The appellant was charged with summary conviction impaired driving and released on an undertaking not to operate a motor vehicle for 21 months prior to sentencing.
At sentencing, the judge imposed the mandatory one-year driving prohibition under s. 259(1)(a) of the Criminal Code but backdated it to the commencement of the pre-sentence prohibition, effectively giving credit for time already served.
The Court of Appeal held that granting such credit was impermissible as it would reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that common law judicial discretion to grant credit for a pre-sentence driving prohibition — recognized in R. v. Lacasse — is not displaced by s. 259(1)(a) or s. 719(1) of the Criminal Code, as those provisions govern the imposition of a minimum punishment and the commencement of a sentence respectively, and do not preclude a sentencing court from crediting pre-sentence prohibition time served.
