Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCC

The appellant, who had a long history of psychiatric disorders and was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder, challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code provisions governing the disposition of NCR accused.

He argued that section 672.54 of the Criminal Code violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada, relying on its concurrent decision in Winko, held that the provisions do not violate the Charter as they are carefully crafted to protect the liberty of the NCR accused while ensuring public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code regime governing persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, arguing that s. 672.54 violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter by creating an improper burden, vagueness, overbreadth, and discriminatory treatment.

The Court held that Part XX.1 created an individualized assessment-and-treatment regime directed to public safety and fairness, not punishment, and that an NCR accused must receive the least onerous and least restrictive disposition compatible with the statutory objectives.

The majority interpreted s. 672.54 to require an absolute discharge unless the court or Review Board positively finds a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Court further held that the regime did not discriminate against mentally disordered accused, but instead promoted substantive equality through individualized treatment.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant, who had a history of psychiatric illness, was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for breaking and entering.

The Review Board repeatedly granted him conditional discharges, denying an absolute discharge because it could not conclude he was not a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible for various offences and was conditionally discharged by the Review Board.

He challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter, as they are carefully crafted to protect the liberty of the NCR accused while ensuring public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently made three statements to police regarding the incident.

She was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident under the Criminal Code.

The trial judge excluded the statements under s. 24(1) of the Charter, finding they were compelled by the provincial Motor Vehicle Act and their admission would violate the principle against self-incrimination under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that statements made under the statutory compulsion of the Motor Vehicle Act are inadmissible in criminal proceedings against the declarant.

The Court established that a statement is compelled if the driver honestly and reasonably believes they are required by law to report the accident.

The accused was charged with sexual offences and made an initial confession to police that was later ruled inadmissible.

During a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, the accused made a 'protected statement' confirming the earlier confession.

At trial, the accused testified and denied the offences.

The Crown cross-examined him on the protected statement to challenge his credibility under s. 672.21(3)(f) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the protected statement was inadmissible because it was derived from the prior involuntary confession.

The Court concluded that s. 672.21(3)(f) cannot be interpreted to permit the use of an involuntary confession, as doing so would violate section 7 of the Charter.

The accused admitted killing his spouse but argued he acted in an automatistic dissociative state allegedly triggered by insulting words.

The Court clarified a general two-step framework for automatism, requiring the defence to establish a proper evidentiary foundation and then requiring the trial judge to determine whether the condition is mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism by reference to internal cause, continuing danger, and policy factors.

The majority held that the alleged condition was properly treated as a disease of the mind and that only mental disorder automatism should have gone to the jury.

The Court also held that disclosure of the defence psychiatric report caused no miscarriage of justice and that provocation may still mitigate sentence after reducing murder to manslaughter.

Both the conviction appeal and the Crown sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, whose first language was French, was charged with first degree murder.

After his first trial ended in a mistrial and his second trial conviction was overturned, he applied for a third trial before a judge and jury who speak both official languages.

The pre-trial judge dismissed the application under s. 530(4) of the Criminal Code, and the appellant was convicted in English.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that language rights must be interpreted purposively and substantively.

The Court found that the trial judge erred in focusing on the appellant's ability to speak English, as language rights are distinct from trial fairness.

A violation of s. 530 constitutes a substantial wrong, precluding the application of the curative proviso, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had allowed the accused's appeal from her manslaughter conviction and ordered a new trial based on errors in the jury charge regarding self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing substantially with the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, and confirmed the order for a new trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that had overturned the accused's convictions for sexual offences and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal.

The Court found that the trial judge had properly applied the principles from R. v. W. (D.), carefully explaining why she did not believe the accused, why his testimony failed to raise a reasonable doubt, and why she found the complainant credible despite a possible motive to fabricate.

Crown appeal from an acquittal for sexual assault arising from progressively more intimate sexual touching during a purported job interview.

The Court held that consent for the actus reus is the complainant’s subjective state of mind and that there is no defence of implied consent in Canadian law.

The only potentially available mens rea defence was honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, but there was no air of reality to that defence on the accepted facts, particularly in light of repeated verbal refusals.

The appeal was allowed, a conviction entered under s. 686(4), and the matter remanded for sentencing.

The police received a disconnected 911 call from the appellant's apartment.

Upon arrival, the appellant answered the door, stated there was no problem, and attempted to close the door.

The police forced entry to investigate the call and found the appellant's wife crying with a swollen eye, stating the appellant had hit her.

The appellant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer with intent to resist arrest after a struggle ensued.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police have a common law duty to protect life and safety, which justifies a forced entry into a dwelling to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller when the call is disconnected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The United States requested the extradition of the respondent, a Canadian citizen, on charges of attempting to launder money and conspiracy to launder money following a failed FBI sting operation.

The respondent argued his conduct would not constitute an offence in Canada because the money was not actually the proceeds of crime, making the offence impossible.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent's conduct would amount to a criminal attempt and a criminal conspiracy under Canadian law, as factual impossibility is not a defence to these inchoate offences.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal regarding disclosure, finding that the limited disclosure provided was adequate for an extradition hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction on the basis that the trial judge's exhortation to the jury interfered with their deliberations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Manitoba Court of Appeal that the exhortation was improper.

Given the numerous trials and appeals the appellant had been subjected to, the Court entered a stay of proceedings.

The applicant was ordered extradited to the United States and subsequently brought multiple applications for writs of habeas corpus.

His first application was heard on the merits and dismissed, with leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada refused.

He then brought three successive applications, which were also dismissed.

The applicant sought extensions of time to file notices of appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada for the subsequent dismissals.

The Court held that because the first application was heard on the merits, section 784(5) of the Criminal Code applied, meaning the applicant had exhausted his appeals and could not rely on section 784(3) to appeal as of right.

The motions for extension of time were dismissed.

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right after the Court of Appeal set aside a trial judge's order quashing their indictment.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judgment quashing the indictment was not tantamount to an acquittal.

Consequently, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed against sentences involving the imposition of consecutive sentences.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the unusual circumstances of the case distinguished it from previous jurisprudence, and agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal of Alberta.

The accused was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the designation, finding the trial judge failed to consider the gravity of the predicate offences in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 753(b) of the Criminal Code, a trial judge need not focus on the objective seriousness of a predicate offence to justify a dangerous offender designation, provided the offender's past conduct demonstrates a present likelihood of inflicting future harm.

The trial judge's findings were reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant, a member of the regular armed forces, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of trafficking and possession of narcotics under the Narcotic Control Act, pursuant to section 120 of the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the grounds that trial by a military tribunal for ordinary criminal offences deprived him of his right to an independent and impartial tribunal and his right to equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military justice system was established pursuant to a valid federal objective under section 91(7) of the British North America Act and did not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.