Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiff's defamation claim was statute barred under section 6 of the Libel and Slander Act (LSA).

The plaintiff published an article alleging the plaintiff hired a hacker to destroy a video of Mayor Rob Ford.

The plaintiff commenced the action more than three months after learning of the publication.

The defendants argued that the preconditions in sections 7 and 8 of the LSA were satisfied, making the three-month limitation period applicable.

The court found that the article was published in Ontario and that the publisher's information was substantially compliant with statutory requirements.

The motion was granted and the claim was dismissed as statute barred.

The court dismissed the main action against Roger Rameshwar Rajkumar, finding no basis to pierce the corporate veil and impose personal liability for environmental damage to property.

The court granted the counterclaim of Rita Josomatee Rajkumar and 1526381 Ontario Inc. against Gloria Rajkumar, Superior Independent Medical Assessment Centre Ltd., and Simac Canada Inc., finding that Rita was constructively dismissed and entitled to 18 months’ notice and damages.

The decision addresses the legal standards for piercing the corporate veil, the distinction between employee and independent contractor, and the requirements for constructive dismissal and reasonable notice.

The court considered whether to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that the delay was due to their former counsel and the conduct of the defendants, and that they always intended to prosecute the action.

The court refrained from deciding the motion, directing that the former counsel be served with the motion materials and given an opportunity to respond, as the allegations against him could affect his interests and the fairness of the process.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defamation action against him.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that partial summary judgment was inappropriate because the issues were intertwined with claims against other defendants and a trial was already scheduled.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that partial summary judgment could lead to inconsistent findings and would not achieve a proportionate, cost-effective, and timely dispute resolution given the upcoming trial.

The plaintiffs sought approval of a US$7 million settlement with the Bosch defendants regarding the installation of 'defeat devices' in certain diesel vehicles, as well as approval of class counsel's legal fees.

The settlement targeted 'leftover damages' for class members who were not made whole under previous settlements with the vehicle manufacturers.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the pragmatic distribution protocol and the low number of objections.

The court also approved class counsel's 25 percent contingency fee, finding it presumptively valid and noting that the distribution mechanism would ensure high take-up by eligible claimants.

The plaintiff, a former Canada Post employee terminated in 1988, brought an action against his former union and its retained lawyer for civil conspiracy and other torts, alleging they deliberately provided inadequate representation during his grievance.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motions, finding that the essential character of the claim was a Duty of Fair Representation complaint within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Canada Industrial Relations Board.

The court also found the claim was statute-barred and, as against the lawyer, an abuse of process attempting to re-litigate previously decided issues.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendants' affidavits and motion record filed in support of a motion to set aside a default judgment.

The plaintiffs argued the affidavits should be struck because the defendants refused to attend in-person cross-examinations, citing COVID-19 health concerns.

The plaintiffs also argued the motion should be struck because it was brought by counsel retained by the former lawyer's insurer.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding the elderly defendants had a legitimate health concern justifying video conference examinations, and that counsel had standing to act on their behalf.

The plaintiff initiated an action for defamation and malicious confinement against his sister, the defendant.

He brought a motion for document production from various police and security organizations.

The defendant, noted in default, sought to set aside the default and file a statement of defense, and also requested the court to consider the action vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

The court struck the plaintiff's statement of claim as frivolous and vexatious, granting leave to amend it within 30 days, failing which the action would be permanently stayed.

The defendant was granted leave to file a statement of defense after the amended claim.

The plaintiff's motion for document production was not entertained until pleadings are closed.

The court declined to apply Rule 2.1.01 at this stage.

No costs were awarded.

Following a successful summary judgment motion in a class action regarding administrative segregation in federal penitentiaries, the representative plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $1,235,590.33.

The defendant argued the costs were excessive and duplicative of work done in a concurrent class action involving mentally ill inmates.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that the work was largely duplicative, noting the cases were distinct and the defendant had tenaciously defended both.

The court made a modest reduction of $113,000 for some overlapping settlement discussions and awarded the plaintiff $1,122,590.33 in costs.

The moving party, an employee of the invoice payor, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the fraud action against him.

The plaintiff factoring company was defrauded of millions of dollars through fictitious invoices.

The moving party claimed his identity was stolen by the fraudsters to confirm the fake invoices and that he was also a victim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that conflicting evidence regarding the moving party's emails, his financial ties to the fraudulent payee, and credibility issues among the co-defendants created genuine issues requiring a trial.

The receiver, Ernst & Young Inc., moved for approval of its activities and its fees and disbursements in the receivership of Hanfeng Evergreen Inc. The former CEO and his spouse opposed the motion, seeking conditions to protect their position in separate litigation and demanding further document disclosure to assess the fees.

