Samantha M. Green

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Coco Developments Ltd., against the defendant, Sukhwant Singh Bal, for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding liability or damages.

The defendant failed to close the transaction, and the plaintiff was entitled to damages reflecting the difference between the original and resale prices, as well as carrying costs.

The court also awarded the plaintiff $19,000 in costs, relying on the agreement’s full indemnity provision and the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s legal costs.

The respondents brought a motion to stay the applicant's oppression application, arguing the dispute was subject to arbitration clauses in the parties' unanimous shareholders' agreement and partnership agreement.

The applicant argued the dispute arose solely under a separate control agreement that lacked an arbitration clause.

Applying the competence-competence principle, the court found an arguable case that the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration agreements and granted the stay, referring the matter to an arbitral tribunal to determine its jurisdiction.

The defendants (Trinity) moved for an order requiring the plaintiff (CSMI) to produce documents relating to a real estate development.

CSMI consented to production, but the National Capital Commission (NCC), a non-party, sought enhanced confidentiality protections for the documents.

The court rejected the NCC's proposed two-tier confidentiality order, finding it overbroad and unsupported by evidence demonstrating that the existing implied undertaking, deemed undertaking rule, and confidentiality protocol were insufficient.

The court granted the motion on the terms proposed by Trinity.

The plaintiff requested clarification regarding the scope of an order compelling production of documents.

The court had previously found a joint retainer existed between the plaintiff and the defendant.

The court clarified that as between joint venture parties, communications with the jointly retained lawyer relating to the subject matter of the joint venture are not privileged, even if the communications involved matters where the parties' interests were adverse or concerned withdrawing from the joint venture.

The defendants (Trinity Development Group Inc., Trinity Albert LP, and John Ruddy) brought a motion to compel Capital Sports Management Inc. (CSMI) and Eugene Melnyk to produce documents related to the work of Gowling WLG LLP for RendezVous LeBreton Group (RLG) and the LeBreton Project.

Trinity argued that Gowlings was jointly retained by CSMI and Trinity in relation to the RLG joint venture, or that common interest privilege applied, or that CSMI had waived privilege.

CSMI contended that Gowlings acted solely for CSMI.

The court found that a joint retainer existed between Gowlings, CSMI, and Trinity for the RLG and LeBreton Project from July 23, 2015, to November 23, 2018, based on objective evidence including Gowlings' representation of RLG to third parties, shared instructions, and shared payment of fees.

The court also noted that CSMI's pleading of a fiduciary relationship with Trinity was inconsistent with its claim of privilege.

The motion to compel production was granted, requiring CSMI to produce the requested documents in unredacted form.

The defendants, former solicitors for the plaintiff, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's negligence action on the basis that it was commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff alleged negligence in drafting condominium documents, leading to a substantial reduction in a prior award.

The court found that the plaintiff discovered or ought to have discovered its claim against the defendants no later than July 7, 2017, when a prior court endorsement specifically addressed the inadequacy of disclosure, which was attributable to the defendants' drafting.

As the action was commenced on November 19, 2019, it was barred by the Limitations Act.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

This decision addresses a motion by Brewers Retail Inc. for security for costs against Chill Media Inc., and a cross-motion by Chill Media Inc. for leave to late file expert reports.

The court found that Chill Media Inc. had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs but did not establish impecuniosity in the legal sense.

The court dismissed Chill Media's argument of delay by Brewers Retail Inc. in bringing the motion.

The motion for security for costs was granted, but for a reduced amount of $100,000 (from $352,000), payable within 60 days, without staying the action.

The cross-motion for late filing of expert reports was also granted, allowing Chill Media Inc. to file reports within 20 days, with Brewers Retail Inc. having 60 days for reply reports.

The defendant agreed to purchase a house from the plaintiff for approximately $1.4 million but failed to close the transaction due to stricter mortgage rules and a decline in market value.

The plaintiff terminated the agreement, resold the property for a lower price, and sought summary judgment for the shortfall.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the defendant breached the contract and awarding the plaintiff $135,870.59 in damages.

The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to the significant personal consequences for the defendant.

The applicants, former officers of the respondent corporation, brought applications for advance funding of their legal fees to defend an action alleging complex commercial fraud.

The applications were brought pursuant to the corporation's Unanimous Shareholders Agreement and section 124 of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The court applied the strong prima facie case test to determine if advance funding should be denied due to bad faith.

The court dismissed the application of the former CEO, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud had been established against him in a related Mareva injunction motion.

The court granted the application of the former COO, as the evidence did not establish a strong prima facie case of fraud against him.

