R. Sinding

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentences for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault with a weapon against his former spouse.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the W. (D.) framework, provided inadequate reasons, and erred in sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal for the assault with a weapon counts and one sexual assault count, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and reasons sufficient.

However, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial for the second sexual assault count, finding the trial judge erred by concluding the appellant offered no evidence on consent when he had explicitly denied forcing himself on the complainant.

The sentence for the remaining sexual assault conviction was reduced from 10 months to 8 months.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) seeking to extend the timeline to set the action down for trial.

The action, involving allegations of historic physical and sexual abuse while in foster care, had been delayed for over five years without examinations for discovery being completed.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay, particularly a 26-month period where the action was held in abeyance while former counsel contemplated a class proceeding.

The motion was dismissed, and the action was dismissed for delay.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, citing institutional and Crown delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was 27.5 months.

The court deducted three months of delay attributable to bringing the application, resulting in a net delay of 24 months.

As the delay fell below the 30-month ceiling established in Jordan, the onus was on the accused to show the delay was unreasonable.

The court found the accused failed to demonstrate that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have, particularly given the transitional tolerance for institutional delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assaulting a peace officer contrary to s. 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged findings that the police officer had been invited into the residence, had no legal obligation to state the purpose of attendance before entry, and was lawfully executing his duties when arresting individuals for trespassing.

The appellant also argued that the Trespass to Property Act did not apply on reserve lands and that the officer’s authority ended once consent to remain was withdrawn.

The court held that the officer had been invited into the home, that no legal requirement existed to disclose the purpose of attendance before entry, and that the Trespass to Property Act applied as provincial legislation of general application.

Finding no palpable and overriding error or legal error, the court dismissed the appeal.