The court approved the receiver's activities, noting that such general approval does not constitute fact-finding that would bind the objectors in other litigation.

The court also approved the fees and disbursements, finding them fair and reasonable under the Belyea factors, and rejected the objectors' demands for further docket disclosure as disproportionate and misdirected.

The applicant property owner sought a declaration that a 'right of first refusal to purchase' granted to the respondent upon the sale of the property was void due to frustration.

The applicant argued that the withdrawal of an adjacent landowner from a planned land assembly rendered the development project impossible.

The court determined that the right was an option to purchase creating an interest in land, not a mere right of first refusal.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the withdrawal of the adjacent landowner was a foreseen event provided for in the parties' agreements and did not render the provision of the commercial space impossible.

The court also held that the right did not violate the rule against perpetuities.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant architectural firm for negligent misrepresentation regarding the construction costs of a stacked townhouse project.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 'entire agreement' exclusion clause in their contract precluded the plaintiffs from suing based on pre-contractual representations.

The court found that the exclusion clause applied to the alleged misrepresentations and that it was not unconscionable to enforce it.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike out the defendants' Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, or specific parts thereof, alleging contravention of Rule 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure by pleading evidence (especially technical opinion evidence), improper references to legal counsel, and argument.

The defendants argued their pleading contained material facts relevant to their defence and limitations.

The court found that many paragraphs contained opinion evidence, irrelevant references to legal counsel, or argument, and ordered specific paragraphs and sentences struck out with leave to amend, but declined to strike the entire pleading.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against their properties, which were subject to an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) with the plaintiff.

The dispute centered on conflicting closing date clauses in the APS and a subsequent amendment, leading to a triable issue regarding the agreement's validity.

The court applied the "Dhunna factors" to assess the equities, finding the properties unique and the plaintiff's primary claim for specific performance valid.

The motion to discharge the CPL was dismissed, as the defendants failed to meet the burden of proof.

The plaintiff, Mr. MacIvor, sought long-term disability (LTD) benefits from Manulife under a group insurance policy held by his former employer, Pitney Bowes, after being seriously injured.

Manulife denied liability, arguing that the plaintiff's coverage ceased when he resigned from Pitney Bowes and that his claim was made after the limitation period.

The court found that the plaintiff was not a "Covered Person" under the policy at the time he made his claim, as coverage terminated upon his resignation.

Section 297(1) of the Insurance Act was deemed inapplicable as the policy itself had not terminated.

Consequently, the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction, the defendants sought costs of over $100,000 payable forthwith.

The court noted the general rule that an unsuccessful party on an injunction motion typically pays costs forthwith, but found this to be an exceptional case.

The court found the defendant accountant's evidence regarding his involvement in the allegedly fraudulent transaction to be highly questionable and contrary to normal business practices.

Consequently, the court fixed costs at $85,000 on a partial indemnity basis but ordered them to be in the cause, leaving the ultimate burden of costs to be determined at trial.

The defendants moved to dismiss a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rules 24.01 and 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that none of the criteria under Rule 24.01 were met because the plaintiff had served the claim in time, the defendants had defended the action, and the matter had been set down for trial.

The master also found that he lacked jurisdiction to dismiss the action as an abuse of process outside the rule-based authority relied upon by the defendants.

Even if jurisdiction existed, the court held that the delay was not inordinate or inexcusable given earlier procedural steps and ongoing settlement discussions.

The motion was therefore dismissed and costs awarded to the plaintiff.

A corporation sought leave under Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene in pending motions concerning enforcement and variation of a document production order involving a law firm and a related company.

The proposed intervenor asserted that certain documents in the law firm’s files were subject to solicitor-client privilege under a sole retainer and were outside the scope of the earlier consent production order.

The court held that the proposed intervenor had a direct interest in the subject matter of the dispute because the documents were claimed to be its property and potentially privileged.

Allowing intervention would not cause undue delay or prejudice.

The motion to intervene was granted and the existing sealing order was varied to permit access by the intervenor and its counsel.

An insurer sought a declaration determining which of two insurance policies responded to liability arising from a motor vehicle collision involving a rented vehicle operated by an employee of a production company.

The dispute turned on whether the vehicle had been leased under a single agreement exceeding 30 days, triggering coverage under a commercial general liability policy, or under a series of shorter rental contracts that would leave coverage under a standard automobile policy.

The respondent argued the issue was barred by issue estoppel following earlier proceedings and an appellate decision.

The court held that the prior appellate ruling set aside the earlier decision only because the evidentiary record was insufficient and therefore did not create issue estoppel on the substantive question.

Interpreting the limited documentary record, the court concluded the rental arrangement constituted a single agreement of more than 30 days and that the respondent insurer was required to respond.