The plaintiff, Paradise Homes North West Inc., moved for summary judgment against the defendant, Indervir Singh Sidhu, for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS).

The defendant defaulted on a deposit and failed to close the transaction.

The defendant argued frustration of contract due to market conditions and an assignment fee, and alleged the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.

The court rejected the frustration arguments, finding market fluctuations and financing difficulties were not unforeseen supervening events, and the assignment fee was reasonable.

The court also found the defendant failed to prove the plaintiff did not reasonably mitigate damages.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for damages totaling $82,059.50.

The plaintiff, Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), moved for summary judgment against VDF Wine Importers Inc. (VDF) on a loan agreement and against Natale Santelli on a personal guarantee.

VDF was noted in default.

Santelli opposed, arguing the guarantee was incomprehensible and unconscionable due to his limited education and BDC's failure to ensure independent legal advice (ILA), especially given his mistaken belief of being VDF's owner, director, or officer.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, holding that VDF breached the loan agreement and the guarantee was enforceable.

The court rejected Santelli's unconscionability and non est factum arguments, noting he was a shareholder at the time of the guarantee and his subjective understanding or subsequent discovery of his corporate role did not invalidate the clear terms of the guarantee.

BDC's internal policy on "knowing your client" was not a basis to void the guarantee.

Judgment was granted to BDC for the outstanding loan amount plus interest and costs.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a successful summary judgment motion where the third parties (McMillan LLP, Philip Thompson, and Marssa Giahi) were granted judgment in a solicitors' negligence action brought by the defendants (Crosslink Bridge Corp. and Andrew Penuvchev).

The third parties sought substantial indemnity costs, citing complete success and a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The defendants opposed, raising access to justice concerns and disputing the reasonableness and proportionality of the hours claimed.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 factors and the principle of proportionality, found the time spent by counsel for the third parties to be disproportionate to the result.

Consequently, the court reduced McMillan LLP's requested costs from $209,897.73 to $140,000 and Philip Thompson and Marssa Giahi's requested costs from $256,604.64 to $110,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, deeming these adjusted amounts reasonable in the circumstances.

The third-party solicitors McMillan LLP, Philip Thompson, and Marssa Giahi brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss claims of negligence brought against them by defendants Crosslink Bridge Corp. and Andrew Penuvchev.

The defendants alleged the solicitors failed to warn them of environmental risks associated with purchasing contaminated railway lands.

The court found that the solicitors were not negligent, as their retainers were limited, the clients were sophisticated and had conducted their own due diligence, and the environmental disclosure documents were not provided to the solicitors.

Furthermore, the court found the third-party claims were barred by the expiration of the applicable limitation periods.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the claims against the third parties were dismissed.

An appeal of a wrongful dismissal action where the trial judge found just cause for termination based on three incidents of misconduct by a Senior Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer.

The incidents involved: (1) failure to disclose a land flip transaction where the controlling shareholder's group profited $6.5 million; (2) failure to disclose warrant redemption profits to independent directors; and (3) involvement in a tax scheme to mislead the Canada Revenue Agency.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the McKinley test, misinterpreted Advanced Realty and Hodgkinson, and failed to consider condonation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, confirming that fiduciaries owe a duty to disclose conflicts of interest and misappropriation of corporate opportunities.

Following a trial where the plaintiff's claims for damages were entirely dismissed, the successful defendant sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff argued that each party should bear its own costs.

The court found the defendant's claim for costs to be fair and reasonable, ordering the plaintiff to pay $165,630.83 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff, Willowbrook Nurseries Inc., sued the Royal Bank of Canada for breach of contract and bad faith, alleging the bank failed to provide reasonable notice of changes to its lending arrangements and restricted financing.

Willowbrook claimed an overarching agreement for continued credit, including temporary accommodation requests (TARs), which RBC abruptly ceased.

The court found that the relationship was contractual, not fiduciary, and while RBC's actions might have been financially unwise, they were not in bad faith.

The bank exercised its contractual entitlements and provided reasonable notice for Willowbrook to seek alternative financing.

The plaintiff's claims for specific, goodwill, productivity, general, and punitive damages were dismissed.

The plaintiff commenced an action against her former legal and financial advisors alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with advice provided during negotiation of a marriage contract.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions asserting that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process because the plaintiff had a statutory remedy under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act to set aside the marriage contract against her spouse.

The court held the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability and knew or ought to have known of the material facts giving rise to her claims more than two years before commencing the action.

The court further held that attempting to obtain, through damages against advisors, relief that should have been pursued through family law proceedings constituted an abuse of process.