The court found the plaintiffs' responding evidence, consisting solely of a law clerk's affidavit, to be largely inadmissible.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the lawyer had met the standard of care, followed instructions, and properly accounted for all funds.

This motion concerned the priority of insurance policies following a motor vehicle accident.

The primary issue was whether a State Farm Personal Liability Umbrella Policy (PLUP) was a primary owner's policy or an excess policy, and its response sequence relative to a State Farm Automobile Policy and an Economical Insurance Automobile Policy.

The court determined that the State Farm PLUP was a true excess policy, not a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act, and would respond only after the primary coverages of both the State Farm Automobile Policy and the Economical Insurance Automobile Policy were exhausted.

The Economical Insurance Automobile Policy was found to be a primary, first-loss policy, responding alongside the State Farm Automobile Policy.

The third party moved for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' third party claim against him.

The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a rented boom lift after instructing the third party to remove a pin from the machine.

The third party argued he was merely following the plaintiff's instructions and could not be found negligent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding whether it was reasonable for the third party to follow the instructions without making inquiries or assessing the risk.

The applicant sought an order under Rule 45.02 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure to compel the respondents to pay escrowed funds into court as security for a claim being pursued in the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta.

The underlying dispute involved alleged latent defects in a real estate transaction.

The court questioned its jurisdiction to grant interlocutory relief under Rule 45.02 when no underlying proceeding was before the Ontario court.

The court ultimately dismissed the application, finding that Rule 45.02 does not provide a freestanding cause of action for freezing funds in support of an action in another jurisdiction, and even if it did, judicial comity dictated that the Alberta court should be approached first for such relief.

The moving defendants brought a motion to strike several paragraphs of the statement of claim alleging conspiracy, misrepresentation, injurious falsehood, and interference with economic relations arising from alleged diversion of employees and business from a technology company.

The court held that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action against one defendant spouse because no material facts supporting any claim were pleaded against her, and struck the relevant paragraph and dismissed the action against her with leave to amend.

The court found that allegations supporting fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, injurious falsehood, and civil conspiracy were adequately pleaded when the statement of claim was read as a whole.

However, the pleading failed to properly plead the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

That claim was struck with leave to amend within 30 days.

An electrical subcontractor brought a construction lien action seeking payment for overtime and premium labour charges and other alleged extras arising from work performed during the construction of an automotive assembly plant.

The subcontract was a stipulated price agreement under the CCA1 standard form, requiring written notice of claims for adjustments to the subcontract price.

The court held that labour performed during premium shifts was within the scope of the subcontracted work and did not constitute “extra work.” The subcontractor also failed to comply with the contractual notice provisions, which operated as a condition precedent to recovery.

Most additional claims were dismissed for the same reason, although the defendant’s counterclaim for a back charge was also dismissed because the evidence did not establish that the subcontractor’s scope included the high-voltage work in question.

Following a successful opposition to a motion seeking to stay or dismiss an action for non-payment of prior costs, the plaintiff sought costs of the motion.

The court applied the presumption of partial indemnity costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While accepting the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate, the court reduced the preparation time claimed and fixed the costs at $8,000 plus disbursements and HST.

The court further ordered that the awarded costs could be set off against outstanding costs owed by the plaintiff to the moving party.

Following a construction lien trial in which the plaintiff recovered the balance owing for stone installation and successfully defended a counterclaim alleging deficiencies, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought full or substantial indemnity costs, arguing that the defendants engaged in unreasonable conduct by presenting inflated invoices contradicted by their own witness and by making misleading testimony.

The court held that the conduct was unreasonable but did not rise to the level warranting full or substantial indemnity costs.

Considering the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties’ settlement offers, the complexity of the construction litigation, and proportionality, the court awarded costs slightly above partial indemnity.

Costs were fixed at $50,000 plus HST and $3,000 in disbursements.

Following a successful appeal restoring certain pleadings in a proposed class action against an insurer, the Court reconsidered a prior costs award relating to a pleadings motion.

The original motion had struck numerous paragraphs and several causes of action, but the Court of Appeal later restored portions of the pleading and certain claims.

On reconsideration, the court found that success on the pleadings motion was divided: the defendant had properly challenged non‑compliant pleadings while the plaintiff preserved several causes of action.

Exercising its discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs of the motion at $75,000 and ordered that the costs be in the cause rather than payable immediately.

In a certified securities class action arising from a take‑over bid, the defendant law firm moved for summary judgment dismissing negligence and statutory misrepresentation claims.

The plaintiff alleged that a partner of the firm, who acted as counsel to the bidder and sat on its board, participated in preparing a take‑over circular containing misrepresentations contrary to s. 131 of the Securities Act.

The court held that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the law firm owed a duty of care to shareholders who received and relied on the circular.

The court further held that the question of whether a law partnership could be vicariously liable under the Partnerships Act for a partner’s statutory liability as a corporate director should also proceed to trial.

Summary judgment was refused because the issues were novel and required a full factual record.

Engineering consultants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a third party claim for contribution and indemnity arising from alleged design deficiencies in a warehouse concrete slab.

The moving parties argued that the contractor’s covenant in the main construction contract to obtain wrap‑up liability insurance barred any claim against them and that they could rely on a principled exception to the doctrine of privity to benefit from that covenant.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the alleged losses would have been covered by the contemplated insurance or that the contract intended to extend such benefits to the engineers.

The pleadings disclosed a potential claim for contribution and indemnity relating to defective design and workmanship.

The motion to dismiss the third party claim as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process was therefore dismissed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their Rule 21 motion to strike the action as statute‑barred and an abuse of process.

The dispute arose from a payment allegedly made to facilitate the purchase of a condominium, which the responding party claimed was held in trust to provide lifetime accommodation.

The court found there was good reason to doubt the motion judge’s conclusion that the claim for ongoing support avoided the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also expressed doubt that a claim for parental support under s. 32 of the Family Law Act could succeed where the moving parties had never been supported or cared for by the responding party as children.

Leave to appeal was granted on these issues but refused regarding the costs award.