Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCC

The accused was charged with major narcotics offences while awaiting trial for another indictable offence.

He was denied bail initially but released on review.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the constitutionality of the bail provisions.

The Court held that the 'public safety' component of s. 515(10)(b) and the reverse onus provisions in ss. 515(6)(a) and (d) are constitutionally valid.

However, the Court struck down the 'public interest' component of s. 515(10)(b) as unconstitutionally vague, violating the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause under s. 11(e) of the Charter.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for conspiracy to export high-technology equipment to the U.S.S.R. and for a scheme to defraud a computer corporation.

The extradition judges committed the respondent, but the British Columbia Court of Appeal granted habeas corpus, holding that the offences must be listed in the extradition treaty according to both Canadian and U.S. law.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the extradition judge's role is limited to determining whether a prima facie case exists that the conduct constitutes an extradition crime according to Canadian law, and does not require proof of foreign law.

The appellant was stopped at a random roadside check stop.

A police officer shone a flashlight into the vehicle and saw an open gym bag.

The officer questioned the appellant about the bag's contents and subsequently searched it, finding narcotics.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was arbitrarily detained at the check stop and that the subsequent questioning and search of the bag, without reasonable and probable grounds, constituted an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court concluded that admitting the conscriptive real evidence would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The United States sought to extradite the appellant for fraud-related charges.

After a warrant of committal was issued, the Minister of Justice signed a warrant of surrender.

The appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Minister violated section 7 of the Charter by relying on a confidential internal memorandum not disclosed to the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus for impending secondary detention like a warrant of surrender.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding no institutional or actual bias in the Minister's decision-making process, and concluding that the internal memorandum was protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal ruling declaring unconstitutional a reverse-onus bail provision applicable to certain narcotics offences.

The Supreme Court held that habeas corpus was available in the narrow circumstances of a constitutional challenge seeking both a declaration under s. 52 and a remedial order under s. 24(1), but reaffirmed that bail review under the Criminal Code is ordinarily the proper route.

On the merits, the majority held that the reverse-onus provision did not infringe ss. 7, 9, 11(d), or 11(e) of the Charter because it operated in a narrow class of offences and was justified by the functioning of the bail system in relation to drug trafficking and flight risk.

The appeal was allowed and the habeas corpus application dismissed, subject only to the contemporaneous modification arising from Morales.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal which had ordered a stay of proceedings due to the omission of a formal accusation on both the first trial and the second trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Brossard J.A. The Court held that the procedural errors were irregularities covered by s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code, and restored the guilty verdict entered by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for conspiracy.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that while the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the evidence of conspiracy was erroneous, it did not cause prejudice to the appellant because the essential evidence was direct and given by a co-conspirator.

The jury was adequately instructed on the weaknesses of that testimony, and the verdict would have been the same regardless of the error.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the Court of Appeal on a charge of arson.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no evidence of a fire retardant.

The Court held that this total lack of evidence made the trial judge's conclusion that the accused had the exclusive opportunity to set the fire unreasonable.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which allowed the Crown's appeal from an acquittal on a charge of first degree murder and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that a new trial should be held, but agreeing with the trial judge that the accused's statement was properly excluded due to a violation of the right to counsel.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that set aside a stay of proceedings and remitted the matter to trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, applying the principles from R. v. Morin.

The Court held that there was no unreasonable delay within the meaning of s. 11(b) of the Charter and ordered that the trial be expedited.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that allowed the Crown's appeal from an order staying proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the complexity of the case was an important factor justifying the delay, and ordered an expedited trial.

The accused was acquitted at trial of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a fatal collision at an intersection.

The trial judge found the accused negligent but lacking the necessary criminal element.

The Crown appealed, and the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider all relevant evidence and the totality of the driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's assessment of the facts and evidence did not constitute an error of law, and the Court of Appeal improperly interfered with factual findings.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a dissenting opinion in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal had set aside the accused's conviction for attempted murder.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, agreeing with the dissenting judge that the majority of the Court of Appeal had merely disagreed with the trial judge on the weight of evidence, which did not constitute an error of law.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the provincial appellate court after a trial judge had convicted the accused of sexual offences against three young girls.

The Supreme Court held that under s. 686(1)(a)(i) an appellate court may re-examine and to some extent reweigh the evidence, including credibility-based findings, but must show substantial deference to the trial judge's assessment.

The Court further held that children's evidence is not inherently unreliable and should not be assessed through rigid adult credibility stereotypes or assumptions about how victims of sexual abuse ought to behave.

The appellate court erred by overstating inconsistencies, discounting supporting evidence, and relying on outdated views about corroboration and complaint.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The appellants, financial planners, recommended investment projects to their clients and received commissions from the promoters without adequately disclosing these commissions to their clients.

They were acquitted at trial of accepting secret commissions under s. 426(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a corrupt bargain is not required for the offence, and that a new trial was necessary to determine whether the disclosure made by the appellants was adequate and timely.

The appellant, a financial investment advisor, sold real estate units to his clients and received undisclosed commissions from the developer.

He was convicted of corruptly accepting a reward under s. 426(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, he argued that the offence required proof of a "corrupt bargain" between the giver and the taker.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the word "corruptly" in the context of secret commissions means secretly or without adequate and timely disclosure, and does not require a corrupt bargain with the giver.

The appellant, a young offender, appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings ordered by the trial judge due to delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the framework from R. v. Morin and considered the societal interest in proceeding expeditiously with charges under the Young Offenders Act.

The Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that there was no unreasonable delay in this case and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the factors from R. v. Morin and agreed with the Court of Appeal that there was no unreasonable delay in bringing the accused to trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings ordered by the trial judge due to delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the principles from R. v. Morin to conclude that the delay in this case was not unreasonable.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had stayed proceedings against several young offenders due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the time required for an application to transfer a young offender to adult court is part of the inherent time requirements of a case under the Young Offenders Act.

Applying the Morin framework, the Court found the delay was not unreasonable and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal to dispose of the remaining issues.